



























































































































Industry both consumes and creates an abundance of dangerous goods, which must
be transported from producers to end-users. This creates opportunities for incidents,
including traffic accidents, which could release poisonous, corrosive, flammable or
carcinogenic substances into the environment. Releases of dangerous goods at a
location may pose a significant threat to the health of the neighbouring population. The
Durban South Basin, with its hazardous mix of heavy industrial, employment and
residential areas, was chosen as the case study for research into the risks associated
with the transportation of dangerous goods. High levels of traffic flow occur in this
region and significant volumes of dangerous goods are transported on the roads within
the basin. The objectives of this investigation were to: develop a methodology that may
be applied to estimate the likelihood and consequences of releases of dangerous
goods due to road accidents; and to evaluate the usefulness of this methodology by
applying it to estimate the risks posed to the people residing in, working in and
travelling through the Durban South Basin.
The literature pertaining to risk assessment of dangerous goods transport was
examined. A review was undertaken of the current state of the art and the theory and
methodology used by previous researchers. As intersections provide greater
opportunities for vehicles to be involved in accidents, traffic surveys were conducted at
selected intersections within the Durban South Basin in order to obtain an indication of
the flow of dangerous goods vehicles and the types of dangerous goods being
transported through these locations. Two approaches were utilised to estimate the
likelihood of dangerous goods accidents and releases at intersections: a deterministic
model and an innovative method based on Monte Carlo simulation. Dispersion
modelling and geographic information systems were integrated to estimate the impacts
of accidental releases of dangerous goods at intersections. Queuing analysis was
combined with dispersion modelling to estimate the risks posed to road users from
dangerous goods releases. The investigation verified that dangerous goods
transportation risk assessment could be performed even when there are substantial
data uncertainties. Furthermore, in comparison to the deterministic approach typically
used in transportation studies, Monte Carlo simulation facilitates a deeper
understanding of the nature and distribution of dangerous goods accident risk. The
results suggest that although dangerous goods accidents and releases are infrequent,
the potential exists for very serious incidents involving large numbers of injuries.
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Along with the advances taking place in our society comes an increasing potential for
danger. Many conveniences taken for granted in modern civilization depend in part on
dangerous goods. Industry both consumes and creates an abundance of dangerous
goods that must be stored, transported and handled. Dangerous goods are
substances, which by virtue of their chemical, physical or toxicological properties, pose
a significant risk to health, safety, property or the environment [Lepofsky, Abkowitz, &
Cheng, 1993]. Dangerous goods include explosives, gases, flammable liquids and
solids, oxidizing substances, poisonous and infectious substances, corrosive
substances and hazardous wastes. As these products are needed for industries and
consumers, the question of banning them is impractical in most cases.
These materials must be transported from producers to end users, which creates
opportunities for incidents that could release dangerous goods into the environment.
An incident is defined as any unintentional release of dangerous goods during the
transport process, including loading and unloading. Vehicular accidents form a subset
of incidents. The public is becoming much more aware of and concerned with the
hazards associated with the transportation of dangerous goods. This increased
awareness has lead to the introduction of regulatory policies and legislation aimed at
reducing the risks of these shipments, e.g. the National Road Traffic Act [1996].
1.2 Motivation for this study
Domestic flows of dangerous goods are significant and growing. Over three hundred
million tonnes of chemicals were transported by road, rail and pipeline in South Africa
in 2002. During this period there were approximately two hundred transportation
incidents involving the unintentional release of chemicals [CAIA, 2003]. At present, the
selection of transport routes for the carriage of dangerous goods by road is solely
based on commercial considerations. The availability of en-route facilities for managing
emergencies is not taken into account. Other factors like avoiding population centres,
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tunnels, etc. when there are alternatives, are generally not considered when selecting a
particular route.
The Durban South Basin contains heavy industry such as the Engen and SAPREF oil
refineries and Island View Storage, the largest chemical storage facility in the southern
hemisphere [CSIR, 1999]. Intertwined with these facilities are the residential areas of
Bluff, Clairwood, Isipingo, Merebank, Umlazi and Wentworth. These heavy industries
generate an important but dangerous flow of goods that results in road tankers carrying
dangerous goods travelling very close to, or through these residential areas. These
high flows of dangerous goods, when combined with South Africa's poor road safety
record, create numerous opportunities for incidents that could release dangerous
goods into the environment. Internationally, traffic accidents are the leading cause of
severe dangerous goods incidents (Le. deaths, injuries, etc) [Harwood & Russell,
1989]. To reduce the chances of a catastrophe occurring as a result of a dangerous
goods release within the facility, Engen, SAPREF and Island View Storage are
equipped with water deluge systems, containment, foam generation systems and fire
proofing, along with scheduled inspection and maintenance. The same high levels of
protection are not found on road tankers that transport dangerous goods.
It is a legal requirement that a risk assessment must be performed for all Major Hazard
Installations, Le. installations, which store or handle dangerous goods in quantities
sufficient to pose a hazard to the public in the event of a catastrophic on-site incident
[Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1993]. Yet, many dangerous goods are
transported on the road network in quantities sufficient to result in significant public
health impacts if released en-route. Hence, there is a need to perform risk
assessments for dangerous goods transport. The Durban South Basin Strategic
Environmental Assessment [CSIR, 1999] has recommended that the future
development of the area should be industrial. There is likely to be further industrial
expansion and increased traffic of goods vehicles within the basin. Hence, an





Taking into consideration the situation outlined in Sections 1.1 and 1.2, the objectives
of this investigation are as follows:
To develop a methodology that may be applied to estimate the likelihood and
consequences of releases of dangerous goods due to road accidents.
To evaluate this methodology by applying it to estimate the risks posed to the people
residing in, working in and travelling through the Durban South Basin.
1.4 Approach
To fulfil the objectives of this investigation, the following approach was adopted:
The literature pertaining to risk assessment of dangerous goods transport was
examined. The current state of the art and the theory and methodology used in
previous risk analyses were identified. Intersections provide greater opportunities for
dangerous goods carrying vehicles to be involved in accidents. Hence, traffic surveys
were conducted at selected intersections within the Durban South Basin in order to
obtain an indication of the flow of dangerous goods vehicles and the types of
dangerous goods being transported through these locations.
Two approaches were developed to estimate the likelihood of dangerous goods
accidents and releases at intersections: a deterministic model and an innovative
method based on Monte Carlo simulation. Toxic materials of interest to this
investigation are those that could give rise to dispersing vapour clouds upon release
into the atmosphere. Dispersion modelling in combination with geographic information
systems was used to estimate the impacts of dangerous goods releases at the
selected intersections. These results were also integrated with queuing analysis to
estimate the risks to road users.
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1.5 Overview of chapters
The structure of this dissertation is as follows:
Chapter 2: summarises the main issues associated with the transportation of
dangerous goods. The concept of risk is defined. Tools and techniques that may be
applied to fulfil the objectives of this investigation are identified. Noteworthy incidents
during the transportation of dangerous goods are reviewed. Local legislation pertaining
to dangerous goods transport is summarised.
Chapter 3: describes the selection of the case study for this investigation. Hazard
identification, the first step in the process of risk analysis, is outlined. The outcomes of
the traffic surveys conducted at selected intersections within the Durban South Basin,
are presented.
Chapter 4: describes the methodology developed to estimate dangerous goods
accident and release rates at intersections.
Chapter 5: describes the methodology utilised to estimate the consequences of
dangerous goods releases at intersections.
Chapter 6: concludes this dissertation, summarising the work that has been carried out




This chapter summarises the main issues associated with the transportation of
dangerous goods. The literature pertaining to risk assessment of dangerous goods
transport is examined. An account is given of the theory and methodology used by
previous researchers as well as of the current state of the art. This review is not meant
to be exhaustive. Further review of the literature and many additional references may
be found in the papers cited in this chapter.
2.1 Critical Issues in the Transport of Dangerous Goods
2.1.1 Overview of dangerous goods transportation risk
Most dangerous goods are not used at their point of production and they may be
transported over considerable distances. What differentiates shipments of dangerous
goods from shipments of other materials, is the risk associated with the accidental
release of these materials during transportation. Dangerous goods are extremely
harmful to human health, since exposure to the toxic chemical constituents may lead to
injury or death. Although accident probabilities are quite low for any given trip, the
sheer amount of dangerous goods shipments means that there will be some accidents
over a sufficiently long period of time [Erkut & Verter, 1998].
While public safety is the primary concern in dangerous goods incidents, environmental
damage may have severe short and long-term effects. Drainage structures are highway
components and releases onto a road surface may be quickly carried away to storm
water or natural drainage channels. This may impair the emergency responders' ability
to mitigate and clean up a release and may be extremely important in areas where
streams, lakes, habitats, wildlife reserves or other ecologically sensitive areas are
adjacent to the roadway. For example, a dangerous goods spill that reaches a river
may harm the birds, fish and other animals that frequent the river and its banks [FHWA,
1994].
Fortunately, it is possible to reduce the risks associated with the transport of dangerous
goods. Proper driver training, enhanced vehicle maintenance, improved tank design
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and careful emergency-response planning all contribute to the reduction of transport-
related risks. This risk is recognized by society and in many countries, strict regulations
govern the movement of dangerous goods. As a result, dangerous goods carriers often
have better accident records than other carriers [Erkut & Verter, 1998]. Nevertheless,
even though they are a rare occurrence, accidents do happen during the transportation
of dangerous goods. In a particularly noteworthy accident in Afghanistan in 1982,2700
fatalities were reported due to a fuel tanker explosion inside a tunnel. The annual
number of fatalities due to regular traffic accidents is much greater than the average
annual number of fatalities due to dangerous goods transportation accidents. However,
dangerous goods transportation accidents receive special attention by the media,
which sensitises the public to the hazard of transporting dangerous goods [Erkut &
Verter, 1998].
2.1.2 Interested and affected parties
There are several different stakeholders that have an interest in the reduction of
dangerous goods transportation risk, both to the population and to the environment.
These include:
• The general public who are exposed to the risks from the shipments, and who are
becoming more concerned with environmental issues;
• Government agencies run by elected and appointed officials who are charged with
the responsibility for public safety;
• Industry, which comprises dangerous goods producers, carriers and consumers.
While the justification for this interest is quite obvious for the public and regUlatory
agencies, there are several motivating factors for industry to take this stance. Firstly,
there is a strong campaign within industry to promote itself as a good corporate citizen,
concerned about its place in the community and the nation. Secondly, industry may
face prosecution, at least in theory, if they are found responsible for any incidents.
Finally, even if legal liability cannot be attributed to a specific company, the public will
consider that company to be at least partially accountable for the consequences of the
incident, thereby tarnishing their public image [Lepofsky, Abkowitz, &Cheng, 1993].
2.1.3 Causes of dangerous goods transport incidents
Human error has been cited as a major cause of dangerous goods transport incidents
[Harwood & Russell, 1989]. Releases from containment may occur during normal
6
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transport (en-route) or as a result of a traffic accident. En-route releases may be
caused by: loose or defective fittings, tanker valve leakages, defects in the tanker
welds or corrosion-induced container failure. Container failure also frequently occurs
during loading and unloading operations [Abkowitz, List & Radwan, 1989]. En-route
incidents, although taking place with some frequency, generally involve a minor loss of
material and a low consequent damage. Although accident-related releases occur with
much lower frequency than en-route releases, they may reflect more catastrophic
failures with more extensive consequent damages [Saccomanno & Shortreed, 1993].
Harwood & Russell [1989] confirmed that traffic accidents are far more likely to result in
severe dangerous goods incidents than other causes. They studied five years of data
(1981-1985) from the U.S. Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA)
Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting system and identified factors that contributed
to dangerous goods incidents. Traffic accidents were found to precipitate approximately
11 per-cent of all on-highway dangerous goods incidents. As driver error is a significant
cause of traffic accidents [Harwood & Russell, 1989], "human error" is essentially
responsible for a large proportion of the dangerous goods incidents presented in Table
2.1. When considering severe incidents only (deaths, injuries, etc.), traffic accidents
were found to be the leading cause.
Table 2.1: Distribution of U.S. on-highway dangerous goods incidents by cause of
release, 1981-1985 [Harwood & Russell, 1989]
Cause of dangerous All reported incidents Severe incidents only
goods release No. % No. %
Traffic accident 1 457 10.8% 355 56.1%
---------------------------- -------------------- ------------------- -----------------.-- -------------------
Human error 6845 50.5% 101 16.0%
---------------------------- ------------.------- -----.------------- -------------------- -------------------
Package failure 4691 34.6% 128 20.2%
---------------------------- .------------------- -------------.----- -------------------- -------------------
Other 550 4.1% 49 7.7%
Total 13543 100% 633 100%
Harwood & Russell [1989] also noted that the predominant dangerous goods released
were flammable and combustible liquids (46 per-cent) and corrosive materials (40 per-
cent). Poisonous gases and liquids constituted 5 per-cent of all on-highway releases.
Flammable and combustible liquids constituted 71 per-cent of releases due to traffic
accidents. Corrosive materials accounted for only 13 per-cent of the releases due to
traffic accidents, but 43 per-cent of the releases due to other causes. Hence, corrosive
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materials, by their very nature are much more likely to produce a valve, fitting or
container failure than other dangerous goods [Harwood & Russell, 1989].
2.2 Challenges of Transporting Dangerous Goods in Urban Areas
There are several issues and problems associated with the movement of dangerous
goods in urban areas.
2.2.1 Road geometrics
The common problems faced by heavy-vehicle drivers may be attributed to the poor
geometrics of intersections and to obstacles along routes [ASCE, 1989]. The
geometrics of many urban intersections are not adequate for accommodating the
turning radius of large heavy vehicles and the off-tracking of their rear wheels. To make
turns at these intersections large heavy vehicles must often cross the centreline and
encroach on the portion of road meant for oncoming traffic; otherwise, the rear wheels
may go over the kerb and cause damage. Telephone and utility poles and even traffic
control signals are often located too close to the kerbside lanes where they can hinder
the free movement of heavy vehicles. The problem of inadequate lateral clearance is
more serious on roads with narrow lane widths and sharp curves, where heavy
vehicles are forced to encroach on the adjacent lane [ASCE, 1989]. The majority of
intersections in urban areas do not require special geometrics for large heavy vehicles
because of the small number of heavy vehicles going through these locations.
However, there are specific locations with high flows of large heavy vehicles in most
urban areas.
2.2.2 Routing and scheduling
Major arterial routes in urban areas carry a large number of dangerous goods vehicles.
In many cases, these routes pass through developed areas with residential
developments located in close proximity. Routing involves the selection of paths
through the transport network connecting the shipment origin and destination. The
criteria for route selection may include avoiding high-accident locations, densely
populated areas or heavily congested links [Abkowitz et al. 1989]. Routing decisions




Pet-Armacost, Sepulveda & Sakude [1999], investigating the risks associated with
transporting the chemical Hydrazine, found that routes that avoided large population
centres actually placed more people at risk due to the longer route length, relatively
higher accident frequencies and larger number of total kilometres travelled through
small cities and towns. All-freeway routes were found to be less hazardous, both in
terms of the number of adverse consequences and the population at risk.
Routing is further complicated by the fact that a route that is safe for the transportation
of one type of dangerous substance may not be safe for the transportation of another
as their hazard manifestations are different. Hazard manifestation refers to the plume
size, shape, direction of movement and impact zone resulting from a dangerous goods
release. Impact zones are areas in which a threshold chemical concentration is
exceeded [Ashtakala & Eno, 1996].
Although certain communities may face high levels of risk from transportation routes
with large dangerous goods flows, equally high levels of preparedness will have the
effect of reducing the adverse consequences of dangerous goods releases and thus,
overall vulnerability [Abkowitz et al. 1989].
Scheduling is also important to the routing problem, as it involves the timing of
dangerous goods shipments. The objective of scheduling is to minimize the level of
exposure caused by a given shipment or a collection of shipments. Potential
scheduling actions include travel restrictions during peak hours or through heavy
employment areas during the daytime and heavy residential areas at night. It may also
be appropriate to avoid periods when schools are either starting or ending [Abkowitz et
al. 1989].
Besides safety, another issue concerning dangerous goods routing is the transportation
cost. Dangerous goods routing models that use only risk related criteria, or only cost
related criteria, often fail to capture the conflict existing between risk and transportation
cost. A route that minimizes risk may not coincide with a route that minimizes the
heavy-vehicle operating cost [Zografos & Davis, 1989]. Thus, a trade-off exists
between risk and carrier cost. Routing decisions are likely to increase the trip length for
the carrier and scheduling restrictions are likely to increase the travel time, both of
which increase the shipment cost. Eventually these cost increases are passed on to




2.3.1 Individual and societal risk
There are two types of risk used in risk assessment: individual risk and societal risk.
Individual risk is defined as the risk of harm to an individual, who is assumed to be in a
particular position for all the time he/she is exposed to the risk. It measures the risk of
harm at a given point. Individual risk is totally dependent upon the source of the risk.
Societal risk shows the relationship between the frequency of an incident and the
number of people harmed. Societal risk considers the distribution of people in the study
area. Hence, societal risk is dependent on the source of the risk and the density and
proximity of the public [Saccomanno &Shortreed, 1993].
2.3.2 Overview of accident, incident and exposure data
A dangerous goods transportation risk assessment requires a complete understanding
of, and a careful distinction between accident, incident and exposure data. Exposure
data in dangerous goods studies provide a measure of the opportunities for accidents
and incidents to occur [Harwood & Russell, 1989]. Figure 2.1 presents a classification












Accidents - Types 1 and 2
Incidents - Types 1 and 3
Figure 2.1: Classification scheme for on-highway events for heavy vehicles carrying
dangerous goods [after Harwood & Russell, 1989]
Figure 2.2 further illustrates the overlapping nature of accidents and incidents. Figure
2.2 shows that exposure measured in total highway trips or total highway vehicle-
kilometres of travel (represented by Block A) may be subdivided into three categories:
dangerous goods shipments (B); other heavy-vehicle shipments that involve similar
vehicles but do not involve dangerous goods (C); and highway travel by vehicle types
other than heavy vehicles (D). Each highway shipment or trip mayor may not involve a
traffic accident. Dangerous goods shipments may also involve an incident (release)
even if no accident occurs [Harwood & Russell, 1989]. Thus, Figure 2.2 illustrates:
some incidents that are not accidents (F), some accidents that are not incidents (L),


















































Figure 2.2: Relationships between accident, incident and exposure data [after Harwood & Russell, 1989]
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2.3.3 The process of risk estimation
Risk estimation is a sequential process. It begins with understanding the level of
exposure (e.g. number of dangerous goods shipments, type of material, trip lengths,
tons carried), the frequency and type of incident occurrence (e.g. traffic accident,
tanker rollover, loose fitting) and the consequence for a given incident (e.g. death,
injury, property damage). The manner in which these factors are defined and measured
depends on the data available, the purpose of the risk assessment and the preference
of the risk analyst. The reliability of any dangerous goods transport safety assessment
is only as good as the quality of the available data. Information is needed on three
aspects of the problem: flows of dangerous goods; incidents and accidents; and the
population at risk. Census data are standard and readily available. Hence, the need for
quality and consistency lies mainly with the first two data categories [Harwood &
Russell, 1989].
A major stumbling block in heavy-vehicle safety research is that exposure data that
correspond well to the available accident data are seldom available. For example,
suppose that accident data were obtained for all highways in a particular province
broken down by highway type, heavy-vehicle type (single-unit heavy vehicles,
articulated heavy vehicles, multiple-articulated heavy vehicles) and cargo area
configuration (f1atbed, tanker, ISO-tainer, etc.). In order to establish accident rates for
these variables, exposure data broken down by the same factors would be needed.
Heavy-vehicle exposure data of this type is unlikely to be available [Harwood &
Russell, 1989].
Data on the movement of dangerous goods by heavy vehicles into and through urban
areas, as well as the number and nature of dangerous goods incidents, is difficult to
obtain. Due to the cost and difficulty of collecting corresponding exposure data, it is
often necessary to make exposure estimates from data sources that are independent
of, and not intended for use with, the available accident and incident data [Harwood &
Russell, 1989]. Hence, many transportation studies have utilised Whatever historical
data is available without concern for the quality of the data, its uncertainties and biases
[Abkowitz et al. 1989].
An intensive risk analysis should consider the activities of non-residential areas, such
as industry, services, commerce, education, health and social activities, sport and
cultural activities and transportation. Importance should be placed on the more
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vulnerable zones in an area in the event of an incident. The more vulnerable zones are
places that concentrate a large number of people who are difficult to protect or
evacuate, e.g. schools, hospitals or commercial centres [Lassarre, Fedra & Weigkricht,
1993].
Expressing risk in terms of a single number may simplify the tasks of estimation and
evaluation, but it does not provide as much information as a risk profile, which is a
probability distribution of incident likelihood and consequence. The shape of the risk
profile helps in distinguishing between the contribution of high probability/Iow
consequence events and the contribution of low probability/high consequence events
to the estimated risk [Abkowitz et al. 1989].
The term Risk has been used repeatedly as a measure of relative safety and is the
basis for transportation hazard analysis. Lepofsky, Abkowitz, & Cheng [1993] defined
risk as a combination of accident likelihood, release probability, consequence of
release and risk preference.
Accident likelihood is a function of the characteristics of the driver, the vehicle, the
transportation network and other external effects. The likelihood of an accident is often
represented as the accident rate for a transportation segment and is defined to be the
number of accidents over some measure of exposure, such as vehicle-kilometres of
travel. Deciding on the appropriate accident rate for use in the analysis, and finding a
means for estimating the level of exposure is crucial. The accident rate cannot be
estimated without somehow estimating how many accidents did not occur. This is
usually done by obtaining estimates on the number of vehicle-kilometres of travel that
occurred on the portion of the transportation network for which the accident statistics
were obtained [Lepofsky et al. 1993].
The probability of a release, given a dangerous goods accident, is associated with the
characteristics of the container in which the material is being transported. There is a
relationship between the cargo type, the container type and the mechanics of the
accident [Lepofsky et al. 1993].
The consequences of an incident are usually measured in terms of the population
exposed, but could be extended to include expected injuries or fatalities, cost of
property damage, or the extent of environmentally sensitive areas that are affected
[Lepofsky et al. 1993].
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Risk preference is used to adjust risk measurement to better reflect the attitudes of a
particular interest group. Risk preference is difficult to quantify as it is based on public
perception. Each interest group has a different perspective on the issues and
consequences of dangerous goods transportation. For example, the general public has
tended to be more concerned about a single accident in which fifty people are killed,
than fifty separate accidents, each of which results in a single fatality. The public's
association of a higher perceived risk with more catastrophic incidents is representative
of risk-averse behaviour. Risk neutral, which is used to represent technical risk, is the
risk estimated without any modifications for risk preference [Lepofsky et al. 1993].
Lepofsky et al. [1993] used the following equation to describe the relationship between
the components of risk:
Risk preference
Risk= ( Accident likelihood) x (Release probability) x (Consequences) (2.1)
The first two terms in Equation (2.1) are used to predict the release-causing accident
rate, which is the likelihood of an accident for a given shipment multiplied by the
likelihood of a release given an accident. A neutral risk preference is represented by an
exponent value of one. Values of risk preference greater than one will cause
consequences to be weighted more heavily and would result in a risk-averse analysis
[Lepofsky et al. 1993].
2.3.4 Effects of risk aversion
In the context of dangerous goods transport, although every incident is likely to receive
media attention, a very large incident, for example, one that requires the evacuation of
one thousand people, may receive disproportionate attention. Such an incident and the
resulting public scrutiny, may result in very significant costs (financial and public image)
to the shipper and carrier, perhaps even in the imposition of new restrictions on
shipments. It may be in the best interests of a carrier to avoid such incidents if at all
possible. An incident affecting one thousand people may well be more than one
hundred times costlier than an incident affecting ten people, in terms of financial cost
and tarnished public image. Consequently, a carrier may prefer a route involving a one-
in-a-thousand chance of an incident that affects ten people, to a one-in-a-hundred-




Perhaps the most obvious example of risk averse behaviour is the attention directed to
airplane crashes. Many more people die in highways accidents than in airplane
accidents. Furthermore, travel by aeroplane is considerably safer than driving for trip
lengths where air travel is a realistic alternative. However, almost every aeroplane
crash makes it to the news media, whereas most highway accidents do not [Erkut &
Ingolfsson, 2000].
2.4 Heavy-vehicle Accident Rate Models
To conduct risk assessments for the road transportation of dangerous goods, estimates
of accident and release rates are essential. Published literature underscores the
importance of these rates in risk assessment, as well as the shortcomings of the
available data. Reliable data on heavy-vehicle accident rates is a key element for use
in establishing the relative probabilities of dangerous goods releases [FHWA, 1989].
2.4.1 Heavy-vehicle accident rate models for route segments
The U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) has published guidelines, which
include a risk assessment model, for identifying preferred routes for the transportation
of dangerous goods [FHWA, 1989]. Harwood, Viner & Russell [1993] pointed out
several weaknesses in the accident probability portion of these USDOT guidelines.
These weaknesses include:
• The guidelines are based on accident predictive models that apply to accident rates
for all vehicle types, rather than to heavy-vehicle accident rates. All-vehicle accident
rates are based primarily on passenger car accidents, even though the highway
transportation of dangerous goods is conducted primarily by heavy vehicles.
• The USDOT guidelines implicitly assume that all accidents have an equal likelihood
of resulting in a dangerous goods release. Research has established that certain
types of accidents are more likely than others to result in a release.
• The guidelines recommend the use of observed accident rates for the specific route
segments under analysis, whenever possible, in preference to default values given
for the route segment type. However, no statistical guidance is given on whether
the observed accident rate is based on a sufficiently large sample to be statistically
reliable; or whether the differences between the observed accident rates and the
default values are statistically significant.
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Harwood et al. [1993], taking into cognisance these weaknesses in the USDOT
guidelines, developed heavy-vehicle accident rates as a function of roadway type and
area type. Harwood et al. [1993] studied databases containing information on highway
geometrics, heavy-vehicle volumes and heavy-vehicle accidents for the entire state
highway system of three U.S. states: California, Illinois, and Michigan. This information
is summarised in Table 2.2. These states were chosen because they had computer
files that were the most complete and easy to integrate. The unit of measurement
commonly used for heavy-vehicle accident rate on links or road segments is accidents
per million vehicle-kilometres. It is evident from Table 2.2 that there are substantial
variations in accident rate among the three states. According to Harwood et al. [1993],
this is the case for most accident studies. Accident rates for seemingly identical
conditions in different U.S. states can differ by a factor as large as three or four. Such
differences may arise due to differences in the accident reporting systems of the
various states or due to a particular highway class in a state having a small sample
size of heavy-vehicle accident involvements or heavy-vehicle travel. In order to
minimise the influence of values based on small sample sizes, the heavy-vehicle
accident rates in Table 2.2 were weighted by vehicle-kilometres of travel to obtain a
weighted average.
The authors concluded that the three-state weighted averages presented in Table 2.2
adequately represent the relative differences in risk between highway classes and are
appropriate for use as default values of heavy-vehicle accident rate when no better
local estimates are available. However, Harwood et al. [1993] strongly encouraged the
development of default values from regional data, wherever possible.
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The heavy-vehicle accident rates for each highway class were estimated by Harwood
et al. [1993] as follows:
A··




TARj = Heavy-vehicle accident rate for highway c1assj
Aij = number of heavy-vehicle accident involvements in one year on route
segment i in highway class j (accidents involving two or more heavy
vehicles are counted as two or more involvements)
VKTij =annual vehicle-kilometres of travel on route segment i in highway class
j (obtained by multiplying the length of segment i by the heavy-vehicle
Annual Average Daily Traffic volume)
2.4.2 Probability of release given an accident
There is a need to consider incident likelihood and severity in safety analyses
[Abkowitz et al. 1989]. An accident involving a dangerous goods carrying heavy vehicle
cannot lead to potentially catastrophic consequences unless the dangerous goods
18
Chapter 2
being transported are released. The probability of a release, given that an accident
involving a dangerous goods carrying heavy vehicle has occurred, varies with the type
of accident. The dangerous goods release probabilities presented in Table 2.3 were
developed by Harwood et al. [1993] using information from the U.S. Federal Highway
Administration heavy-vehicle accident databases.
Table 2.3: Probability of release as function of accident type, given that an accident has











Collision with parked vehicle
Collision with train
Collision with non-motorist
Collision with fixed object
Other collision
Collision with passenger car
Collision with heavy vehicle
Collision with other vehicle













The distribution of accident types varied markedly between highway classes. For
example, the percentage of single vehicle non-collision accidents (which had the
highest probability of producing a dangerous goods release if an accident occurs) was
approximately twice as high on rural highways as on urban highways.
The probability of a release, given an accident involving a dangerous goods carrying











= probability of a dangerous goods release given an accident involving a
dangerous goods carrying heavy vehicle, for highway class j
= probability of a dangerous goods release given an accident involving a
dangerous goods carrying heavy vehicle, for accident type k (from Table
2.3 or equivalent regional data)
= probability that an accident on highway class j will be of accident type
k
Harwood et al. [1993] developed default values for the probability of a dangerous
goods release, given that an accident has occurred on a particular highway class.
Harwood et al. [1993] concluded that the three-state weighted averages presented in
Table 2.4, are appropriate for use as default values when no better local estimates are
available. However, Harwood et al. [1993] strongly encouraged the development of
default values from regional data, wherever possible.
Table 2.4: Probability of a dangerous goods release given an accident, as a function of
highway class, for use as default values [Harwood et ai, 1993]
Area type Roadway type
Rural Two-lane
Probability of dangerous goods
release given an accident
0.086
Rural Multilane undivided 0.081












Urban One-way street 0.056
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Urban Freeway 0.062
2.4.3 Releasing accident rate
Harwood et al. [1993] presented Table 2.5, which gives typical values of Releasing
Accident Rate, Heavy-vehicle Accident Rate and Probability of Release that may be
used as default values.
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= Releasing Accident Rate for highway class j
=average Heavy-vehicle Accident Rate for highway class j
= Probability of a dangerous goods release given an accident involving a
dangerous goods carrying heavy vehicle, for highway class j
Table 2.5: Default heavy-vehicle accident and release rates [Harwood et al. 1993]
Heavy-vehicle Probability of
Releasing accidentArea Roadway type accident rate dangerous goods rate [Releases pertype [Accidents per release given an
million vehicle-km] accident million vehicle-km]

































2.4.4 Statistical guidance on use of local accident rates
Harwood et al. [1993] stated that there is a need for caution in using accident rates
based on small sample sizes of accidents, which are typical of relatively short route
segments. For example, consider three route segments of one kilometre length.
Suppose that in a three-year period, Segment 1 experiences zero heavy-vehicle
accidents, Segment 2 experiences one heavy-vehicle accident and Segment 3
experiences two heavy-vehicle accidents. It would be incorrect to treat Segment 1 as
having zero risk of a dangerous goods release. It would also be incorrect to presume
that, since Segment 3 had twice as many accidents as Segment 2, it also has twice as
much risk [Harwood et al. 1993]. Since accident occurrence is a random variable, site-
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specific accident data cannot be presumed to indicate true differences in risk between
segments unless a statistical test indicates that these differences are significant. The
default heavy-vehicle accident rates from Table 2.5, or preferably, average regional
values should be used to estimate heavy-vehicle accident rates. According to Harwood
et al. [1993], a statistical procedure based on the Chi-squared (1'2) test may be used
to establish whether the actual accident frequency for a particular route segment is
sufficiently larger or smaller than the expected accident frequency to warrant
replacement of the default heavy-vehicle accident rates by site-specific rates based on
accident histories. The test is performed by calculating the value of the Chi-squared
( 1'2 ) statistic:
(2.5)
= Chi-squared statistic
= expected number of heavy-vehicle accidents
=observed number of heavy-vehicle accidents
If1'2 ~ 4, then the expected and observed number of heavy-vehicle accidents do not
differ significantly at the 95 per-cent confidence level. Therefore, the system-wide
default accident rate should be preferred to the site-specific data. If 1'2 > 4, then the
expected and observed numbers of heavy-vehicle accidents differ significantly
[Harwood et al. 1993], Le. at the 95 per-cent confidence level, the observed accident
rate is lower or higher than the system-wide default value. In this case, the system-
wide default accident rate should be replaced by a value based on the site-specific
data. If the site-specific accident rate is greater than the default accident rate, then the
site-specific rate should be used. If the site-specific accident rate is less than 50 per-
cent of the default accident rate, then 50 per-cent of the default accident rate should be
used. The latter restriction is included to keep very low short-term accident experience,
or poor accident reporting levels in a particular area, from disproportionately affecting
the results. Even if a roadway segment has experienced no accidents during the study
period, there is still risk involved in transporting dangerous goods over this segment




2.5 Application of Dispersion Modelling
The dispersion modelling process, a major component of risk analysis, has been
undergoing continuous refinement in recent years. This is evident in the number of
commercially available products that perform some type of dispersion modelling [US-
EPA, 1998].
The dangerous goods of interest to this investigation are those that could give rise to
dispersing vapour clouds upon release into the atmosphere. These could subsequently
cause harm through inhalation or absorption through the skin. When a release of
dangerous goods occurs, a dispersion model may be utilised to estimate the plume
size, shape and direction of movement of dangerous substance resulting from the spill.
By combining information on the spill characteristics, material properties and
meteorological and topographical parameters, the hazard zone affected by a release of
dangerous goods may be estimated using a dispersion model. Hazard zones are areas
in which a threshold chemical concentration is exceeded. The chemical itself governs
many of the health consequences of an incident. By comparing the ambient
temperature and the boiling point of the chemical, the initial state (liquid or gas) in
which a material is released into the atmosphere, may be forecast. The molecular
weight may be used to estimate concentrations under varying release rates. Dose
relationships estimate the severity of the hazard to humans. These are expressed as
concentrations that will result in exposure, injuries and fatalities [CERC, 2001J.
Meteorological conditions interact with material properties to define the characteristics
of the plume. The direction of the wind, if any wind is present, governs the direction in
which the airborne contaminants will move. The wind speed is used to estimate the
plume's downwind distance as a function of time and also affects the extent to which
the plume expands perpendicular to its direction of travel, Le. the plume spread. The
stability of the atmosphere is also a factor in the expansion of the plume. The more
turbulent the air, the more extensive is the area of dispersion [Pasquill & Smith, 1983].
When multiple potential dangerous goods incidents are investigated for planning or risk
assessment purposes, historical distributions of meteorological conditions may be used
to estimate the dispersion effects of each release scenario. Topographical data may
enhance the accuracy of dispersion modelling by providing a more precise
representation of a release scenario [CERC, 2001J.
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The use of dispersion modelling enables a sophisticated risk assessment approach,
leading to estimation of expected injuries or fatalities instead of simple population
exposure. When applied over a range of incident scenarios, risk profiles may be
generated that combine the consequences for various scenarios based on their
likelihood. Risk profiles portray the relationship between incident likelihood and
severity. Intuitively, a given accident will yield a profile in which there are a large
number of possible scenarios that result in low or moderate casualties and a smaller
number of scenarios that will result in a very high number of casualties. The
consequences of a spill may be expressed per shipment of dangerous goods.
Therefore, in order to compare the risk of a given dangerous goods shipment to other
risks, e.g. the risk of being involved in a passenger car accident or being struck by
lightning, the number of shipments per year (or some other appropriate time interval)
should be considered [Lepofsky et al. 1993].
2.6 Application of Geographical Information Systems
2.6.1 The nature of geographic information systems (GIS)
Risk assessment of dangerous goods transportation involves an assessment of the
following [Lassarre, Fedra & Weigkricht, 1993]:
• The potential hazards of the substances involved.
• The packaging aspects.
• The vehicle and route selection in relation to accident probabilities.
• The operational aspects of transportation, such as speed limits, restrictions to
daytime mobilization, or certain weather conditions.
• The environment around the network in terms of general land use, population
density and vulnerable installations such as schools or hospitals.
The analysis of dangerous goods transportation flows, accident scenarios and impacts
are related to the road network, whereas the exposure analysis is related to the
surroundings of the road network. Hence, the simulation of activities related to
transportation requires not only detailed information about the road network, but also
geographical and environmental data. These categories lend themselves to
representation and manipulation by means of geographical information systems
[Lassarre et al. 1993]. Abkowitz, Cheng & Lepofsky [1990a] illustrated the use of
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geographic information systems (GIS). They found that GIS is ideally suited to
dangerous goods routing and risk assessment.
Geographic information systems may be applied to sophisticated transportation
management problems, some of which may require real-time decision-making. Two
applications have been identified: the management of dangerous goods highway
incidents and transportation hazard analysis. Highway incident management includes
emergency response deployment and the rerouting of traffic to bypass the affected
area. Transportation hazard analysis includes the routing of dangerous goods
shipments and emergency preparedness in the case of a dangerous goods release,
and involves comprehensive risk assessment and evacuation planning [Lepofsky et al.
1993].
The nature of GIS itself makes sophisticated transportation management analysis
possible. With GIS, detailed transportation networks that incorporate both physical and
operational characteristics may be developed or obtained. Complicated analyses may
be performed efficiently by combining information describing the transportation
network, specific chemicals, historical meteorological conditions and population
distribution into an integrated environment [Lepofsky et al. 1993].
The use of geographical information systems can thus enhance dispersion modelling
by extending analysis capability. Through integrating plume representation with
population data and maps of the transportation system, the consequences and
population exposure may be estimated more efficiently. Without this integration, plume
coordinates must be transferred to another system or census map and the affected
population must be counted [Lepofsky et al. 1993].
The evacuation planning capability of GIS may be used in real-time to influence area-
wide evacuation strategies in the event of a dangerous goods incident. After first
identifying the area at risk using a dispersion model, and with the transportation
network overlaid, GIS may be used to identify the most efficient method for evacuating
an area. Traffic volumes and densities may be used to estimate existing roadway
utilization and the potential for accommodating additional traffic that must be rerouted
from other roads affected by the incident. This is a dynamic process and the groWing
plume may be used to eliminate roadways from the evacuation network as they




To illustrate the application of a GIS to transportation hazard analysis and managing
dangerous goods shipments, Lepofsky et al. [1993] presented a case study. Lepofsky
et al. [1993] illustrated the application of GIS to vehicle routing on the transportation
system. The transportation of a shipment of rocket fuel between an origin-destination
pair in the state of California, U.S. was used as an example. GIS provides the ability to
select preferred routes between an origin-destination pair based on efficiency, safety or
a combination of the two. Travel time, which takes into account the operational
characteristics of a route, was used as a measure of efficiency instead of travel
distance. For example, a route passing through a densely populated urban area may
be shorter in length than a route using circumferential highways; however, the urban
route might incur travel time penalties due to congestion. Road segments within the
state were selected and the segment distance was divided by the average operating
speed to yield the travel time for the segment. The risk of population exposure within
an eight-kilometre band around each road segment was used as the measure of
safety. Using different combinations of weights on the two criteria resulted in the
identification of distinct route alternatives, Le. weighting the analysis entirely on
minimising travel time produced a very different route than if risk minimisation were the
dominant criterion. Weighting each criterion equally resulted in another alternative.
Table 2.6 presents the impact measures corresponding to routes identified based on
three different weighting alternatives.
Table 2.6: Routing analysis impact measures [Lepofsky et al. 1993]
Path Objective to Distance Travel time Populationminimise (km) exposed
1 100% travel time 625 7 hours, 54 min 3059408
2 50% travel time, 699 8 hours, 10 min 81968750% risk
3 25% travel time, 792 8 hours, 31 min 21496075% risk
A comparison of the resulting routes showed that with only a small increase in travel
time, the number of people exposed could be drastically reduced, e.g. Path 2 reduced
the population exposed by almost 75 per-cent and only resulted in a 3.4 per-cent
increase in travel time over the quickest route. Hence, with a routing analysis, a
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shipment of dangerous goods may be routed so as to reduce the negative impacts on
the public, without significantly increasing the financial burden on the carrier Lepofsky
et al. [1993].
2.7 Application of Monte Carlo Simulation
2.7.1 Models and simulation
A model is a mathematical representation of a physical process, Le. models are an
abstraction of reality. Modelling is a fundamental tool of science, engineering and
business. Models generally have limits of credibility [Kalos & Whitlock, 1986]. A model
may be used to make predictions and try "What If?" scenarios. Changing the inputs
and recalculating the model may generate a new answer. Computers have made it
possible to create models that simulate reality and aid in making predictions. One of
the methods for simulating real systems is the ability to take into account randomness
by investigating many different scenarios. The results of these scenarios can then be
compiled and used to make decisions [Pet-Armacost, Sepulveda & Sakude, 1999].
A simulation is a type of model where the computer is used to imitate the behaviour of
a physical process. Simulation is often the only type of model possible for complex
systems. The process of building a simulation can clarify the investigator's
understanding of the real system. This is sometimes more useful than the actual
application of the final simulation. Simulation allows for sensitivity analysis and
optimisation of a real system without need to operate the real system. With a simulation
the investigator can maintain better control over experimental conditions and can
evaluate the system on a slower or faster time scale than the real system [Kalos &
Whitlock, 1986].
However, a simulation may be very expensive and time consuming to build. It is easy
to misuse a simulation by "stretching" it beyond the limits of credibility. This problem is
apparent when using commercial simulation packages, due to their ease of use and the
lack of familiarity with the underlying assumptions and restrictions. Fancy graphics,
animation, tables, etc. may tempt the user to assign unwarranted credibility to the
output [Pet-Armacost et al. 1999].
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2.7.2 Monte Carlo simulation
Scientists, engineers, statisticians, managers, investors, etc. have employed Monte
Carlo simulation to investigate issues in the following fields: business modelling,
decision analysis, risk analysis, management science, project management, real
options analysis, and others [Pet-Armacost et al. 1999J.
Monte Carlo simulation is a stochastic technique, i.e. it is based on the use of random
numbers and probability statistics to investigate problems. A model created with a
spreadsheet like Microsoft Exce/™, has certain input parameters, and equations that
use those inputs to produce a set of outputs. This type of model is typically
deterministic, i.e. if the input parameters are held constant, the same results are
obtained no matter how many times the model is recalculated. Monte Carlo simulation
is a method for iteratively evaluating a deterministic model using sets of random
numbers as inputs. This method is often used when the model is complex, non-linear,
or involves multiple uncertain parameters [Kalos & Whitlock, 1986J.
Monte Carlo simulation may be used to establish how random variation, lack of
knowledge, or error affects the reliability, performance or sensitivity of the system that
is being modelled. It provides approximate solutions to a variety of mathematical
problems. Monte Carlo simulation is a sampling method; the inputs are randomly
generated from probability distributions to simulate the process of sampling from an
actual population. A distribution is chosen for each input parameter that closely
matches the existing data, or best represents the current state of knowledge. The data
generated from the simulation may be represented as probability distributions (or
histograms) or converted to tolerance zones, confidence intervals, error bars, and
reliability predictions [Kalos & Whitlock, 1986].
2.7.3 Case study
Pet-Armacost et al. [1999J employed Monte Carlo simulation to investigate the risks
associated with transporting the chemical Hydrazine in tanks, with and without relief
devices fitted. Relief devices are used on tankers transporting flammable dangerous
goods in order to prevent an explosion in the case where pressures in the tank become
too high, e.g., in an accident where fire is involved. Relief devices are designed to
release pressure (and vapour or liquid) when the pressure in the tank reaches a certain
threshold [Pet-Armacost et al. 1999J. Hence, in the case of toxic substances, there is
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an increased risk of toxic exposures associated with containers fitted with relief
devices. Hydrazine is highly toxic and flammable, as well as corrosive. Therefore, there
was a conflict as to whether a relief device should be used or not.
No historical data was available on the impact of relief devices on release probabilities
and subsequent toxic exposures, or on the impact of Hydrazine on the likelihood of
fires and explosions. A Monte Carlo sensitivity analysis was employed to assess the
impacts of these unknown parameters on the risk of toxic exposures, fires and
explosions. The results of this study were utilised to make a policy decision regarding
the use of relief valves in Hydrazine transportation. Pet-Armacost et al. [1999]
concluded that the Monte Carlo simulation approach used in the study could be
applicable to a broad range of problems involving estimation of transportation risks and
routing decisions, even when there are substantial data uncertainties.
2.8 Previous Studies and Risk Assessment Models
Several other studies on the transportation of dangerous goods have been reported in
the literature. They relate to aspects such as database development, selecting criteria
for designating routes for transporting dangerous goods, etc. A selection of these
studies is highlighted in this section.
Abkowitz, Cheng & Lepofsky [1990b] studied the impact of using alternative criteria and
weights for route selection. Purdy [1993] developed a methodology for risk analysis of
the transportation of toxic and flammable substances by road or rail as part of a major
study in Britain. Stewart, Van Aerde & Shortreed [1990] created a computer model
called RISKMOD to provide estimates of the risk associated with the transportation of
dangerous goods by road and by rail. Pijawka, Foote & Soesilo [1985] developed a
model for dangerous goods risk management and proposed a risk score for individual
routes which reflected the interaction of a number of variables: the number of hazard
events on a route, dangerous goods accident probability, population at risk and volume
of dangerous goods by class. Saccomanno, Shortreed & Mehta [1990] performed a
study of fatality rates and hazard areas for transporting Liquefied Petroleum Gas and
Chlorine by heavy vehicle. Given the spill size, various damage propagation models
were developed to establish the corresponding hazard areas associated with 50 per-
cent and 1 per-cent damage.
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Most of the existing dangerous goods routing models assume that the links of the (
transportation network have unlimited capacity to carry dangerous goods shipments.
This assumption could lead to a small number of network links accommodating the
network-wide flow of dangerous goods shipments. An immediate effect of such a
routing procedure is the assignment of high risk to the population residing along these
links, which fails to capture the aim of the equitable distribution of risk. Hence, Zografos
& Davis [1989] developed a multi-objective decision-making model to mathematically
formulate the routing of dangerous goods on the transportation network. The model
included criteria relating to minimization of risk, minimization of risk to special
populations, minimization of travel time and minimization of property damages.
Everitt [2004] examined the status of dangerous goods transport in South Africa. An
assessment was made of toxic gas dispersion risk using a case study. The population
affected by a worst-case scenario release for a section of the N3 highway was
estimated. This included a comparison of the number of motorists affected versus the
exposed population in the communities adjacent to the road.
2.8.1 Lassarre, Fedra and Weigkricht model
Lassarre et al. [1993] developed· software based on GIS to manage, treat and
represent statistical and geographical data related to the evaluation of dangerous
goods transportation risk on a road network.
For a link on a network, Lassarre et al. [1993] defined the accident rate as the
frequency of occurrence of an accident involving a vehicle transporting dangerous
goods, multiplied by the length of the link. This rate was expressed as the number of
accidents per vehicle-kilometres and varied according to the road category of the link.
The direct estimation of this accident rate was difficult due to the lack of statistics for
accidents involVing dangerous goods and the lack of information about the number of
vehicles transporting dangerous goods. To estimate this rate, the heavy-vehicle
accident rate for different road categories and locations (urban and rural areas) was
evaluated and multiplied by a factor specific to dangerous goods (usually less than
one) to obtain the rate of accidents involving heavy vehicles transporting dangerous
goods. This lead Lassarre et al. [1993] to the following estimates of accident rates (in
units of accidents per 107 vehicle-kilometres) on four road categories: 2.5 on
motorways, 7.5 on national roads and 12.5 on secondary roads and other roads. The
risk calculation by Lassarre et al. [1993] was based on a daytime weekday situation.
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For a link, the density (in units of vehicles per kilometre) was fixed to: forty for
motorways, twenty for national roads, five for secondary roads and one for other road
types. The vehicle occupancy rate was fixed to 1.8 persons per vehicle.
Lassarre et al. [1993] defined the consequences C, by the integral of the density of the
exposed population p, over an impact zone E. Hence:
(2.6)
The exposed population could be concentrated on a site, distributed along a link or
distributed over an area. If the density is constant over the impact zone, then:
C=p xf1(e) (2.7)
With J.l taken as an estimate of E.
• If E is a site, then J.l(E) =1
• If E is a link, then J.l(E) =L, the length of the link
• If E is an area, then J.l(E) =S(E), the area of the exposed surface
For the population exposed, pis:
• For a site, the number of people allocated to that site
• For a link of the network, the density of vehicles per kilometre on that section
multiplied by the number of occupants per vehicle
• For an area, the population density per unit of surface area exposed
2.8.2 Ashtakala and Eno model
Ashtakala & Eno [1996] developed a model to select the route, which minimises risk to
population, for transporting a specific dangerous substance between a point of origin
and a point of destination (O-D pair) in a study area. Dangerous goods from three
different classes, namely Chlorine gas, Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) and Sulphuric
Acid were chosen for study. The minimum risk routes between an O-D pair were
established by using population risk units as link impedances. The risk units for each
link were estimated by considering the probability of an accident and its consequences
on that link. Their results showed that between the same O-D pair, the minimum risk
routes were different for different dangerous goods. Hence, it is not possible and not
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realistic to designate a single route for the transportation of all types of dangerous
goods [Ashtakala & Eno, 1996].
In the Ashtakala and Eno [1996] model, a significant amount of data on the highway
network was required to compute risk units on the links. The highway network was
coded in terms of links (road sections), nodes (intersections) and the attributes for
individual links (distance, risk units, etc.). The number of people exposed to the
dangers of dangerous goods was limited to an evacuation area on both sides of the
road. An evacuation distance of five hundred metres on each side of the road was
used, resulting in an evacuation width of one kilometre. The evacuation width multiplied
by the length of the link gave the evacuation area of the link. The population density
multiplied by the evacuation area gave the number of people affected on the link. The
population densities corresponding to each link were obtained by integrating the
demographic map and the highway map. Table 2.7 presents distance, traffic volume,
dangerous goods Releasing Accident Rate (RAR), heavy-vehicle volume, accident
probability and risk units for LPG for a sample link on the highway network.
Table 2.7: Population risk units on link [Ashtakala & Eno, 1996]
Population Traffic RAR Heavy-vehicle LPGNode Node Distance [persons volume [releases per volume Accident populationfrom to [km] / km2] [vehicles 10
6 [heavy probability risk units
/day] vehicle-km] vehicles/day] [fatalities]
1 2 38 62 1526 0.124 183 0.31 0.029
Ashtakala & Eno [1996] defined risk as follows:
Risk = (Accident probability) x (Accident consequences) (2.8)
Accident probability was estimated from traffic accident rates and traffic volumes. The
consequences of an accident were estimated using a dispersion model specific to the
dangerous substance. The consequent damages were expressed only in terms of
immediate impacts. For different types of dangerous goods, the corresponding hazard
area was affected by the release rate and release volume, duration of release, material
properties and meteorological conditions. Saccomanno, Shortreed & Mehta [1990]
reported hazard areas and fatalities for different release profiles on the road and these
were used in computing accident consequences by Ashtakala & Eno [1996]. Risk was
expressed in the number of fatalities and injuries to population. In this manner, the risk
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to population was estimated in terms of numerical units, which were termed population
risk units.
The availability of heavy-vehicle accident rates and release probabilities permitted the
estimation of the probability of a dangerous goods accident in which a release
occurred. The probability of a dangerous goods releasing accident was estimated using







=probability of an accident involving a dangerous goods release for
route segment i
= heavy-vehicle accident rate for route segment i, in units of accidents
per vehicle-kilometre
=probability of a dangerous goods release given an accident involving a
dangerous goods carrying heavy vehicle for route segment i
=length of route segment i, in units of kilometres
Ashtakala & Eno [1996] deemed Equation (2.9) suitable for dangerous goods
transportation risk analyses because:
• Risk is based on the probability of a dangerous goods release rather than just the
probability of an accident.
• Risk is based on heavy-vehicle accident rates rather than all-vehicle accident rates.
• Equation (2.9) retains the proportionality of risk to route segment length.
To illustrate the use of Equations (2.8) and (2.9), Ashtakala & Eno [1996] provided the
following example:
Highway class = Multilane divided highway in rural area
Length ofroad segment = 10 km
Annual Average Daily Traffic volume (AADT) = 3500 vehicles/day
Releasing Accident Rate = 0.118 releases per million vehicle-km [Harwood et
al. 1993]
Percentage o/heavy vehicles on roadway = 15 % [Harwood et al. 1993]
Average daily heavy-vehicle volume = 0.15 x 3500 = 525 heavy vehicles/day
33
Chapter 2
Vehicle-km on link per year = 525 x 10 x 365 = 1.916 million vehicle-km
Accidentprobability = (1.916 x 106) x (0.118 x 10-6) = 0.23
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) dispersion model:
Fatalities per density exposed to LPG = 0.0015 [Saccomanno et al. 1990J
Population density = 300 persons/km2
Fatalities per density of300 persons/knl = 300 x 0.0015 = 0.45
Risk = Accident probability x Accident consequences
Risk to population = 0.23 x 0.45 = 0.10 fatalities per year
To establish the accident probability of a road segment, data such as annual average
daily traffic (AADT) volume and percentage of heavy vehicles were used. The heavy-
vehicle accident rates and releasing accident rates used in the Ashtakala & Eno [1996]
study were developed by Harwood et al. [1993] (as discussed in Section 2.4.1). For
example, on a multilane divided highway, the dangerous goods releasing accident rate
is 0.118 releases per million vehicle-kilometres.
2.9 Transportation Disasters
The United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP, 2001] has compiled details of
noteworthy incidents during the transportation of dangerous goods. These incidents are
presented in Table 2.8 in chronological order.
Table 2.8: Noteworthy transportation incidents involving dangerous goods [after UNEP,
2001]
Year Place Description Incident Consequences
1974 Eagle Pass, Leakage of liquefied petroleum 17 people died, 34 injured
U.S. gas (LPG) during road
transportation
----.- .. ------------------- ---------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
1974 Yokkaichi, Leakage of Chlorine during a 521 people injured
Japan transhipment
-------- ------------------- ---------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
1976 Deer Park, Accident during road 5 people died, 200 injured
U.S. transportation of Ammonia
-------- ------------------- ---------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
1976 Houston, U.S. Accident during road 6 people died, 178 injured
transportation of Ammonia







Tanker delivering Propane to a
camp site exploded
216 people died, 200 injured
1978 Youngstown, Leakage of Chlorine during rail
U.S. transportation
8 people died, 138 injured
1979 Suda Bay,
Greece






Train derailment. 3 cars carrying
Propane exploded. A Chlorine
tank was punctured, releasing
Chlorine into the air
Accident during road
transportation of Chlorine
250 000 people evacuated from
the surrounding area






Explosion during transportation of 317 people died, 44 injured
LPG
Accident during transportation of 182 people injured, 3000
Ammonia evacuated









40 million litres of Crude Oil
spilled into the ocean from the
supertanker Exxon Valdez
A tanker carrying LPG crashed,
resulting in an explosion
Environmental damage. Cleanup
cost US$2 billion





Accident during transportation of 51 people died, 54 injured
LPG
Release of Chlorine from a heavy 182 people injured
vehicle
1991 California, U.S. Tractor-semitrailer overturned
releasing Automotive Gasoline
and causing a fire
3 people injured. People in the
surrounding area evacuated.
Property damage and cleanup
costs total US$1 million.
1991 Bombay, India Accident during transportation of 1 person died, 150 injured
Ammonia Gas
1994 Thane District, Accident during transportation of 4 people died, 298 injured
India Chlorine gas
--- ..... ------------------- ---------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
1994 Allentown, Explosion and fire in a Natural 1 person died, 66 injured.
U.S. Gas distribution pipeline Property damage of US$5 million
-------- ------------------- ---------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
1994 New York, Collision involving Propane heavy 1 person died, 23 injured. Fire
U.S. vehicle. Tank fractured, releasing engulfed the area within a radius
Propane and causing a fire. of 120 metres.
-------- ------------------- ---------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
1994 Onitscha,
Nigeria
Leakage of Fuel Oil during
transportation causing fire
60 people died
-------- ------------------- ---------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
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Year Place Description Incident Consequences
1994 Palmeira, Gas transportation accident 36 people died
Mozambique
-------- ------------------- ---------------------------------------- -------------------.-----.-----------.--
1995 Madras, India Petroleum transportation accident 100 people died, 23 injured
-------- ------------------- ---------------------------------------- -------------------------------.--------
1995 Mahrashtra, Accident during transportation of 2000 people injured
India Ammonia gas
-------- ------------------- ---------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
1996 Alberton, U.S. A freight train derailed, releasing One person died instantly from
59 tons of Chlorine into the air acute chlorine exposure. 300
and 64 000 litres of Potassium area residents who had inhaled
Hydroxide Solution into the soil chlorine hospitalised. 1000
people evacuated. Over 1000 m3
of soil contaminated
-------- ------------------- ---------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
1996 Lively, U.S. Pipeline carrying Liquid Butane 2 people died, 25 families
ruptured. Release followed by a evacuated. Damage to roadway,
fire. properties and adjacent
woodlands
-------- ------------------- ---------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
1997 Sea of Japan, Russian oil tanker broke in two, Several clean-up workers died,
Japan spilling 4.5 million litres of Fuel 800 km of coastal land
Oil contaminated (including marine
life/fisheries) and beaches
-------- ------------------- ---------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
1997 Bhopal, India Ammonia leakage during 400 people injured
transportation
-------- ------------------- ---------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
1997 Lahore, Accident during transportation of 32 people died, 900 injured, 1000
Pakistan Chlorine evacuated
-------- ------------------- ---------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
1997 Stanger, South Accident during road 34 people died, 2 injured
Africa transportation of Petroleum
-------- ------------------- ---------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
1998 Kyrgyzstan A heavy vehicle transporting 1800 kg of Sodium Cyanide
Cyanide to a gold mine plunged spilled into a river upstream of
off a bridge several villages. Within days,
hundreds of people sought
treatment at medical clinics
-------- ------------------- ---------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
1998 Idjerhe, Niger A fire and explosion in a leaking 500 people killed. 32
Delta, Nigeria Fuel pipeline communities affected. Farms and
buildings destroyed
-------- ------------------- ---------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
1998 Yaundi, Petroleum products 220 people died, 130 injured
Cameroon transportation accident
-------- ------------------- ---------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
1998 Biloxi, U.S. Overflow of Petroleum and 5 people died, 1 injured.
subsequent fire at a service Damages of US$55000
station
-------- ------------------- ---------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
1999 France 8000 tonnes of Fuel Oil escaped 100 kilometres of coastline
from the oil tanker, Erika polluted. Seabirds trapped in the
oil. The spill had major economic
effects on fishing, oyster farming
and tourism.
-------- ------------------- ---------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
1999 Brand, Austria Lorry carrying Lacquer crashed 12 people died, 50 injured.
into a queue of cars in the Closure of the tunnel for 3





Table 2.8 provides compelling evidence that incidents involving the transportation of
dangerous goods may have very serious consequences and that there is a need for
effective disaster prevention and response planning. The dangerous goods frequently
involved in transportation disasters are LPG, Chlorine and Ammonia.
2.10 South African Regulatory Environment
Selected legislation related to the road transportation of dangerous goods is
summarised in this section.
Section 27 of the National Land Transport Transition Bill [2000] states that transport
authorities, core cities and other municipalities must prepare and submit annually to the
MEC (member of the Executive Council of a province who is responsible for public
transport in the province) integrated transport plans for their respective areas for the
coming five-year period. These integrated transport plans must include a general
strategy or plan for the movement of dangerous goods by road along designated
routes. A person may not transport dangerous goods in the area of a planning
authority, except along such a designated route, and any person who does so is gUilty
of an offence. According to Section 22 of the National Land Transport Transition Bill
[2000], the MEC, using these integrated transport plans, must annually prepare a
provincial land transport framework for the coming five-year period. This provincial land
transport framework must set out a general strategy or plan for the movement of
dangerous goods by road along designated routes in the province.
The National Road Traffic Act [1996] also affects the road transportation of classified
dangerous goods and substances. This legislation regulates the transportation of
dangerous goods in both bulk and packaged form. Both heavy and light vehicles
transporting dangerous goods are required to display the appropriate placarding and to
carry the necessary documentation. The legislation contains in excess of 2500
classified dangerous goods. The legislation was summarised by FleetWatch [2001] as
follows:
SANS 10228: Identifies and classifies each of the listed dangerous goods and includes




SANS 10229: Includes information on acceptable packaging for dangerous goods and
contains requirements for the correct marking, labelling and testing of packages.
SANS 10230: Specifies statutory inspection requirements for all vehicles transporting
classified dangerous goods.
SANS 10231: Stipulates operational procedures and rules for transporting dangerous
goods and includes the responsibilities of the operator/owner of a dangerous goods
vehicle. This code also lists driver qualifications and driver duties before proceeding
and while en-route.
SANS 10232 Part 1: Includes placarding requirements for vehicles transporting
dangerous goods and compatibility requirements of multiload vehicles.
SANS 10232 Part 3: Includes information on emergency response guides to be used if
an incident occurs.
SANS 10233: Contains requirements for Intermediate Bulk Containers and indicates
those dangerous goods that may be transported in the intermediate bulk containers.
SANS 1398: Lists design requirements for tankers transporting Petroleum-based
flammable substances.
SANS 1518: Stipulates design requirements for normal road tankers transporting
dangerous goods and includes the type of materials that may be used in the
manufacture of the tankers [FleetWatch, 2001].
In South Africa, the dangerous goods shipment size is primarily constrained by mass
limitations such as the 56000-kilogram permissible maximum vehicle mass limit for
heavy vehicles [National Road Traffic Act, 1996]. Drivers of heavy vehicles transporting
dangerous goods need to obtain a professional driving permit specifically for
dangerous goods. To obtain this permit, the driver has to be trained in terms of a
minimum syllabus at an approved training body. The driver of a dangerous goods
vehicle must carry specific documentation on the vehicle including a transport
emergency card for each substance transported, a dangerous goods declaration
containing a list of the substances being transported and a clear indication of the route
to be taken by the driver [FleetWatch, 2001].
2.11 Local Situation
The Responsible Care initiative is the global health, safety and environmental
programme initiated by the chemical industry in 1984. It has since been adopted by
forty-seven countries. The Chemical and Allied Industries' Association (CAlA) launched
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Responsible Care in South Africa in 1994 to respond to public concerns about the
manufacture, storage, transport, use and disposal of chemicals. Membership is open to
chemical manufacturers as well as to service providers such as storage companies and
consultants [CAIA, 2003].
Major chemical companies in South Africa often outsource their transport
arrangements. Road accidents involving hauliers carrying dangerous goods are not
uncommon on the country's roads. As a result, the CAIA expanded its Responsible
Care mandate to include road hauliers involved in the transportation of dangerous
goods. The CAIA embarked on a drive to encourage chemical companies to require
transporters of their products, to not only become association members, but also
Responsible Care signatories [CAIA, 2003]. There are only a few major carriers of
dangerous goods in South Africa, dominated by firms that specialize in bulk "liquid"
transport, e.g. Tanker Services, Cargo Carriers, Unitrans, etc. [CAIA, 2003].
As at the end of 2002, CAIA had 182 members of whom 104 were signatories to
Responsible Care. Companies that have committed to Responsible Care in South
Africa account for approximately 90 per-cent of the annual turnover of the chemical
manufacturing industry [CAIA, 2003]. The Responsible Care Performance Report 2002
[CAIA, 2003J stated that over three hundred million tonnes of chemicals were
transported by road, rail and pipeline in South Africa in 2002. In this period there were
approximately two hundred transportation incidents involving the unintentional release
of chemicals. No further breakdown of the proportion of chemicals transported by road
or the proportion of road transportation releases was available from the CAIA. This
figure of two hundred transportation incidents should be treated as a conservative
estimate. Under-reporting of incidents is a serious problem due to the lack of
compliance enforcement in the past [Abkowitz et al. 1989].
2.12 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, the literature pertaining to risk assessment of dangerous goods
transport was examined. A review was undertaken of the current state of the art and
the theory and methodology used by previous researchers. Dangerous goods
transportation studies reported in the literature relate to aspects such as risk
assessment; database development; designating routes for transporting dangerous
goods, etc. Historical records confirm that dangerous goods transportation incidents
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may have very serious consequences. Dangerous goods releases may occur during
normal transport (en-route) or as a result of a traffic accident. Internationally, traffic
accidents were found to be the leading cause of severe dangerous goods incidents
(deaths, injuries, etc.).
Risk is a measure of relative safety and is defined as a combination of accident
likelihood, release probability, consequence of release and risk preference. Risk
estimation requires information on: flows of dangerous goods; incidents and accidents;
and the population at risk. Accident likelihood is estimated from traffic accident rates
and traffic volumes. Estimates of release rates are essential to conduct risk
assessments, as an accident involving a dangerous goods vehicle cannot lead to
potentially catastrophic consequences unless the cargo is released. The probability of
a release, varies with the type of accident and varies between highway classes.
Intensive risk analyses should consider the activities of non-residential areas and
vulnerable zones (places that concentrate a large amount of people who are difficult to
protect or evacuate, e.g. schools, hospitals or commercial centres).
Dispersion modelling may be used to estimate injuries or fatalities resulting from a
dangerous goods release. With geographic information systems (GIS), information
describing the transportation network, specific chemicals, historical meteorological
conditions and population distribution may be combined into an integrated
environment. GIS enhances dispersion modelling by allowing consequences and
population exposure to be estimated more efficiently. Monte Carlo simulation is a
stochastic method for iteratively evaluating a deterministic model using sets of random
numbers as inputs. The Monte Carlo simulation approach may be applied to a broad
range of problems including the estimation of dangerous goods transportation risks and
routing decisions, especially when there are substantial data uncertainties.
The National Road Traffic Act [1996] is the principal legislation governing the road
transportation of dangerous goods in South Africa. Local legislation stipulates that
municipalities and provinces must prepare transport plans for the movement of




This chapter describes the selection of the case study for this investigation. The first
step in the risk analysis, the process of hazard identification, is outlined.
3.1 Background
3.1.1 General description of study area
The Durban South Basin, one of South Africa's most important industrial centres, was
chosen as the case study for this investigation. Major industry sectors represented in
the basin include: automotive components and assembly, food and beverage,
petrochemical, pulp and paper, and textile and clothing [CSIR, 1999]. The basin
comprises parts of the South Central and South districts of the eThekwini Municipality.
Figure 3.1 presents a map of the districts comprising the eThekwini Municipality.
N
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Figure 3.1: Districts of the eThekwini Municipality [eThekwini Municipality GIS, 2005]
The Durban South Basin Strategic Environmental Assessment [CSIR, 1999] classified
its study area as extending from Umbogintwini in the south to the Durban Bay in the
north and extending approximately five kilometres inland of the coast. Figure 3.2
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Poor development and planning policies in the Durban South Basin have intertwined
residential areas (namely Bluff, Clairwood, Isipingo, Merebank, Umlazi and Wentworth)
with heavy industry. the Durban International Airport and port infrastructure. Large-
scale industrial plants and infrastructure have developed on the floor of the basin.
Housing dominates the Bluff dune. valley slopes and ridgelines that surround the
Durban South Basin [CSIR, 1999].
Plate 3.1: Communities living in close proximity to industries at Wentworth [Ngeta &
Bhikha. 2003]
The wide variety of regions within the Durban South Basin includes:
• The manufacturing and heavy-engineering industrial areas of Jacobs and Mobeni;
• The Clairwood residential zone, which has been the gradually infiltrated by light
engineering, manufacturing and transport related industries;
• The industrial zone of Prospecton which houses light industry and manufacturing,
including the Toyota South Africa manufacturing plant [CSIR, 1999].
The area directly south of the Durban Harbour is comprised mainly of infrastructure
associated with the port. This includes Island View Storage, the largest tank farm in the
southern hemisphere. The approximately 1200 tanks are used for bulk liquid storage
and warehousing of a range of substances including petrochemicals, jet fuel and toxic
chemicals like Acrylonitrile and Benzene [CSIR, 1999]. There are also a number of
large industrial complexes in the basin, including:
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• The Engen Oil Refinery, which is encircled by the residential areas of Wentworth
and Merebank;
• The SAPREF Oil Refinery, which is bounded to the west by the Durban
International Airport and to the east by a coastal dune;
• Mondi Paper, which is located north of the Durban International Airport and
immediately to the south of Merebank.
3.1.3 Social conditions
The total residential population of the Durban South Basin is approximately 400 000,
according to the 1995 Census [Statistics SA Durban Metropolitan Unicity, 2002]. All
people within the Durban South Basin are within three kilometres of medical facilities.
Austerville, Bluff, Merebank and Wentworth comprise formal housing while
Mbokodweni comprises only informal dwellings. There are also informal dwellings in
industrial areas surrounding the Durban International Airport and Clairwood [CSIR,
1999].
3.1.4 Traffic and transportation
The Durban South Basin is the main industrial area within the eThekwini Municipality.
The eThekwini Municipality Transport Authority has estimated that approximately
nineteen thousand vehicles travel into the Durban South Basin every weekday morning
during the two-hour peak period (7 AM to 9 AM). By comparison, approximately thirty-
six thousand vehicles enter the central Durban area during the morning peak period.
High levels of traffic flow occur in the Durban South Basin and significant volumes of
dangerous goods, including poisons and flammable liquids are transported between
the basin and other destinations within the eThekwini Municipality, and further a-field
[CSIR, 1999]. These high flows of dangerous goods, when combined with South
Africa's poor road safety record, create numerous opportunities for incidents (including
traffic accidents) that could release dangerous goods into the environment and result in
public exposure to poisonous, corrosive and possibly carcinogenic substances.
3.2 Approach
It is impossible to conduct a risk assessment for all possible dangerous goods
transportation incidents at all possible locations within the basin. Hence, the decision
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was taken to focus on the dangerous goods being transported to and from the Major
Hazard Installations in the Durban South Basin. A Major Hazard Installation (MHI) is an
installation where any substance is produced, processed, used, handled or stored in
such a form and quantity that it has the potential to cause a major incident. A major
incident is defined as an occurrence of catastrophic proportions [Occupational Health
and Safety Act, 1993]. MHl's in the Durban South Basin include Island View Storage
and the Engen and SAPREF oil refineries. The basis of the decision to focus on MHI's
was as follows: if dangerous goods are being stored in sufficient quantities at an
installation, such that it is classified as a MHI, then those dangerous goods are being
transported to and from said installation (except those dangerous goods that are
produced and consumed entirely on site).
The eThekwini Municipality has a Disaster Management Centre. This facility serves as
a central point for managing any large-scale emergencies within the city [Mitchell,
2003]. eThekwini Municipality Disaster Management have received Major Hazard
Installation risk assessments from approximately sixty MHI's in the Durban South
Basin. With the assistance of members of the South Durban Community Environmental
Alliance (SDCEA), an environmental non-governmental organisation, and eThekwini
Municipality Disaster Management, preliminary locations were identified to begin the
hazard identification process of this investigation.
3.3 Preliminary Survey
3.3.1 Selection of appropriate locations for the preliminary survey
The following information regarding dangerous goods traffic within the Durban South
Basin, chiefly provided by a member of SDCEA [Ramchurren, 2003], was utilised to
select preliminary locations for traffic surveys:
• Island View Storage is located in close proximity to the Fynnland, Ocean View,
Grosvenor and Clairwood residential areas. Road tankers leaving Island View
proceed down Bayhead Road and then turn into South Coast Road. These tankers
then access the M4 Southern Freeway at Exit 4: Edwin Swales VC Drive M7. Edwin
Swales VC Drive is also used by tankers to access the N2 at Exit 161 [Ramchurren,
2003].
• Tankers travelling to and from the SAPREF Oil Refinery access the N2 via Exit 149:
Prospecton Road and travel through The Avenue East road [Ramchurren, 2003].
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A site visit to the area surrounding the Engen Oil Refinery on 22 February 2003 yielded
the following information: Tara Road is a two-way, two-lane road that used by tankers
travelling to and from Engen. Tankers leaving Engen turn into Duranta Road, which
has a steep gradient. Numerous dangerous goods spills have occurred on Duranta
Road [Ramchurren, 2003]. These spills have damaged the road, which is slippery in
parts and requires resurfacing. During the site visit, it was observed that part of the left
lane at the crest of Duranta Road was covered in sand, which had been placed there to
cover a recent spill [Ramchurren, 2003].
Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride, a highly corrosive and poisonous substance, is
transported from Pelindaba, via the N3 to the SAPREF and Engen Oil Refineries [de
Klerk,2004].
Revertex Chemicals on Lansdowne Road, Jacobs is a Major Hazard Installation. The
toxic materials handled at Revertex include Acrylonitrile and Vinyl Acetate.
Approximately seven Acrylonitrile ISO-tainers are transported to Revertex per annum.
This flow is expected to increase to approximately ten Acrylonitrile ISO-tainers with the
implementation of the upgrades proposed in Ecoserv [2003]. Raw chemicals are
transported to Revertex from Island View and the finished products are transported
locally and around South Africa [Ecoserv, 2003].
Based upon the preceding information, the following locations were selected to conduct
a preliminary survey:
• The Shell Service Station on Bayhead Road just before the Bayhead Road - South
Coast Road intersection. This route is used by heavy goods vehicles travelling to
and from the Island View area.
• On Tara Road immediately before the Tara Road - Duranta Road intersection. The
Engen Oil Refinery is located on Tara Road.
• Immediately before the entrance to Revertex Chemicals (Pty) Ltd. on Lansdowne
Road.
• The Caltex Service Station on The Avenue East just before the Refinery Drive -
The Avenue East intersection. This is the predominant route used by heavy goods
vehicles travelling to and from the SAPREF Oil Refinery.
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3.3.2 Preliminary survey findings
Heavy vehicles transport dangerous goods in bulk inside tanks, containers and ISO-
tainers. In addition, light delivery vehicles (LDV's) carry smaller shipments of
dangerous goods in drums and cylinders [Ramchurren, 2003]. Vehicles transporting
dangerous goods are required by law to display the appropriate hazard label and
United Nations (UN) number on the sides of the vehicle. The UN number is allocated to
an item of dangerous goods in accordance with the United Nations Recommendations
on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, which is synonymous with the Substance
Identification Number given in SANS 10228 [National Road Traffic Act, 1996]. This UN
number is used to identify the dangerous goods being transported when conducting a
traffic survey.
A preliminary traffic survey was conducted at the selected locations within the Durban
South Basin on Monday, 14 April 2003 and Tuesday, 15 April 2003. The purpose of the
preliminary survey was to obtain an indication of: the flows of dangerous goods
vehicles, the types of dangerous goods being transported through these locations, the
vantage points from which a more extensive survey could be conducted and the
number of observers that would be required. A summary of the preliminary survey is
presented in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Summary of the preliminary survey
# of Heavy vehicles # of Dangerous
Location Date Survey period passing survey Goods Vehicles
passing surveylocation
location
Bayhead Road 14/4/2003 8:30-9:30 AM 419 44
--------------------- ------------ --------------------- -------.---------------- ----------------------------
Tara Road 14/4/2003 10:40-11:40 AM 27 20
------------ --------- --.---.----- --------------------- ------------------------ ------------------------- ---
Lansdowne Road 14/4/2003 11:50-12:20 AM 16 3
--------------------- ------------ --.------------------ ------------------ --- - -- ----------------------------
The Avenue East 15/4/2003 9:10-10:40 AM 90 13------------------.-. ------------ --------------------- ------------------ -----. ----------------------------
Tara Road 15/4/2003 11 :05-12:05 AM 28 21
Dangerous goods are classified according to the type of risk involved [Infosource,
2001]. This system is internationally recognised.
• Class 1: Explosives.
• Class 2: Flammable gases; non-flammable gases, non-toxic gases; toxic gases.
• Class 3: Flammable liquids.
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• Class 4: Flammable solids; substances liable to spontaneous combustion;
substances that, on contact with water, emit flammable gases.
• Class 5: Oxidizing substances; organic peroxides.
• Class 6: Toxic substances; infectious substances
• Class 7: Radioactive substances
• Class 8: Corrosive substances
• Class 9: Miscellaneous dangerous substances or goods
Dangerous goods are allocated a danger group as follows:
• Danger group I: substances that present a very severe risk
• Danger group 11: substances that present a serious risk
• Danger group Ill: substances that present a relatively low risk
• Danger group IV: substances that present a very low risk [Infosource, 2001]
Table 3.2 presents a selection of the dangerous goods identified during the preliminary
survey, including substances belonging to Danger groups I and 11. A full listing of the
dangerous goods identified during the preliminary survey is presented in Appendix A.






Class Group Tara The Avenue Bayhead Lansdowne
Road East Road Road
_~ 9_~?_ ~~q~_~~~~_~_~!~C?~~~_'!! _<?_~~~~ ? J _
1090 Acetone 3 11 ..;-11-14- Be~~-e~e------------------------- ---3--- ----1---- ---~--- -------/----------------- --------------
-1203- Petrol---------------------------- ---3--- ----11---- ---~--- ------T-----------~----- --------------
--- .. -. ----------------------------------- ------- --------- ------- -------------------------- --------------
1230 Methanol 3 11 ..;-12-45- Methyl-Iso-b~tyl-Ket~~e--------- ---3--- ----11---- ------- --------------------T--- --------------
-12-47- Methyl-Meth~~-rYl~te-Mo~~me~ ---3--- ----11---- ------- --------------------~----- --------------
-12-94- i~l~e~-e ------- -------- ----------- -- -3- -- ----11---- --- ---- ---------- --------- -~- ---- ----- ---------
-15-47- A~ili-~e- --------------------------- ---6- -- ----11- --- ------- --------------------~- ---- --------------
-16-49- i et~~Ethyl-Le~d ---------------- ---6- -- ----1- --- ------- ------".J ------------------ --------------
-20-7f3 i~l~e~-e-Diiso~y~-~~te---------- ---6--- ----11---- ------- --------------------T--- --------------
Ecoserv [2003] disclosed the following information about Revertex Chemicals:
Acrylonitrile and other dangerous goods (including Caustic Soda and Ammonia) are
transported to Revertex from the Cutler Complex at Island View by the transport
company Cargo Carriers. Approximately 50 per-cent of products are transported from
the Revertex site by bulk road tanker, with much of the remainder being transported via
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210 litre drums and one-ton mini bulk containers. Dangerous goods are delivered to
site from Monday to Friday during normal daytime working hours. On average, one bulk
road tanker per day is delivered to Revertex. The route used by Cargo Carriers to
transport dangerous goods to Revertex from Island View includes the Bayhead Road -
South Coast Road and Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersections
[Ecoserv, 2003]. Due to the comparatively low volume of dangerous goods vehicles
observed during the survey on Lansdowne Road, the decision was taken to exclude
Revertex Chemicals from further direct investigation. However, vehicles travelling to
and from Revertex would contribute to the dangerous goods flows at the Bayhead
Road - South Coast Road and Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road
intersections.
Nalco Chemserve, which manufactures speciality chemicals, is part of the AECI
Industrial Complex at Umbogintwini, located approximately twenty-two kilometres south
of Durban. The dangerous goods handled at Nalco Chemserve include: Acrylonitrile,
Epichlorohydrin and Hydrochloric Acid [Mitchell, 2003]. A survey on Moss Kolnik Road
outside the south gate of the AECI Industrial Complex site was attempted. However,
this survey was abandoned due to safety concerns.
3.4 Intersection Surveys
3.4.1 Accidents and intersections
Dangerous goods producers and customers are generally well prepared to deal with
incidents. However, if dangerous goods releases were to occur during transportation,
they would be more problematic because the emergency response is usually handled
by local authorities (fire departments and police) who would have less experience with
these substances [Pet-Armacost et al. 1999]. As discussed in Section 2.1.3, traffic
accidents are the leading cause of severe dangerous goods incidents (Le. deaths,
injuries, etc) [Harwood & Russell, 1989; Saccomanno & Shortreed, 1993]. Hence, the
decision was taken to focus this investigation on accident-related releases of
dangerous goods.
Furthermore, in comparison to developed countries, South Africa's road safety record is
very poor. Table 3.3 illustrates that South Africa's road fatality rate per 100 000
vehicles is over eight times the level of that in Australia, the U.S. and Canada.
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Table 3.3: Comparison of South Africa's road fatality rates with those of developed
countries [after Road Accident Fund Commission, 2002]






South Africa 31.78 181.83
Figure 3.3 illustrates that in South Africa, in 1998; the majority of road accidents
occurred in urban areas (90 per-cent). The highest number of accidents occurred on
straight roads, followed by stop/yield locations (i.e. unsignalised intersections) and
traffic signals (i.e. signalised intersections). When the analysis is limited to urban areas,
accidents at intersections account for approximately 37 per-cent of the total number of
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Figure 3.3: Locations at which accidents occurred, South Africa, 1998 [after Road
Accident Fund Commission, 2002]
Accidents at intersections tend to be more serious than those on road segments [Vogt,
1999]. Studies in other countries confirm that a high percentage of accidents occur at
intersections. Hakkert & Mahalel [1978] observed that more than 50 per-cent of
accidents in Israel occur at intersections. The study included both injury and fatality
accidents, on two-lane and four-lane roads, at signalised and unsignalised
intersections. Pickering, Hall & Grimmer [1986], in a study of UK data from 1983,
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reported that one-third of injury accidents occurred at intersections. Yinhai, Hitoshi &
Mannering [2003] found that in Japan, approximately 60 per-cent off all accidents and
45 per-cent of fatal accidents occur at intersections.
The prevalence of accidents at intersections can be partially attributed to the conflicting
manoeuvres undertaken by vehicles [Hauer, Ng & Lovell, 1988; Roebuck, 2003].
Figure 3.4 illustrates a frequent accident pattern at intersections: two vehicles from
different approaches are attempting conflicting manoeuvres during a green phase at a
signalised intersection that has simple phasing (Le. no indicative green arrow for right-
turning vehicles). The term phase is used to describe a set of traffic manoeuvres that
can occur simultaneously, or the sequence of traffic signal indications received by such
a set of manoeuvres [Cannell & Gardner, 1996].
Figure 3.4: Common conflicting manoeuvres at a signalised intersection [after Hauer et
al. 1988]
Vogt [1999] reported that signalised intersections that had a higher percentage of
heavy-vehicle traffic on any or all approaches, compared to other signalised
intersections, showed a rise in the number of accidents. Heavy vehicles at a signalised
intersection, in addition to haVing greater destructive capacity than passenger vehicles,
take a longer time to engage in turning manoeuvres (hence, occupying the collision
zone for a longer period) and block visibility during this time [Vogt, 1999].
Based upon the preceding information, the decision was taken to focus this
investigation on intersections, where there is a greater possibility of a dangerous goods
carrying vehicle being involved in an accident.
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3.4.2 Use of historical accident data to select intersections
It was necessary to select appropriate intersections in urban areas. The following
criteria were utilised to appraise intersections as possible data sources:
• Proximity to dangerous goods trip generators, e.g. Major Hazard Installations
• Historical accident record
The historical accident records of Durban South Basin intersections in close proximity
to MHI's were obtained from the eThekwini Municipality Transport Authority. The most
recent three-year records are presented in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Accident records of selected intersections, 2000-2002
Intersection
Total Accidents (all vehicle types)
2000 2001 2002 Mean
South Coast Road - M7 Edwin Swales VC Drive 224 226 186 212
-------------._--------------------------------------------- .---------. ------------ ------------ -----------
_~_~_~_~L~_~~i~_~~~_I~~_y~_~~i~~_(~_C!~!L ?~ ~~ ~~ ~~ _
_~_~_~_~L~_~~i~_~~~_I~~_y~_ ~~i~~_(~~_~~L ?~ ~~ ~~ ?~ _
-~-'~y-~~-~~-~~~~:_~~-~!~-~~~~-~~~~~-- ---------- ---- ---_!_~---- -----~~-- --- -- --~~----- ----~~ ----
_~_~ 9_~_~!~~P_~~!~_~_~_~~~ !~~~y~I]~~_~~~~ ?~ ~~ ~ ~? }~ _
_~_! 9_~ _~!~~P_~~!~_~ _~_~~~ _-_ ~?_ {~~~_t)___________________ _ ~_~ ____ _ ~?_ _____ ?~______ ?~ _
_~! 9_~ _~!~~P_~~!~_~ _~_~~~ _-_ ~?jyy_~~!L ~ !~ 1_? ~~ _
_~~_~~_~!~_~~~_f.~~~~~X ~~!~~_~_~~~_~ _(I?~~~L ~_~ !~ ~~ ~! _
_~~_ ~~_~!~~~~_ f.~~~~~X ~~!~~_~_~~~_~_(~~_~!L ~ !~ ~_~ ~~ _
_"!"~~- ~y~~-~~- ~~~!--- ~~!!~-~ry-~~~~~ ----------- ------- ----~-~- --- ----_!~- ---- ----~-~- ---- -- --~~----
Tara Road-Duranta Road 12 12 9 11
------------------------------------------------------------ ----.------ ------------ ------------ -----------
_~~)~I]~~!3~_~~_~_~_?_(~_~~!L ~_~ J ~ ~~ _
Joyner Road - N2 (West) 3 8 5 5
The intersections highlighted in bold text in Table 3.4 were selected for further study
due to: the findings of the preliminary survey, their historical accident record and their
close proximity to dangerous goods trip generators, specifically:
• Engen Oil Refinery (Tara Road - Duranta Road, M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta
Road (East) and M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta Road (West) intersections)
• SAPREF Oil Refinery (The Avenue East - Refinery Drive intersection)
• Island View Storage (Bayhead Road - South Coast Road and South Coast Road -
Edwin Swales VC Drive intersections)
Large heavy vehicles appear to experience particular problems at interchange ramps,
where high rates of acceleration and deceleration occur. Harwood & Russell [1989],
studying fatal accidents in the U.S., reported that in comparison to other locations, off-
ramps at freeway interchanges had the highest proportion of overturned heavy-vehicle
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accidents. These findings provided further motivation to include the M4 Southern
Freeway - Duranta Road (East) and M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta Road (West)
intersections.
3.4.3 Dangerous goods surveys at selected intersections
Traffic surveys were conducted at the following intersections: Bayhead Road - South
Coast Road; Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road; Tara Road - Duranta Road;
M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta Road; and The Avenue East - Refinery Drive. The
parameters recorded in the surveys included the:
• UN number of the dangerous goods being transported;
• Direction of approach and type of manoeuvre at intersection (e.g. From North
turning right, etc);
• Vehicle configuration (e.g. Light delivery vehicle or LDV, Single-unit heavy goods
vehicle, articulated heavy vehicle, multiple-articulated heavy vehicle);
• Load configuration (e.g. tank, container, drums, cylinders)
The survey data were broken down into fifteen-minute counts.
In order to avoid double-counting during the survey and to avoid confusion during the
subsequent analysis in later chapters, the M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta Road (East)
and M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta Road (West) intersections were treated as a
single intersection and designated the M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta Road
intersection.
Roebuck [2003] suggested a six-hour observation period at each intersection in order
to collect the necessary data, with the observation periods divided into one-hour
segments covering various days where possible. The one-hour segments are
recommended to cater for variations in traffic flow that might occur. Table 3.5 presents
a summary of the surveys conducted at the five intersections. Appendix B contains a
complete listing of the dates and times of each intersection survey, the specific
dangerous goods identified, and directional dangerous goods vehicle traffic volumes.
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Table 3.5: Summary of six-hour dangerous goods intersection surveys
# of Dangerous Goods# of Dangerous
Intersection Goods Vehicles Heavy Vehicles (excluding
LDV's)
__~~~~~~~ _'3~~~_ ~ _~~l}!~_ ~~~~! _'3_~~~ ?_~? ?_~ ~ _
__~~_"Y.i~_ ~~~!~~~~ g_r.iY~ _~ _~_~~!~_ ~~_~~! _~~§I_~ ~_~9 ~_~? _
__~_~ _~_~~~~_~~~_~~~~!Y~¥ __=__ ~~!§I_~!~_ ~~~~ ~_~? ~_~ ~ _
Tara Road - Duranta Road 172 167___________________________ M~ _
The Avenue East - Refinery Drive 89 57
SAPREF Oil Refinery's fuel decanting depot is situated at Island View Storage, which
is linked to SAPREF by pipeline. This may account for the comparatively lower volume
of dangerous goods vehicles recorded at The Avenue East - Refinery Drive
intersection. On average fifty road tankers are serviced and loaded per twenty-four
hours at this fuel-decanting depot. However, LPG is decanted into road tankers at the
SAPREF Oil Refinery itself [Badstobner, 2003]. Hence, fuel produced at SAPREF
contributes to the dangerous goods flows at the Bayhead Road - South Coast Road
and Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersections.
The details of all vehicles transporting dangerous goods were recorded during the
surveys. It was noted that light delivery vehicles (LDV's) carry smaller shipments of
dangerous goods in drums and cylinders. Heavy vehicles transport dangerous goods in
bulk inside tanks, containers and ISO-tainers. Hence, the decision was taken to focus
this investigation on heavy vehicles transporting dangerous goods. Accidents involving
heavy vehicles may have far more serious consequences, due to the larger quantities
of dangerous goods involved.
Three different heavy-vehicle configurations are of interest to dangerous goods
transportation. These are: single-unit heavy vehicles; articulated heavy vehicles; and
multiple-articulated heavy vehicles. Articulated heavy vehicles consist of a separate
tractor and single semi-trailer unit joined with a trailer hitch. Multiple articulated heavy




3.4.4 Chemical identification at intersections
The dangerous goods belonging to Danger group I, identified during the surveys, are
presented in Table 3.6. Appendix B contains a complete listing of the dangerous goods
identified at each intersection during the surveys.
Table 3.6: Dangerous goods allocated to Danger group I, identified during the surveys
Intersection
M4 The Bayhead Edwin
Swales
UN Danger Tara Road Southern Avenue Road- VC Drive
No. Dangerous Goods Class Group - Duranta Freeway- East- South -SouthRoad Duranta Refinery Coast CoastRoad Drive Road Road
1093 Acrylonitrile 6.1 I ;J
. - ----- ---------------------- ---- - -- --------- ----------.- ------------ ----------- ------------ ____ M_MM_M.
1114 Benzene 3 I ;J ;J pt ;J
- ------ ---------------------- ------- --------- ------.----- ------------ ------._--- ------------ -----------
1221 Isopropylamine 3 I ;J ;J
------- ---------------------- - - ----- --------- ------------ ------------ --._------- ------------ -----------
1649 Tetra Ethyl Lead 6.1 I ;J P ;J ;J
------- ---------------------- - - -- - -- --------- ------------ ------------ ----------- ------------ -----------
2902 Methyl Isocyanate* 6.1 1111/111 ;J ;J
tThese dangerous goods were recorded dUring the preliminary survey but not dUring
the full six-hour survey.
*The Dangerous Goods Standard Source [Infosource, 2001] identifies UN number
2902 as "Pesticides, liquid, toxic". This record represents many different insecticide
compounds. However, the words "Methyl Isocyanate" were clearly displayed on these
tankers recorded during the traffic surveys. Yet, the correct UN number for Methyl
Isocyanate is 2480. This raises concerns that some hauliers are transporting
dangerous goods without displaying the correct chemical signage boards. The correct
boards indicate how each product is to be dealt with in an emergency. Hence,
emergency workers are being placed at risk, as specific chemicals require specific
responses.
Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride, a highly corrosive and poisonous substance allocated to
Danger group I, is transported via the N3 to the SAPREF Oil Refinery (sixteen tons
monthly) and Engen Oil Refinery (six tons monthly) [de Klerk, 2004]. Hence, Anhydrous
Hydrogen Fluoride is transported through the: Tara Road - Duranta Road; M4




As described in Section 3.3, up to ten Acrylonitrile ISO-tainers per annum are
transported to Revertex through the Bayhead Road - South Coast Road and Edwin
Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersections [Ecoserv, 2003].
Combining this information with Table 3.6, yields Table 3.7 which contains an
expanded listing of the dangerous goods belonging to Danger group I, that are being
transported through the selected intersections.







Avenue Road- VC DriveUN Dangerous Goods Class Freeway- East- South
No. Group Duranta - South
Road Duranta Refinery Coast CoastRoad Drive Road Road
1052 Anhydrous 8 I ..J ..J ..JHydrogen Fluoride
------_. --------_ ... ----------- - - - ---- -------- -----.-.---- ----------.- ------------ ------._--- ------------
1093 Acrylonitrile 6.1 I .,j .,j
-------- -._-----.-------------- -- - - --- -------- ------------ ------------ ------------ ----------- ------------
1114 Benzene 3 I .,j .,j .,j .,j
-------- ----------------------- --- - - -- -------- ------------ ------------ ------------ ----------- ------------
1221 Isopropylamine 3 I .,j .,j
------- ----------------------- ------- -------- -_.-.------- ------------ ------------ ----------- ------------
1649 Tetra Ethyl Lead 6.1 I .,j .,j .,j .,j
-------- ----------------------- ------- -------- ------------ ------------ ----- ... _--- ----------- ------------
2902 Methyl Isocyanate 6.1 1/11/111 .,j .,j
3.5 Chapter Summary
The Durban South Basin, one of South Africa's most important industrial centres, was
chosen as the case study for this investigation. High levels of traffic flow occur in the
Durban South Basin and significant volumes of dangerous goods are transported on
the roads of the basin daily. These high flows of dangerous goods, when combined
with South Africa's poor road safety record, create numerous opportunities for incidents
(including traffic accidents) that could release dangerous goods into the environment
and result in public exposure to poisonous, corrosive and possibly carcinogenic
substances.
The decision was taken to focus on the dangerous goods being transported to and
from the Major Hazard Installations in the Durban South Basin, including Island View
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Storage and the Engen and SAPREF oil refineries. Preliminary surveys were
conducted at selected locations within the basin in order to obtain an indication of: the
flows of dangerous goods vehicles, the types of dangerous goods being transported
through these locations, the vantage points and manpower requirements for a more
extensive survey.
Traffic accidents are the leading cause of severe dangerous goods incidents (Le.
deaths, injuries, etc). In South Africa, the majority of road accidents occur in urban
areas and accidents at intersections account for a high percentage of the total number
of urban accidents. Accidents at intersections tend to be more serious than those on
road segments. Dangerous goods accidents involving heavy vehicles may have far
more severe consequences than those involving light delivery vehicles, due to the
larger quantities of dangerous goods involved. Hence, the decision was taken to focus
this investigation on intersections, where there is a greater possibility of a heavy-
vehicle transporting dangerous goods being involved in an accident.
Traffic surveys were conducted at the following intersections: Bayhead Road - South
Coast Road; Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road; Tara Road - Duranta Road;
M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta Road; and The Avenue East - Refinery Drive. These
intersections were chosen for study based on: the findings of the preliminary survey,
their historical accident records and their proximity to dangerous goods trip generators
such as Major Hazard Installations. Analysis of the traffic surveys yielded the specific
dangerous goods being transported and directional dangerous goods vehicle flows at
the selected intersections. Combining information obtained from a desk study with the
analysis of the traffic surveys, yielded a listing of the dangerous goods, belonging to
Danger group I (substances that present a very severe risk), that are being transported
through the chosen intersections: Acrylonitrile, Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride,
Benzene, Isopropylamine, Methyl Isocyanate and Tetra Ethyl Lead.
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4. LIKELIHOOD OF DANGEROUS GOODS ACCIDENTS AND RELEASES
This chapter describes the methodology developed to estimate dangerous goods
accident and release rates at intersections. Two approaches are utilised, a
deterministic model and Monte Carlo simulation.
The technique that has been developed to estimate dangerous goods accident and
release rates is summarised by the following relationships:
Dangerous Goods Accident Rate
= Heavy Vehicle Accident Rate x
Proportion ofHeavy vehicles transporting Dangerous Goods
Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate
= Dangerous Goods Accident Rate x
Probability ofrelease IDangerous Goods accident
(4.1 )
(4.2)
where: the symbol" I " means "given". As discussed in Section 3.4.3, the decision was
taken to focus this investigation on heavy vehicles transporting dangerous goods.
Accidents involving heavy vehicles may have far more serious consequences, due to
the larger quantities of dangerous goods involved.
4.1 Deterministic Model for Dangerous Goods Accidents
A review of the literature did not reveal any dangerous goods transportation studies
specifically focussing on intersections. Nevertheless, the principles of the research
cited in Chapter 2 (notably the development of dangerous goods heavy-vehicle
accident and release rates for route segments by Harwood et al. [1993]) were utilised
and adapted for use in this investigation.
The development and implementation of the deterministic approach used to estimate
dangerous goods accident and release rates at intersections, is detailed in this section.
The Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection is used as an example.
Spreadsheets were used to perform the calculations in this investigation. Hence, the
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parameters were calculated to a greater number of significant figures than shown in the
text.
4.1.1 Heavy-vehicle accident rate
The first step in estimating the dangerous goods accident and release rates was the
estimation of the Heavy-vehicle Accident Rate. Accident studies require the use of
three years of historical data in order to perform adequate statistical analysis [FHWA,
1994; Roebuck, 1989; Roebuck, 2003]. If available, a longer historical record may be
used to increase the precision of the analysis. The most recent three-year record of
heavy-vehicle accidents was obtained from the eThekwini Municipality Transport
Authority for each of the intersections selected for survey. From 1 January 2000 to 31
December 2002, there were 297 heavy-vehicle accidents at the Edwin Swales VC
Drive - South Coast Road intersection. Hence, the heavy-vehicle accident rate may be
estimated as:
lJ h' I A 'd R Heavy-vehicle accidents in 3 yearslleavy-ve lC e CCl ent ate = ------'=--~--------:...--
3
= 297 =99 Heavy-vehicle accidents/year
3
(4.3)
The assumption was made that only one heavy vehicle was involved in each reported
heavy-vehicle accident. Therefore, there were 297 heavy vehicles involved in accidents
at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection during 2000-2002. This
is a reasonable assumption as most heavy-vehicle accidents are with passenger cars
[Harwood & Russell, 1989; Hauer, 2001]. The necessity of this assumption is
discussed in Section 4.1.3. Hence, at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road
intersection:
Heavy-vehicle Accident Rate = 99 Heavy vehicles involved in accidents/year
4.1.2 Exposure
Exposure may be regarded as the opportunity for accident involvement. The purpose of
measuring exposure is to enable a reasonable assessment of accident risk to be made.
Intersection exposure may be measured by the volume of vehicles entering a given
intersection over a specific period of time, usually one year [Khanabis & Assar, 1989].
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The eThekwini Municipality conducts manual counts of traffic volumes at intersections
within the metropolitan area. Twelve-hour counts of traffic volumes are undertaken,
usually between 6 AM and 6 PM on a weekday. The traffic volumes are recorded in
fifteen-minute sub-totals and categorised into vehicle-type (e.g. car, bus, heavy
vehicle), direction of approach (e.g. North, South, etc.) and type of manoeuvre (e.g.
proceeding straight, turning left or right). When necessary, usually after a period of a
few years, these counts are repeated. Traffic volumes for the selected intersections
were provided by the eThekwini Municipality Transport Authority for use in this
investigation.
A total volume of 8985 heavy vehicles entered the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South
Coast Road intersection between 6 AM and 6 PM during the eThekwini Municipality
traffic count on 22 April 2002.
A procedure developed to expand this twelve-hour weekday count into an Annual
Traffic Volume, taking into consideration after-hours and weekend traffic, is detailed in
Appendix C. This procedure yields:
Annual Traffic Volume = 3.44 x 106 Entering Heavy vehicles/year
4.1.3 Probability of heavy-vehicle accident
Using the historical accident record and the estimated exposure, the probability of a
heavy-vehicle accident may be estimated as:
P b b 'I'ty if lJ h' I A '..J Heavy-vehicle Accident Ratero a I I 0 neavy-ve IC e CCluent = -----'---------
Annual Traffic Volume
= 99 Heavy vehicles involved in accidents/year _ 88 -5
6 -2. x10
3.44 x 10 Heavy vehicles/year
(4.4)
The reasoning behind expressing the Heavy-vehicle Accident Rate in terms of Heavy
vehicles involved in accidents/year is clarified in Equation (4.4). Probabilities are
dimensionless, and since the denominator is the exposure of vehicles, the numerator
should also be the count of vehicles, not the count of accidents. The use of this
approach is based upon the recommendations of Hauer [2001].
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4.1.4 Proportion of heavy vehicles transporting dangerous goods
Only the details of dangerous goods vehicles were recorded during the six-hour
intersection surveys conducted as part of this investigation. Recording the flows and
manoeuvres of all heavy vehicles entering the surveyed intersections would have
increased the number of observers required to conduct the surveys. Hence, the heavy-
vehicle traffic volumes needed to be estimated from the eThekwini Municipality traffic
counts.
A total volume of 328 heavy vehicles transporting dangerous goods was recorded
during the six-hour dangerous goods survey at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South
Coast Road intersection.
A total volume of 4905 Heavy vehicles entered the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South
Coast Road intersection during the same six hours of the eThekwini Municipality traffic
count on 22 April 2002.
Hence, the proportion of heavy vehicles transporting dangerous goods may be
estimated as:
Proportion ofHeavy vehicles transporting Dangerous Goods
# ofHeavy vehicles transporting Dangerous Goods




=0.0669 Dangerous Goods Heavy vehicles/Entering Heavy vehicle
4.1.5 Dangerous goods accident rate
(4.5)
The assumption was made that heavy vehicles transporting dangerous goods, are just
as likely to be involved in an accident, as other heavy vehicles. Hence, the number of
dangerous goods accidents per entering heavy vehicle, may be estimated as:
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Dangerous Goods accidents/Entering Heavy vehicle
= Probability ofHeavy-vehicle accident x
Proportion ofheavy vehicles transporting dangerous goods
= (2.88 x 10-5 ) x 0.0669
Chapter 4
(4.6)
=1.92 x 10-6 Dangerous Goods Heavy vehicles involved in accidents/Entering Heavy vehicle
=1.92 x 10-6 Dangerous Goods accidents/Entering Heavy vehicle*
*Based on the assumption introduced in Section 4.1.1 that one dangerous goods heavy
vehicle is involved in each dangerous goods accident.
The number of entering heavy vehicles per dangerous goods accident may be
estimated by taking the inverse of Equation (4.6):
Entering Heavy vehicles/Dangerous Goods accident
= )(Dangerous Goods accidents/Entering Heavy vehicle)
- 1/
- /1.92 x 10-6
=5.20 x 105 Entering Heavy vehicles/Dangerous Goods accident
(4.7)
Thus, by including the estimated exposure, the recurrence interval for dangerous
goods accidents may be estimated as:
Years/Dangerous Goods accident
_ Entering Heavy vehicles/Dangerous Goods accident
Entering Heavy vehicles/year
5.20x105= 6 =0.151 Years/Dangerous Goods accident
3.44x 10
The Dangerous Goods Accident Rate may be estimated as:
Dangerous Goods Accident Rate
=Dangerous Goods accidents/Entering Heavy vehicle x
Entering Heavy vehicles/year
=1.92x10-6 x3.44x106
= 6.62 Dangerous Goods accidents/year
= 1/





The Dangerous Goods Accident Rate may also be estimated by taking the inverse of
Equation (4.8).
4.1.6 Probability of release
The U.S. Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) Office of Motor Carriers maintains a
database of heavy-vehicle accident reports. Studying this database, Harwood &
Russell [1989] derived Table 4.1. For the period 1984-1985, Table 4.1 presents the
distribution of accidents involving dangerous goods carrying heavy vehicles by their
relationship to intersections, freeway ramps and railway-highway grade crossings.
Table 4.1: Distribution of FHWA-reported heavy-vehicle accidents by relationship to
intersecting facility, 1984-1985 [Harwood & Russell, 1989]
Relationship to
Non-dangerous Dangerous goods heavy-vehicle accidents
goods heavy-
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100% 3703 100% 3183 520 14.0%,
Heavy-vehicle at-grade intersection accidents appear to be less likely to result in a
dangerous goods release (3.5 per-cent probability), compared to the 14 per-cent of all
accidents involving dangerous goods carrying heavy vehicles that result in a release.
The probability of a release, given that an accident involving a dangerous goods
vehicle has occurred, also varies with the type of accident. The release probabilities
presented in Table 4.2 were developed by Harwood & Russell [1989] using information
reported to the U.S. FHWA for the period 1984-1985.
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Table 4.2: Probability of release as function of accident type, given an accident









Collision with parked vehicle
Collision with train
Collision with non-motorist










Collision with fixed object 12.9%
-----------------------------------.-. ----------------------------------------
Other collision 5.9%
Collision with passenger car 3.5%
-------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
Collision with heavy vehicle 9.4%
-------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
Collision with other vehicle 3.7%
Multiple-vehicle collisions were reported to be the leading type of accident for both
heavy vehicles carrying and not carrying dangerous goods. However, the leading
accident types that resulted in a dangerous goods release were single-vehicle
overturning accidents and single-vehicle run-oft-road accidents. Accidents at
intersections typically involve multiple-vehicle collisions. U.S. FHWA historical data
indicated that multiple-vehicle collisions were less likely to result in a dangerous goods
release [Harwood & Russell, 1989].
Unfortunately, no South African dangerous goods statistics were available to estimate
the probability of release given an accident involving a dangerous goods vehicle.
Hence, based on the information presented in Table 4.1:
Probability ofrelease IDangerous Goods accident = 0.140
where: the symbol" I " means "given". Hence, the assumption was made that a heavy
vehicle transporting dangerous goods has a 14 per-cent probability of releasing its
cargo, if it is involved in an accident. The decision was taken to use the release
probability value presented in Table 4.1 for all accidents involving heavy vehicles
transporting dangerous goods, not the value for at-grade intersection accidents,
because of the larger sample size used to estimate the former.
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4.1.7 Dangerous goods releasing accident rate
A releasing dangerous goods accident occurs when a heavy vehicle transporting
dangerous goods is involved in an accident, and a fraction of the cargo is released.
The number of releasing dangerous goods accidents per entering heavy vehicle, may
be estimated as:
Releasing Dangerous Goods accidents/Entering Heavy vehicle
= Dangerous Goods accidents/Entering Heavy vehicle x
Probability ofrelease IDangerous Goods accident
=(1.92 x 10-6 ) x 0.140
(4.10)
=2.70 x 10-7 Releasing Dangerous Goods accidents/Entering Heavy vehicle
Taking the inverse of Equation (4.10), the number of entering heavy vehicles per
releasing dangerous goods accident, may be estimated as:
Entering Heavy vehicles/Releasing Dangerous Goods accident
= )(Releasing Dangerous Goods accidents/Entering Heavy vehicle)
- 1/
- / 2.70 xI0-7
(4.11 )
=3.70 xI06 Entering Heavy vehicles/Releasing Dangerous Goods accident
Thus, the recurrence interval for releasing dangerous goods accidents may be
estimated as:
Years/Releasing Dangerous Goods accident




=1.08 Years/Releasing Dangerous Goods accident
(4.12)
Hence, taking the inverse of Equation (4.12), the Dangerous Goods Releasing
Accident Rate may be estimated as:
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Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate
- 1/
- / (Years/Releasing Dangerous Goods aCcident)
- 1/
- /1.08
=0.93 Releasing Dangerous Goods accidents/year
4.1.8 Application of deterministic approach to other intersections
(4.13)
Using the deterministic approach outlined in Sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.7, the dangerous
goods accident and release rates have been estimated at the Bayhead Road - South
Coast Road; Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road; Tara Road - Duranta Road;
M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta Road; and The Avenue East - Refinery Drive
intersections. The results of this analysis are summarised in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 reveals that the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection has
the highest estimated rate of dangerous goods accidents and releases, followed by the
Bayhead Road - South Coast Road intersection. The Tara Road - Duranta Road, M4
Southern Freeway - Duranta Road and The Avenue East - Refinery Drive
intersections have a comparatively lower estimated Dangerous Goods Accident Rate
and Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate. Unfortunately, there are no reliable
South African dangerous goods incident databases available to validate these results.
Both the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road and the Bayhead Road - South
Coast Road intersections have a similar Proportion of Heavy vehicles transporting
Dangerous goods. However, the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road
intersection has a higher Heavy-vehicle Accident Rate than the Bayhead Road - South
Coast Road intersection. There appears to be a proportionate (linear) increase in the
estimated Dangerous Goods Accident Rate at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South
Coast Road intersection.
The Avenue East - Refinery Drive and the M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta Road
intersections have a similar Heavy-vehicle Accident Rate. However, the M4 Southern
Freeway - Duranta Road intersection has a higher Proportion of Heavy vehicles
transporting Dangerous goods than The Avenue East - Refinery Drive intersection.
There appears to be a proportionate (linear) increase in the estimated Dangerous
Goods Accident Rate at the M4 Southern Freeway - DuranOta Road intersection.
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Heavy-vehicle accidents in 3 years
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~
Heavy-vehicle Accident Rate [Heavy vehicles involved in accidents/year] (4.3)
1-_- ----------------------------------------------- .
Twelve-hour Weekday traffic volume [Heavy vehicles] I 1358 I 1172 ! 1334
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~-----------------~----------------- -----------------~-----------------~---------------
Annual traffic volume [Entering Heavy vehicles/year]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------
Probability of a Heavy-vehicle accident (4.4) 3.20E-06 8.91 E-06 7.18E-06 1.68E-05 2.88E-05
1-- ----------------------------------------------- • _
# of Heavy vehicles carrying Dangerous goods recorded during 6 hour survey 167 141 57 241 328
1- ----------------------------------------------- _
# of Heavy vehicles noted during same 6 hour period of eThekwini traffic count 650 671 750 3650 4905
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------
Percentage of Heavy vehicles transporting Dangerous goods (4.5) 25.7% 21.0% 7.60% 6.60% 6.69%
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ------------------
Dangerous Goods accidents/Entering Heavy vehicle (4.6) 8.24E-07 1.87E-06 5.45E-07 1.11 E-06 1.92E-06
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ------------------
Entering Heavy vehicles/Dangerous Goods accident (4.7) 1.21E+06 5.34E+05 1.83E+06 9.02E+05 5.20E+05
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ---------------
Years/Dangerous Goods accident (4.8) 2.33 1.19 3.59 0.355
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------
Dangerous Goods accidents/year (4.9) 0.43 0.84 0.28 2.82 6.62
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ------------------
Probability of release given that a Dangerous Goods accident has occurred 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.140
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ------------------
Releasing Dangerous Goods Accidents/Entering Heavy vehicle (4.10) 1.16E-07 2.63E-07 7.66E-08 1.56E-07 2.70E-07
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- --------------
Entering Heavy vehicles/Releasing Dangerous Goods Accident (4.11) 8.64E+06 3.80E+06 1.31 E+07 6.43E+06 3.70E+06
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ------------------
Years/Releasing Dangerous Goods Accident (4.12) 16.6 8.48 25.6 2.53 1.08
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ------------------
Releasing Dangerous Goods Accidents/year (4.13) 0.060 0.118 0.039 0.396 0.930
67
Chapfer 4
4.1.9 Analysis of deterministic approach
When Equations (4.3) to (4.13) are combined and simplified, the deterministic model
for estimating dangerous goods accident and release rates is reduced to two simple
relationships:
Dangerous Goods Accident Rate
= Heavy-vehicle Accident Rate x
Proportion ofHeavy vehicles transporting Dangerous Goods
Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate
= Dangerous Goods Accident Rate x
Probability ofrelease IDangerous Goods accident
(4.14)
(4.15)
Checking, using data from the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road
intersection:
Dangerous Goods Accident Rate
= 99 x 0.0669 = 6.62 Dangerous Goods accidents/year
Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate
= 6.62 x 0.140 =0.93 Releasing Dangerous Goods accidents/year
These results correspond with the values estimated in Section 4.1.5 and Section 4.1.7,
respectively. Hence, the linear relationship postulated in Section 4.1.8, between the
Heavy-vehicle Accident Rate, the Proportion of Heavy vehicles transporting Dangerous
goods and the Dangerous Goods Accident Rate is confirmed.
Henceforth, the Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate will be expressed in terms
of the recurrence interval, Le. in units of Years/Releasing Dangerous Goods accident
instead of Releasing Dangerous Goods accidents/year. This decision was taken as
readers find it easier to grasp the concept of 2.5 Years/Releasing Dangerous Goods
accident, in comparison to the equivalent of 0.4 Releasing Dangerous Goods
accidents/year.
The approach taken in Sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.7 has clarified the understanding of the
system being modelled. judging purely by the parameters in Equations (4.14) and
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(4.15), it would appear that Exposure (measured in units of Entering Heavy
vehicles/year) has no effect on the Dangerous Goods Accident Rate and the
Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate. The specific manner in which the model
has been formulated resulted in the Exposure term being "cancelled out". However, if
there are no heavy vehicles entering the intersection, there will be no heavy-vehicle
accidents. Thus, Exposure and Accident Rate are clearly not independent of each
other.
4.1.10 Application of deterministic approach to specific chemicals
The deterministic approach discussed in Sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.9 may be adapted to
estimate the dangerous goods accident and release rates for specific chemicals.
• Petroleum
Petroleum (UN No. 1203) was the primary dangerous substance identified during the
surveys. During the six-hour survey at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road
intersection, 129 Petroleum tankers were recorded (Appendix 8: Table: 8.2).
SUbstituting this parameter into Equation (4.5) yields:
Proportion ofHeavy vehicles transporting Petroleum
129=--=0.0263 Petroleum tankers/Entering Heavy vehicle
4905
Substituting the proportion of heavy vehicles transporting Petroleum into Equation
(4.14), yields:
Petroleum tanker Accident Rate
= 99 x 0.0263 = 2.60 Petroleum tankers involved in accidents/year
SUbstituting the Petroleum tanker Accident Rate into Equation (4.15) yields:
Petroleum tanker Releasing Accident Rate
= 2.60 x 0.140
=0.366 Releasing Petroleum tanker accidents/year
== 2.74 Years/Releasing Petroleum tanker accident, at the Edwin Swales VC
Drive - South Coast Road intersection
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• Tetra Ethyl Lead
Tetra Ethyl Lead (UN No. 1649) is allocated to Danger group I (substances that present
a very severe risk). During the six-hour survey at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South
Coast Road intersection, two Tetra Ethyl Lead tankers were recorded (Appendix B:
Table: B.2). Substituting this parameter into Equation (4.5) yields:
Proportion ofHeavy vehicles transporting Tetra Ethyl Lead
=_2_ =0.0004 Tetra Ethyl Lead tankers/Entering Heavy vehicle
4905
Substituting the proportion of heavy vehicles transporting Tetra Ethyl Lead into
Equation (4.14), yields:
Tetra Ethyl Lead tanker Accident Rate
= 99xO.0004
= 0.04 Tetra Ethyl Lead tankers involved in accidents/year
== 25 Years/Tetra Ethyl Lead tanker accident
Substituting the Tetra Ethyl Lead tanker Accident Rate into Equation (4.15) yields:
Tetra Ethyl Lead tanker Releasing Accident Rate
= 0.04 x 0.140
=0.006 Releasing Tetra Ethyl Lead tanker accidents/year
== 176 Years/Releasing Tetra Ethyl Lead tanker accident, at the Edwin Swales VC
Drive - South Coast Road intersection
Tetra Ethyl Lead and the other Danger group I substances being transported through
the selected intersections, present a very severe risk. However, as the proportion of
heavy vehicles transporting these substances is low (compared to Petroleum for
example), the estimated frequency of accidents and releases involving Danger group I
substances is much lower.
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4.2 Monte Carlo Simulation of Dangerous Goods Accidents
4.2.1 Background and approach
As described in Chapter 2, many researchers have developed and applied methods to
evaluate the risks associated with dangerous goods transport. In most cases, these
methods required extensive and reliable data sources. Probabilities and parameter
values were usually assumed to be known, deterministic values. However,
transportation risk assessments must often be performed even when there are
substantial data uncertainties.
An important caveat for researchers is the effect of under-reporting of accidents. The
number of accidents reported to the authorities, and hence, the estimated accident
rate, may be far less than the number of accidents that actually occur at a location.
Hauer & Hakkert [1988] studied the effects of under-reporting and estimated that fatal
accident records were accurate to within 5 per-cent, serious injury accident records to
within 20 per-cent, and minor injury records to within 50 per-cent. The reporting of
accidents varies with the driver, the location and time of the accident, and the accident
severity [Hauer & Hakkert, 1988].
The deterministic model for estimating dangerous goods accident and release rates at
intersections, described in Section 4.1, has three input parameters:
• Heavy-vehicle accident rate
• Proportion of heavy vehicles transporting dangerous goods
• Probability of release given that a dangerous goods accident has occurred
The values of these input parameters of the deterministic model are not known with
certainty. Hence, the need for an analysis method that explicitly incorporates this
uncertainty became apparent.
When the input parameters of the deterministic model are held constant, the same
results are obtained no matter how many times the model is recalculated. Monte Carlo
simulation was employed to iteratively evaluate the deterministic model. Specific
probability distributions were chosen for each of the input parameters. The probability
distribution chosen for each input parameter either closely matched the existing data,
or best represented the current state of knowledge. The inputs for each recalculation of
the now stochastic model were then randomly generated from the chosen probability
distributions, to simulate the process of sampling from an actual population. A
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stochastic model is a model that incorporates probability or randomness [Kalos &
Whitlock, 1986]. The process used to select the probability distributions for each of the
input parameters is outlined in this section. The Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast
Road intersection is again used as an example.
4.2.2 Heavy-vehicle accident rate
The most recent three-year record of heavy-vehicle accidents at the Edwin Swales VC
Drive - South Coast Road intersection was obtained from the eThekwini Municipality
Transport Authority. The annual records of accidents involving single-unit heavy
vehicles, articulated heavy vehicles and multiple-articulated heavy vehicles, for the
period 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2002, are presented in Table 4.4. Vehicle-
pedestrian accidents were not included in this investigation as, intuitively, and from the
evidence of Table 4.2, they have a very low probability of resulting in a dangerous
goods release.
Table 4.4: Breakdown of heavy-vehicle accidents at the Edwin Swales VC Drive -
South Coast Road intersection, 2000-2002
# of Heavy-vehicle accidents
Heavy-vehicle type 2000 2001 2002
~~I~~~~~~~_~~~~~~~~~ _~~~~X ~~~_i?~~___________ 27 16 11------------------- -------------------- --------------------
~~!~_~1_~~~9_~_~~_~¥_~~_~~~~~____________________ 43 65 67
------------------- -------------------- --.-----------------
Single-unit heavy goods vehicle 18 23 27
L 88 104 105
The historical record presented in Table 4.4 illustrates variability in the count of
accidents within each heavy-vehicle type over the three-year period. Unfortunately, due
to the random nature of accidents, inferring a potential for accidents at a given
intersection solely from the historical accident data, may yield spurious results [Vogt,
1999]. Most locations do not experience many accidents in any given year (some of the
surveyed intersections in this investigation fall into this category). Observations may be
too infrequent and too variable to yield meaningful and reliable long-term results. In
addition, simple linear regression is generally not regarded as an appropriate statistical
approach for modelling accident relationships because accidents are discrete, random,
non-negative events that often do not follow a Normal distribution [Vogt, 1999].
Accidents are described as discrete, random events because the length of time until
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the next accident occurs does not depend on how long it has been since the last
accident occurred [Vogt, 1999J.
In recent years, a consensus has formed in favour of modelling accidents as rare,
independent events [Vogt, 1999]. Such events may be characterised by their mean A
per unit time and are simply represented by a random variable with a Poisson




where: y =0, 1, 2 ... accidents per unit time
(4.16)
The Poisson distribution is often used to simulate the number of times that an event will
happen when there is no clear upper bound on how many times it might happen.
Poisson models provide an easy linkage to probability, as opposed to other commonly
used accident models such as linear regression [Vogt &Bared, 1998].
A Poisson process does not mean the same thing a Poisson distribution. The
association of Poisson distributed random variables with intervals of time characterises
a 1-dimensional Poisson process. Let the intensity of this particular 1-dimensional
Poisson process, be A per unit time. In any time period of length T, the number of
accidents is a Poisson random variable with mean AT. The numbers of accidents in
separate periods of time are independent of each other. In such a Poisson process, the
times between successive accidents are independent continuous Exponential random
variables with a mean 1/A [Vogt & Bared, 1998J.
One caveat of the using the Poisson process to model the Heavy-vehicle Accident
Rate is that it restricts the mean and variance of the accident frequency data to be
equal. This is often not the case with historical accident frequency data. Such data are
often characterised by overdispersion (the variance of the accident frequency exceeds
the mean). The use of a Negative Binomial distribution to model the Heavy-vehicle
Accident Rate, relaxes this mean/variance equality restriction and accordingly accounts
for overdispersed data. The choice between using the Poisson or the Negative
Binomial distribution is based on the overdispersion observed in the historical accident
data [Vogt, 1999]. Negative Binomial models have been successfully applied to
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estimate the frequency of traffic accidents on roadway segments and at intersections
[Yinhai et al. 2003].
Many previous studies have used Poisson and Negative Binomial accident models.
Hakkert & Mahalel [1978] used a Poisson model to study accidents at intersections.
Pickering et al. [1986], in a study of accidents at three-legged intersections, used a
Poisson model along with a generalised linear modelling technique. Maycock & Hall
[1984] studying traffic circles and Hauer, Ng & Lovell [1988] studying urban
intersections, employed the Negative Binomial technique. Other studies that have used
Negative Binomial models include: Bauer & Harwood [1996] for studying accidents at
intersections and Vogt & Bared [1998] for studying accidents at rural intersections and
on rural segments.
Another characteristic of accident frequency data is a large number of zeros resulting
from not having an accident occur at a specific location, in a given time period. Some
researchers have applied two-state models - one state that has near zero accident
probability and another state follows a Poisson or Negative Binomial distribution [Yinhai
et al. 2003]. Bauer & Harwood [1996] in addition to employing Poisson and Negative
Binomial modelling also presented a Lognormal model, where the natural logarithm of
the number of accidents is regarded as a Normal variable with mean 11 and variance if.
They found this model useful where intersections had very few accidents in the time
period under consideration (some of the surveyed intersections in this investigation fall
into this category).
The parameters of the Heavy-vehicle Accident Rate were calculated from Table 4.4:
Mean 'A =99 Heavy vehicle accidents/year
Variance =91
The variance of this accident frequency data does not exceed the mean, Le. the data is
not overdispersed. Hence, there was no need to use a Negative Binomial distribution to
model the accident rate. Therefore, the decision was taken to model the Heavy-vehicle
Accident Rate at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection as a
Poisson random variable with mean 'A = 99 Heavy-vehicle accidents/year
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4.2.3 Proportion of heavy vehicles transporting dangerous goods
A breakdown of the proportion of heavy vehicles transporting dangerous goods, during
each of the six hours of the survey at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road
intersection, is presented in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Hourly breakdown of the proportion of heavy vehicles transporting
dangerous goods, Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection
Hour # of He~vy vehicles Estimated # of entering Proportion of Heavy
transportmg Dangerous heavy vehicles vehicles transporting
ending goods Dangerous goods
____~~_:~_~ ~? J_~~ ~._~?~~ (~:~~~L __
09:40 64 829 0.0772 (7.72%)
._--------------.----------------------------- ------------------------------- -------------------------------
10:40 59 814 0.0725 (7.25%)
---------------------------------------------- ------------------------------- -------------------------------
11:40 68 829 0.0821 (8.21%)
-------.-.------------------------------------ ------------------------------- ---------------.---------------
12:40 62 873 0.0710 (7.10%)
-----------------------------------------.---- ------------------------------- -------------------------------
13:40 33 839 0.0393 (3.93%)
1:: 328 4905 0.0669 (6.69%)
The parameters of the Proportion of heavy vehicles transporting dangerous goods
were calculated from Table 4.5:
Mean Jl = 0.0667
Standard deviation a =0.0156
The proportion of heavy vehicles transporting dangerous goods in Table 4.5, did not
show a great deal of variability over the course of the six-hour survey. The Lilliefors test
for goodness-of-fit to a Normal distribution was performed on the sample of six values
from the rightmost column of Table 4.5. More information on the Lilliefors test and the
technique for performing this test in Microsoft Excel™ is presented in Sections 4.3.2
and 4.3.3. The null hypothesis, that the proportion of heavy vehicles transporting
dangerous goods at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection,
followed a Normal distribution, could not be rejected at the 0 = 0.05 level of
significance. In addition, the calculated p-value (interpolated from the relevant table in
[Daniel, 1990]) was approximately 0.16, so the null hypothesis was not rejected. The p-
value is the probability of observing the given sample result under the assumption that
the null hypothesis is true. If the p-value is less than the 0 level of significance, then the
null hypothesis is rejected. If the p-value is greater than 0, then there is insufficient
evidence to reject the null hypothesis [Conover, 1980].
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Hence, the decision was taken to model the Proportion of heavy vehicles transporting
dangerous goods at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection. as a
Normal random variable with mean Jl = 0.0667 and standard deviation a = 0.0156.
The usual justification for using the Normal distribution for modelling is the Central Limit
Theorem. which states (roughly) that if a large number of independent samples is taken
from virtually any probability distribution, the mean values of these independent
samples will follow a probability distribution that is approximately Normal [Daniel,
1990].
4.2.4 Probability of release
No South African statistics were available to estimate the probability of release given
an accident involving a dangerous goods vehicle. The dangerous goods release
probabilities presented in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, which were based on information
reported to the U.S. FHWA. were studied.
In Table 4.1, at-grade intersection accidents were shown to have a 3.5 per-cent
probability of resulting in a dangerous goods release. On average, 14 per-cent of all
accidents involving dangerous goods carrying heavy vehicles resulted in a release. The
three-year record of accidents involving heavy vehicles at the Edwin Swales VC Drive
- South Coast Road intersection included a Single-vehicle Overturned accident in
2001. Table 4.2 reported that such accidents in the U.S. had a 37.5 per-cent probability
of resulting in a dangerous goods release. In addition. road tanker vehicles involved in
serious accidents usually do not remain upright [Eurochlor, 1998].
Hence, the decision was taken to model the probability of release given that a
dangerous goods accident has occurred, at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast
Road intersection, as a Uniform random variable between the lower bound A =0.035
and the upper bound B = 0.375.
A Uniform distribution was selected because there was complete uncertainty as to
which values within the range were more likely under South African conditions. As
discussed in Section 2.7.3, Pet-Armacost et al. [1999] used Monte Carlo simulation to
investigate the risks associated with transporting the chemical Hydrazine in tanks, with
and without pressure relief devices fitted. No data was available on the following
factors: the impact of relief devices on release probabilities; and the impact of
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Hydrazine on the likelihood of fires and explosions. Faced with similar data
uncertainties, Pet-Armacost et al. [1999] also made use of Uniform distributions to
model these factors.
4.2.5 Generation of random variables
Computer-generated random numbers are not true random numbers, as computers are
deterministic. However, given a number to start with, called a random number seed, a
series of mathematical operations are performed on this seed in order to generate
unrelated "pseudo" random numbers. If a random number seed is used more than
once, identical random numbers will be generated each time. Thus, for multiple trials,
different random number seeds must be used. Many random number generators draw
a random number seed from somewhere within the system, e.g. the time on the
computer clock, therefore the seed is unlikely to be the same for two different
experiments [Hellekalek, 2004].
The output of random number generators is usually tested with rigorous statistical tests
to ensure that the numbers are actually random in relation to one another. There is
much concern that the statistical algorithms used in Microsoft Excel™ yield erroneous
results and that the procedures for random number generation do not reach an
acceptable standard [KnOsel, 1998; McCullough & Wilson, 1999]. Hence, PopTools, a
freeware enhancement or add-in to Microsoft Excel™ was utilised in this investigation.
PopTools includes routines for generation of random variables from various
distributions, e.g. Normal, Poisson, Binomial, Lognormal, Gamma, Exponential, etc. All
PopTools functions and procedures that depend on random variables use the
Mersenne Twister pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) developed by
Matsumoto & Nishimura [1998]. The Mersenne Twister PRNG has undergone thorough
testing and been proven to have excellent statistical properties [Hellekalek, 2004;
Matsumoto & Nishimura, 1998]. Ultimately, a computer cannot express an infinite state.
Pseudo-random numbers will eventually return to the initial value in a certain cycle,
which is called the period of the random numbers. One of the characteristics of
Mersenne Twister PRNG is its very long period of 219937_1 [Matsumoto & Nishimura,
1998]. Many researchers in the field of random number generation consider the




4.2.6 Overview of stochastic model
Monte Carlo simulation was employed to iteratively evaluate the deterministic model
presented in Section 4.1.9. The input parameters for each recalculation of the now
stochastic model were randomly generated from the selected probability distributions
presented in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: Input parameters for Monte Carlo simulation of dangerous goods accidents
and releases at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection
Input parameter Selected distribution Distribution parameters
Heavy-vehicle accident rate Poisson random variable Mean A. =99
---------------------------------------- ------------------------------ --------------------------------------
Proportion of Heavy vehicles Normal random variable
Mean J1 =0.0667
transporting dangerous goods Standard deviation a =0.0156
---------------------------------------- ------------------------------ --.-----------------------------------
Probability of release I Dangerous Lower bound A =0.035Uniform random variablegoods accident Upper bound B =0.375
The popularity of Monte Carlo methods has led to a number of commercial simulation
programs, which work directly with Microsoft Excel™ spreadsheets as add-ins. Crystal
Ball™ and @Risk™ are the two most popular and are very costly (approximately
US$700). Due to their ease of use and the user's possible lack of familiarity with the
underlying assumptions and restrictions, it is easy to misuse such commercial
simulation packages by "stretching" them beyond the limits of credibility. Slick graphics,
animation, tables, etc. tempt the user to assign unwarranted credibility to the output
[Pet-Armacost et al. 1999].
Fortunately, Monte Carlo simulation may be easily performed in Microsoft Excel™
without purchasing commercial simulation packages. The Column-input Data: Table
procedure in a spreadsheet may be used to tabulate the outputs from repeated
independent recalculations of a stochastic model. However, the resultant Microsoft
Excel™ data tables are "alive", Le. they are recalculated every time the spreadsheet is
recalculated (when the [F9] OR [Enter] keys are pressed) because the input
parameters are random variables. When performing statistical analysis, the following
steps should be taken to prevent the simulated data from changing after the simulation
is completed:
• Select the data range and copy it to the clipboard using the Edit: Copy command
• Use the Edit: Paste Special: Values command on the selected data range.
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The result is that the formulas in the data range are replaced by the values that were
displayed, and these numerical values will not change.
Myerson [2001J developed Simtoo/s.xla, a free downloadable Microsoft Excel™ add-in
comparable to @Risk™ and Crystal Ball™, for performing Monte Carlo simulations.
Simtools.xla adds a Simulation Table procedure to the Tools menu in Microsoft
Excel™. This procedure tabulates outputs from repeated independent recalculations of
a stochastic spreadsheet model. Simulation Table is similar to a column-input data
table, but Simulation Table stores the output data as values that are not recalculated
whenever the spreadsheet changes. In fact, the Simulation Table procedure merely
tells Microsoft Excel™ to carry out a Data: Table command followed by a Copy and
Paste-Special-Values command. Simulation Table also adds a column containing a
percentile index to the output data; indicating (in each row of the output table) what
fraction of the simulation data is above this row. This is useful for making empirical
cumulative distribution charts after sorting the output data.
4.2.7 Monte Carlo simulation results
The results of one thousand independent recalculations of the stochastic model for
estimating dangerous goods accident and release rates at the Edwin Swales VC Drive
- South Coast Road intersection, are summarised in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2.
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Bin: Dangerous Goods accidents/year
12 More
Figure 4.1: Distribution of the Dangerous Goods Accident Rate at the Edwin Swales
VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection
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Bin: Years/Releasing Dangerous Goods Accident
Figure 4.2: Distribution of the Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate at the Edwin
Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection
Graphs of the empirical cumulative distribution function of the output parameters are
another means of conveying the results of a Monte Carlo simulation. The empirical
cumulative distribution function, Sex) may be calculated from the sample data using the
following [Daniel, 1990]:




Sex) =the proportion of sample observations less than or equal to x
n = the total number of sample observations
Sex) is a step function that increases by a value of 1/n at each ordered data point
[Daniel, 1990].
The empirical cumulative distribution functions of the Dangerous Goods Accident Rate




- Empirical cumulative distribution function



















Figure 4.3: The empirical cumulative distribution function of the Dangerous Goods
Accident Rate, Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection
- Empirical cumulative distribution function
















Years/Releasing Dangerous Goods Accident
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Figure 4.4: The empirical cumulative distribution function of the Dangerous Goods
Releasing Accident Rate, Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection
Accidents occur at random points in time, and the length of time between any particular
accident and the next accident is a random variable. Nevertheless, Figure 4.4
illustrates that in 75 per-cent of cases, the length of time between one releasing
dangerous goods accident and the next will be less than 1.5 years, at the Edwin
Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection.
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The output of the Monte Carlo simulation was analysed statistically and the results of
this analysis are presented in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7: Statistical analysis of Monte Carlo simulation, Edwin Swales VC Drive -
South Coast Road intersection
Descriptive statistics
Dangerous Goods Dangerous Goods
Accident Rate Releasing Accident Rate















Table 4.7 reveals that in any given year at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast
Road intersection, there may be:
• up to twelve accidents involving dangerous goods carrying heavy vehicles
• up to four accidents involving heavy vehicles where dangerous goods are released.
However, the results presented in Table 4.7 are not true maxima and minima.
Performing a Monte Carlo simulation with one million recalculations of the stochastic
model for example, may yield new maxima and minima, as more model inputs are
sampled from the extremes of the input parameter population distributions.
4.2.8 Comparison of deterministic model and Monte Carlo simulation
A summary of the estimated dangerous goods accident and release rates at the Edwin
Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection, estimated using both the
deterministic model and Monte Carlo simulation, is presented in Table 4.8.
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Table 4.8: Comparison of the results of the deterministic approach and Monte Carlo
simulation, Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection
Estimated Parameter Deterministic Monte Carlo SimulationModel
Heavy-vehicle Accident Rate [Heavy 99 Poisson random variable withvehicles involved in accidents/year] Mean A=99
-------------------------------------------------- ------------------ -------.-.------------------------------
Proportion of Heavy vehicles transporting Normal random variable with0.0669 Mean J.1 =0.0667 anddangerous goods
Standard deviation a =0.0156
-------------------------------------------------- -------.---------- ----------------------------------------
Dangerous Goods Accident Rate 6.62 Mean value =6.57[Dangerous Goods accidents/year]
-------------------------------------------------- ------------.----- ----------------------------------------
Probability of release I Dangerous goods Uniform random variable between0.140 Lower bound A =0.035 andaccident
Upper bound B =0.375
-------------------------------------------------- ------------------ ----------------------------------------
Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident
Rate [Years/Releasing Dangerous Goods 1.08 Mean value =1.15
Accident]
The mean values of the Dangerous Goods Accident Rate and the Dangerous Goods
Releasing Accident Rate estimated using Monte Carlo simulation, are quite similar to
those results estimated using the deterministic model in Section 4.1.5 and Section
4.1.7. However, Figure 4.2 clearly illustrates that the highest probability densities of the
Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate occur in the range 0.35-0.85
Years/Releasing dangerous goods accident, and not at the mean value of 1.15
Years/Releasing dangerous goods accident.
Essentially, the deterministic model produced two numbers: expected values of the
Dangerous Goods Accident Rate and the Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate.
Further advantages of the application of Monte Carlo simulation have been revealed in
this section. Utilising the same raw data as the deterministic approach, coupled with
justifiable assumptions based on the available data, Monte Carlo simulation has
actually provided the researcher with far more information. Moreover, available
information that would otherwise be ignored or aggregated, has been incorporated into
this investigation. Thus, in comparison to the deterministic models typically used in
transportation risk assessments, Monte Carlo simulation enables a more detailed




4.3 Application of Central Limit Theorem to Monte Carlo simulation results
4.3.1 Lognormal distributions
When the conditions of the Central Limit Theorem are fulfilled, the mathematical
process of multiplying a series of random variables will produce a new random variable
(the product), which tends in the limit to be Lognormal in character, regardless of the
distributions from which the input variables arise [Benjamin & Comell, 1970].
The Lognormal and Normal distributions are closely related. By definition, a data vector
y is said to have a Lognormal distribution, if its natural logarithm In(Y) has a Normal
distribution. The Lognormal distribution is skewed to the right. For a given mean 11, the
skewness increases as the standard deviation a increases [Daniel, 1990]. Figure 4.5
presents the probability density functions for fictitious Lognormal data.
Probability Density Function
-- Lognorrnal (~ =3 , 0 =1)






















Figure 4.5: Probability density functions for fictitious Lognormal data
By visual inspection, the histograms of the Dangerous Goods Accident Rate and the
Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate plotted in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2,
respectively, appear Lognormal in character.
The nature of the population distributions of the Dangerous Goods Accident Rate and
the Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate, are of great interest to this
investigation. Ideally, a researcher would wish to make a statement like: "the
Dangerous Goods Accident Rate at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road
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intersection follows a Lognormal distribution with mean Jl = X and standard deviation a
= Y" (where X and Y are floating-point numbers). Hence, the proposal that the
Dangerous Goods Accident Rate and the Dangerous Goods Re/easing Accident Rate
follow a Lognormal distribution, was investigated.
As discussed in Section 4.2.7, the Monte Carlo simulation consisted of one thousand
independent recalculations of the stochastic model for estimating dangerous goods
accident and release rates. Hence, the Dangerous Goods Accident Rate consists of a
sample size of one thousand. The natural logarithm of each of these one thousand
values of the Dangerous Goods Accident Rate was calculated. This step was repeated
for each value of the Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate. These natural
logarithms were analysed statistically and the results of this analysis are presented in
Table 4.9.
Table 4.9: Further statistical analysis of the Monte Carlo simulation, Edwin Swales VC
Drive - South Coast Road intersection
Dangerous Goods Accident Dangerous Goods Releasing
Rate Accident Rate
In[Dangerous Goods In[Years/Releasing
accidents/year] Dangerous Goods Accident]
Mean 1.85 -0.11
------------------------- ------------------------------------ ------------------------------------
Standard Deviation 0.27 0.66
------------------------- ------------------------------------ ------------------------------------
Count 1000 1000
If the Dangerous Goods Accident Rate is Lognormally distributed, by definition, the
natural logarithms of Dangerous Goods accidents/year will be Normally distributed.
Similarly, if the Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate is Lognormally distributed,
the natural logarithms of Years/Re/easing Dangerous Goods Accident will be Normally
distributed.
A comparison was made of: the empirical cumulative distribution function of
In[Dangerous Goods accidents/year}; and the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
a hypothesised Normal distribution with parameters mean Jl = 1.85 and standard
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of the empirical cumulative distribution function of
In[Dangerous Goods accidentslyearJ and the cumulative distribution function of the
hypothesised Normal distribution, Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road
intersection
The Central Limit Theorem states that the product of a series of random variables
tends in the limit to be Lognormal in character [Benjamin & Comell, 1970). The formula
for calculating the Dangerous Goods Accident Rate, Equation (4.14) contains just two
random variables, yet the two plotted cumulative distribution functions in Figure 4.6
appear very similar.
A comparison was made of: the empirical cumulative distribution function of
/n[YearslReleasing Dangerous Goods Accident]; and the cumulative distribution
function of a hypothesised Normal distribution with parameters mean fJ =-0. 11 and
standard deviation a = 0.66 (taken from Table 4.9).The results of this comparison are
presented in Figure 4.7.
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of the empirical cumulative distribution function of
In[YearslReleasing Dangerous Goods Accident] and the cumulative distribution
function of the hypothesised Normal distribution, Edwin Swales VC Drive - South
Coast Road intersection
The formula for calculating the Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate, Equation
(4.15) contains three random variables, yet the two plotted cumulative distribution
functions in Figure 4.7 are not as similar as the two curves plotted in Figure 4.6.
Clearly, a quantitative assessment of these qualitative observations is required.
4.3.2 Kolmogorov-Smimov one-sample goodness-of-fit test
Goodness-of-flt tests are a means of establishing how well the observed sample data
"fit" some proposed distribution [Conover, 1980). The goodness-of-fit test applied in this
investigation was used to establish whether the Monte Carlo simulated Dangerous
Goods Accident Rate and Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate at the Edwin
Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection, follow a Lognormal distribution.
The Kolmogorov-Smimov (KS) test was designed for testing the goodness-of-fit for
continuous data. One distinction of the KS test is that it makes no assumption about
the underlying cumulative distribution function of the data being tested. Technically
speaking it is nonparametric or distribution-free [Conover, 1980). Nonparametric
statistical procedures have several advantages over parametric procedures. As most
nonparametric procedures depend on a minimum of assumptions, the likelihood of
them being improperly used is reduced. Nonparametric procedures may be applied
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when data are measured on a weak measurement scale, e.g. when only rank data or
count data are available for analysis [Daniel, 1990].
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample goodness-of-fit test focuses on two cumulative
distribution functions: a hypothesised cumulative distribution and the sample (empirical)
cumulative distribution. F(x) is generally used to designate a cumulative distribution
function. For a given x, F(x) is the probability that the value of the random variable X is
less than or equal to x; that is, F(x) = P(X S x) [Conover, 1980].
Let Fo(x) be a hypothesised cumulative distribution function. A random sample is drawn
from some unknown distribution, F(x). The aim is to establish if F(x) :I- Fo(x) for all x. If
F(x) =Fo(x) , close agreement is expected between Fo(x) and the sample (empirical)
cumulative distribution function, S(x). The objective of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-
sample goodness-of-fit test is to establish whether the lack of agreement between Fo(x)
and S(x) is sufficient to cast doubt on the hypothesis that F(x) =Fo(x) [Conover, 1980].
The null hypothesis (Ho) and alternative hypothesis (H1) for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
one-sample goodness-of-fit test are as follows [Conover, 1980]:
Ho: F(x) = Fo(x) for all values of x
H1: F(x) :I- Fo(x) for at least one value of x
A hypothesis may be defined as a "statement about one or more populations." Two
statistical hypotheses exist: the null hypothesis (which is designated Ho) and the
alternative hypothesis (which is designated H1). The null hypothesis is the hypothesis
that is tested. The null hypothesis is usually the statement of no difference. For
example, the null hypothesis may state that one population is identical to another with
respect to some characteristic. A null hypothesis is presumed to be true until sufficient
evidence to reject it has been amassed [Conover, 1980].
The goodness-of-fit test procedure is based on information derived from the data of an
appropriate sample. The test procedure results in one of two outcomes:
• A decision to reject the null hypothesis as false
• A decision not to reject the null hypothesis because the sample does not provide
sufficient evidence to warrant rejection.
When the null hypothesis is rejected, the alternative hypothesis is accepted as true.
This is possible if the null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis are stated in such
a way that they are mutually exclusive and complementary [Conover, 1980].
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To test a null hypothesis (Ho), an appropriate test statistic is selected and its distribution
specified when Ho is true. The value of the test statistic is calculated from the observed
sample data. Before examining the sample data, a decision rule is formulated. This rule
states that Ho will be rejected if the probability of obtaining a value of the test statistic of
a given or more extreme magnitude, when Ho is true, is equal to or less than some
small number o. When the decision rule approach is used, 0 (commonly referred to as
the level of significance) is usually chosen to be 0.05,0.01 or occasionally 0.10 [Daniel,
1990]. For example, at a typical significance level of 0 = 0.05, the probability of
incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis, when it is actually true, is 5 per-cent.
Alternatively, the decision rule may be stated in terms of critical values. The critical
value of the test statistic is the value that is so extreme that the probability of getting
this value or a more extreme value, when Ho is true, is equal to o. For example, in a
one-sided test, Ho is rejected if the calculated value of the test statistic is as extreme as
or more extreme than the critical value [Conover, 1980].





Which is read "0 equals the maximum, over all x, of the absolute value of the
difference Sex) - Fo(x)." When the two cumulative distribution functions are represented
graphically, 0 is the greatest vertical distance between Sex) and Fo(x). The null
hypothesis (Ho) is rejected at the 0 significance level if the test statistic, 0 exceeds the
value shown in the relevant statistical table [Daniel, 1990]. Figure 4.8 is a graph of
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Figure 4.8: S(x), Fo(x) and 0 for fictitious data [Daniel, 1990]
When 0 is calculated arithmetically, it is not always sufficient to calculate and choose
from the possible values of IS(x) - Fo(x)l. As Sex) is a step function, the largest vertical
distance between Sex) and Fo(x) may not occur at an observed value of x, but at some
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Figure 4.9: Graph of fictitious data showing correct calculation of 0 [Daniel, 1990]
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Hence, the correct value of 0 may be obtained by calculating the additional differences:
for all values ofi = 1 ,2, ... , r+ 1
where: r = the number of different values of x, and S(xo) = 0 [Daniel, 1990].
The correct value of the test statistic for the KS test is then [Daniel, 1990]:
(4.19)
Goodness-of-fit test statistics do not provide a true probability measure for the data
actually coming from the hypothesised distribution. Instead, they estimate the
probability that random data generated from the hypothesised distribution would
produce a goodness-of-fit test statistic value as low as that calculated from the
observed data [Conover, 1980].
4.3.3 Lilliefors goodness-of-fit test
When the parameters of the hypothesised distribution must be estimated from the
sample data, rather than specified in advance, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample
test no longer applies in the strict sense [Daniel, 1990]. A related nonparametric
goodness-of-fit test, the Lilliefors test may be employed when the mean Jl and/or the
variance if of the hypothesised population distribution need to be estimated from the
sample data. The test statistic for the Lilliefors test is identical to the test statistic for the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample test, Le.:
(4.20)
Compared to the KS test, the only procedural change is that a separate table is
consulted for the critical value of the test statistic, depending on whether the mean Jl
only, the variance if only, or both Jl and if of the hypothesised population distribution
need to be estimated from the sample data [Daniel, 1990].
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4.3.4 Application of Lilliefors test to Monte Carlo simulation results
The Lilliefors test was utilised to establish whether the Monte Carlo simulated
Dangerous Goods Accident Rate and Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate at
the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection follow a Lognormal
distribution.
In Section 4.3.1 a graphical comparison was made of: the empirical cumulative
distribution function of In[Dangerous Goods accidentslyearj, S(x); and the cumulative
distribution function, Fo(x) , of a hypothesised Normal distribution, with parameters
mean IJ = 1.85 and standard deviation a =0.27 (which were estimated from the
sample data of In[Dangerous Goods accidentslyear)). The results of this comparison
are reproduced in Figure 4.10.
Dangerous Goods Accident Rate
- Empirical cumulative distribution function

















Figure 4.10: Comparison of: the empirical cumulative distribution function of
In[Dangerous Goods accidentslyearj, S(x); and the cumulative distribution function of
the hypothesised Normal distribution, Fo(x) , Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast
Road intersection
In the limit, the critical value of the Lilliefors test statistic at the a =0.05 level of
significance, when both IJ and cl are estimated, is calculated as:




dn =(.J;z -0.01 + 0.83/.J;z)
n = the total number of sample observations [Daniel, 1990J
(4.22)
From Equations (4.21) and (4.22): The critical value of the Lilliefors test statistic
decreases, as n, the total number of sample observations, increases.
The Monte Carlo simulation consisted of one thousand independent recalculations of
the stochastic model. Hence, n = 1000. Substituting into Equations (4.21) and (4.22),
yields:
Critical Value of the Lilliefors test statistic =0.0283 (at the a =0.05 level of
significance)
The test statistic for the Lilliefors test, D is the greatest vertical distance between Sex)
and Fo(x) in Figure 4.10. D was calculated arithmetically in Microsoft Excel™ using
Equation (4.19). A summary of the Lilliefors test follows:
Null hypothesis: /n[Dangerous Goods accidents/year] follows a Normal
distribution
Test statistic calculated for the Lilliefors test, D =0.0355
Critical value of the Lilliefors test statistic = 0.0283
Test result: Reject the hypothesis of normality at the a = 0.05 level of
significance, as D >Critical Value
As the natural logarithms of Dangerous Goods accidents/year are not Normally
distributed, the hypothesis that the Dangerous Goods Accident Rate is Lognormally
distributed, is rejected at the a =0.05 level of significance.
In Section 4.3.1, a graphical comparison was also made of: the empirical cumulative
distribution function of /n[YearslReleasing Dangerous Goods Accident], Sex); and the
cumulative distribution function, Fo(x) , of a hypothesised Normal distribution, with
parameters mean Jl =-0.11 and standard deviation a =0.66 (which were estimated
from the sample data of /n[Years/Releasing Dangerous Goods Accident]). The results
of this comparison are reproduced in Figure 4.11.
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Figure 4.11: Comparison of the empirical cumulative distribution function of
In[YearsIReleasing Dangerous Goods Accident], S(x); and the cumulative distribution
function of a hypothesised Normal distribution, Fo(x) , Edwin Swales VC Drive - South
Coast Road intersection
The test statistic for the Lilliefors test, D is the greatest vertical distance between S(x)
and Fo(x) in Figure 4.11. D was calculated arithmetically in Microsoft Excel™ using
Equation (4.19). A summary of the Lilliefors test follows:
Null hypothesis: In[YearsIReleasing Dangerous Goods Accident] follows a
Normal distribution
Test statistic calculated for the Lilliefors test, D =0.0763
Critical value of the Lilliefors test statistic = 0.0283
Test result: Reject the hypothesis of normality at the a = 0.05 level of
significance, as D >Critical Value
As the natural logarithms of YearslReleasing Dangerous Goods Accident are not
Normally distributed, the hypothesis that the Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident
Rate is Lognormally distributed, is rejected at the a = 0.05 level of significance.
The critical value of the Lilliefors test statistic at the a =0.01 significance level, when
both fJ and cl- are estimated, is calculated as:
Critical Value =1.03Xn =0.0327 (4.23)
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when n =1000 [Daniel, 1990J. Hence, even at the a =0.01 level of significance, the
hypothesis of Lognormality is rejected for both the Dangerous Goods Accident Rate
and Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate.
Conover [1980J asserted that real data are never truly distributed according to any
distribution known to man and that almost any goodness-of-fit test would result in
rejection of the null hypothesis if the number of observations was very large. The
Central Limit Theorem states that the product of a series of random variables tends in
the limit to be Lognormal in character, regardless of the distributions from which the
input variables arise [Benjamin & Comell, 1970J. With this in mind, the following
experiment was undertaken:
A series of Normal random variables, all with the same mean J1 and standard deviation
a, was multiplied and the distribution of the result (the product) was tested for
goodness-of-fit to a Lognormal distribution. The product consisted of an array of one
thousand values. The approach used to test the Dangerous Goods Accident Rate and
Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate for Lognormality, was again utilised. Over
the course of the experiment, the number of Normal random variables that constituted
the product was gradually increased. Even when a series of ten Normal random
variables was multiplied, the natural logarithms of the product did not consistently pass
the Lilliefors test for Normality at the a =0.05 level of significance.
Hence, though they are tending towards the Lognormal, it is unsurprising that the
distributions of the Dangerous Goods Accident Rate and Dangerous Goods Releasing
Accident Rate (parameters which are comprised of only two and three random
variables, respectively) did not pass the goodness-of-fit test.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
The danger exists that the proposed model for estimating dangerous goods accident
and release rates has been oversimplified and that some important details of the real
situation, which would significantly alter the results, have been omitted from the model.
In applied analytical work, variations of the model need to be considered; where each
new variation is an attempt to add another fact of the real world into the model, or to
revise some of the simplifying assumptions that have been made. The process of
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analysing different variations of the model, to observe how they may affect the results,
is called sensitivity analysis [Pet-Armacost et al. 1999].
4.4.1 Tornado diagrams
Tornado-style sensitivity-analysis diagrams depict the significance of each of the input
parameters and consequently, reveal which input parameter has the greatest effect on
the model output. Tornado diagrams are generated by recording the value of the output
parameter, as the input parameters are changed, one at a time, from a given lower
bound, to a given best estimate, to a given upper bound [Pet-Armacost et al. 1999].
In fact, a sensitivity analysis conducted earlier in this investigation revealed that
variations in the value of the Exposure input parameter (measured in units of Entering
Heavy vehicles/year) were having no effect on the estimated Dangerous Goods
Accident Rate and Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate. This indicated to the
researcher that the specific manner in which the deterministic model had been
formulated, had resulted in the Exposure term being "cancelled out".
4.4.2 Input parameter settings
Table 4.10 presents the range of values of the input parameters that were used in a
sensitivity analysis of the proposed model for estimating dangerous goods accident
and release rates.
Table 4.10: Input parameter settings used in a sensitivity analysis of the Dangerous
Goods Accident Rate and the Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate, Edwin
Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection
Input Parameters Best Lower Upper
estimate bound bound
Heavy-vehicle Accident Rate 99 81 119------------------------------------------------------------- --------------- ---------------- ----------------
o~ .?!.~.~~~~ .~~_~~~I.~~. !~~~_~~?~!~~_ ~~~~~r_~~~ ~?~~~... 6.67% 3.61% 9.73%--------------- ---------------- ----------------
Probability of release I Dangerous Goods accident 0.140 0.035 0.375




• Heavy-vehicle Accident Rate
As discussed in Section 4.2.2, the decision was taken to model the Heavy-vehicle
Accident Rate at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection, as a
Poisson random variable with mean 'A =99 Heavy-vehicle accidents/year. An array of
one thousand Poisson random variables with mean 'A = 99 was generated and
analysed statistically. The 2.5 and 97.5 percentile levels of this array were chosen as
the lower bound and upper bound, respectively of the Heavy-vehicle Accident Rate.
Thus, 95 per-cent of these simulated values were incorporated into the sensitivity
analysis.
• Proportion of heavy vehicles transporting dangerous goods
As discussed in Section 4.2.3, the decision was taken to model the proportion of heavy
vehicles transporting dangerous goods at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast
Road intersection, as a Normal random variable with mean /1 = 0.0667 and standard
deviation a = 0.0156 . The lower and upper bounds of the Proportion of heavy vehicles
transporting dangerous goods, for use in the sensitivity analysis, were calculated using
the formula: p±1.96a. The value 1.96 represents the 97.5th percentile of the standard
normal distribution; hence, for data that follow a Normal distribution, 95 per-cent of the
values will be within a multiple of 1.96 standard deviations of the mean [Daniel, 1990J.
For the purpose of brevity, proportions have been converted to percentages in Table
4.10.
• Probability of release given a dangerous goods accident
The input parameter settings for the Probability of release given an accident involving a
dangerous goods vehicle were based' on the information presented in Section 4.2.4
4.4.3 Results of the sensitivity analysis
A tornado-style sensitivity-analysis diagram, depicting the effect of the input
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Figure 4.12: Sensitivity analysis of the input parameters on the Dangerous Goods
Accident Rate, Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection
• Guidance on interpreting Figure 4.12
The first bar in Figure 4.12 may be read as follows: As the Percentage of heavy
vehicles transporting dangerous goods is increased (from 3.61 per-cent to 9.73 per-
cent), while keeping the Heavy-vehicle Accident Rate constant (at 99 Heavy vehicle
accidents/year); the Dangerous Goods Accident Rate increases from 3.58 to 9.63
Dangerous Goods accidents/year.
The Dangerous Goods Accident Rate calculated using the "best estimate" of the input
parameters from Table 4.10 (6.61 Dangerous Goods accidents/year) is indicated by the
value at which the vertical axis intersects the horizontal axis.
Figure 4.12 illustrates that at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road
intersection, the expected variation in the Proportion of heavy vehicles transporting
dangerous goods has a more significant effect on the Dangerous Goods Accident Rate
than the expected variation in the Heavy-vehicle Accident Rate.
A tornado-style sensitivity-analysis diagram depicting the effect of the input parameters
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Figure 4.13: Sensitivity analysis of the input parameters on the Dangerous Goods
Releasing Accident Rate, Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection
Figure 4.13 illustrates that, in comparison to the expected variation in the other input
parameters, the expected variation in the Probability of release given a dangerous
goods accident has the most significant effect on the Dangerous Goods Releasing
Accident Rate at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection.
4.5 Chapter Summary
Two methods for estimating the dangerous goods accident and release rates at
intersections have been developed: a deterministic approach and the stochastic
approach based on Monte Carlo simulation. The deterministic approach revealed that
the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection has the highest expected
rate of dangerous goods accidents and releases, followed by the Bayhead Road -
South Coast Road intersection. The Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road
intersection is expected to experience, on average: six dangerous goods accidents per
year and one releasing dangerous goods accident every thirteen months. The Tara
Road - Duranta Road, M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta Road and The Avenue East-
Refinery Drive intersections have a comparatively lower expected Dangerous Goods
Accident Rate and Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate. No reliable South
African dangerous goods incident statistics are available to validate these results.
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Acrylonitrile, Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride, Benzene, Isopropylamine, Methyl
Isocyanate and Tetra Ethyl Lead, the Danger group I substances that are being
transported through the selected intersections, present a very severe risk. However, as
the proportion of heavy vehicles transporting these substances is low (compared to
Petroleum for example), the estimated frequency of accidents and releases involving
Danger group I substances is much lower.
At the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection, the mean values of
the Dangerous Goods Accident Rate and the Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident
Rate estimated using Monte Carlo simulation, are quite similar to those results
estimated using the deterministic approach. However, in comparison to the
deterministic models typically used in transportation risk assessments, Monte Carlo
simulation enables a more detailed understanding of the nature and distribution of
dangerous goods accident and releases. Utilising the same raw data as a deterministic
approach, coupled with reasonable assumptions based on the available data; Monte
Carlo simulation provides the researcher with far more information.
On the basis of the Central Limit Theorem and further visual observations, the
hypothesis that the Monte Carlo simulated Dangerous Goods Accident Rate and
Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate, follow a Lognormal distribution, was
investigated using the Lilliefors test. Although they are "tending towards" the
Lognormal, the distributions of the Dangerous Goods Accident Rate and Dangerous
Goods Releasing Accident Rate at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road
intersection did not pass the goodness-of-fit test. A sensitivity-analysis was used to
investigate the significance of each of the input parameters of the proposed model for
estimating dangerous goods accident and release rates. At the Edwin Swales VC Drive
- South Coast Road intersection, the expected variation in the Proportion of heavy
vehicles transporting dangerous goods had a more significant effect on the Dangerous
Goods Accident Rate than the expected variation in the Heavy-vehicle Accident Rate.
In comparison to expected variation in the Proportion of heavy vehicles transporting
dangerous goods and the Heavy-vehicle Accident Rate, the expected variation in the
Probability of release given a dangerous goods accident had the most significant effect
on the Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate.
This chapter has verified that, with the use of Monte Carlo simulation, dangerous goods
transportation risk assessments may be performed even when there are substantial
data uncertainties. The formulation and analysis of a Monte Carlo simulation in
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Microsoft Excel™, is preferable to using a commercial Monte Carlo simulation package
and a program like SPSSTM or MATLABTM for subsequent statistical analysis of the
simulation results. In addition to the substantial cost savings, a deeper understanding
of the system being modelled is achieved and the "black box" effect may be largely
avoided. As the researcher is more familiar with the underlying assumptions and




5. CONSEQUENCES OF DANGEROUS GOODS RELEASES
This chapter describes the methodology utilised to estimate the consequences of
dangerous goods releases at intersections. Various tools are employed in this
consequence assessment, including dispersion modelling and geographical information
systems. The impacts to road users are investigated using queuing analysis. A brief
overview of the factors affecting the dispersion potential of the atmosphere is also
provided.
5.1 Overview of Dispersion Modelling
The dangerous goods of interest to this investigation are those that could give rise to
dispersing vapour clouds upon release. These could subsequently cause harm through
inhalation or absorption through the skin. When a release of dangerous goods occurs,
a dispersion model may be utilised to estimate the size, shape and direction of
movement of the plume resulting from the spill [CERC, 2001].
Accidental releases may result in high short-term ground-level concentrations of
contaminants. Dispersion modelling may be used to:
• Investigate the effects of different accidental release scenarios
• Identify the types of accidental releases which could result in significant downwind
adverse effects
• Identify potentially affected people in the event of an accidental release, and to plan
an appropriate response strategy [NIWAR, 2002].
An atmospheric dispersion model is a mathematical simulation of the physics
governing the transport and dispersion of contaminants in the atmosphere. Most
modern dispersion models are computer programs that estimate the contaminant
concentration downwind of a source using information on the contaminant emission
rate, characteristics of the emission source, local topography and meteorology of the
area. The process of dispersion modelling contains four stages (data input, dispersion
calculations, deriving the concentrations and data analysis) [NIWAR, 2002]. Figure 5.1






























Figure 5.1: Summary of the dispersion modelling process [after NIWAR, 2002]
5.2 Dispersion Potential of the Atmosphere
Meteorological processes govern the dispersion and ultimate removal of contaminants
from the atmosphere. Dispersion is composed of vertical and horizontal components.
The stability of the atmosphere and the depth of the atmospheric boundary layer define
the vertical component of dispersion. The horizontal component of dispersion is chiefly
a function of the wind field [Driedonks, 1982].
5.2.1 Stability and instability
The atmosphere is said to be stable when a mass of air, uplifted by some outside force,
tends to return to its original position. The atmosphere is said to be unstable when a
mass of air, which is given an upward or downward displacement, continues to rise or
sink of its own accord. Orographic lifting may trigger this instability, as the air parcel
travels over a mountain (Figure 5.2b) [Preston-Whyte &Tyson, 1988].
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Figure 5.2: Vertical motion and cloud occurrence under stable and unstable conditions
[after Preston-Whyte & Tyson, 1988]
The variation of temperature with height is referred to as the lapse rate. A particle of
unsaturated air (Le. relative humidity less than 100 per-cent) undergoing vertical motion
warms or cools at the Dry Adiabatic Lapse Rate (DALR). An adiabatic process is one in
which no heat enters or leaves the system. If temperature decreases with height, a
lapse condition is said to prevail. If temperature (T) increases with height (z), a
temperature inversion is said to prevail. If there is no variation of temperature with
height, isothermal conditions are said to prevail. Figure 5.3 illustrates the different types
of lapse rates. Inversions and isothermal conditions are stable. Lapse conditions may
be stable or unstable depending on· the magnitude of the Environmental Lapse Rate
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Figure 5.3: Types of lapse rates [after Preston-Whyte & Tyson, 1988]
If the Environmental Lapse Rate is less than the Dry Adiabatic Lapse Rate, the air is
stable (Figure 5.4a). Let Tp be the temperature of a parcel of air and Ta be the
temperature of the ambient air. A parcel of air at a height zo, lifted by some external
force will cool at the dry adiabatic lapse rate. At the new height Z1, the air parcel will be
cooler and denser than the surrounding air; hence, it will sink back to its original
position under the action of the buoyancy force. If the air parcel is forced downward, it
will warm at the dry adiabatic lapse rate. At the new height Z2, the air parcel will be
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warmer and less dense than the environmental air; hence, the positive buoyancy of the
parcel will cause it to rise back to its original position [Preston-Whyte & Tyson, 1988].
If the ELR is greater than the DALR, the air is unstable (Figure 5.4b). A parcel of air at
a height zo, lifted by some external force will cool at the DALR. At the new height Z1, the
air parcel will be warmer and less dense than the environmental air; hence, it will
continue to rise under the action of the buoyancy force. If the parcel is forced
downward, it will warm at the DALR. At the new height Z2, the air parcel will be cooler
and denser than the environmental air; it will continue to sink under the action of the
buoyancy force [Preston-Whyte & Tyson, 1988].
Stable Conditions Unstable Conditions
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and cool at D.A.L.R.
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continue to descend








Figure 5.4: The definition of stability and instability in the atmosphere [after Preston-
Whyte & Tyson, 1988]
When the ELR is equal to the DALR, a condition of neutral stability is said to prevail
and vertical motion is neither resisted nor assisted. The atmosphere is continually
changing between neutral, unstable and stable conditions. Unstable conditions favour
the dispersion of atmospheric contaminants. Unstable conditions are frequently
experienced during sunny, summer days. Dispersion and mixing are suppressed under
stable conditions; thus, ground level releases may remain concentrated for long
distances from the source. Stable conditions may occur as a result of surface
inversions. Surface inversions are often characteristic of clear, calm and dry winter
nights [Preston-Whyte & Tyson, 1988].
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5.2.2 Atmospheric boundary layer
The atmospheric boundary layer is often called the mixing layer as it represents the
vertical extent to which contaminants can be mixed in the atmosphere. Motion in the
atmosphere can be resolved into a fluctuating component superimposed on a general
mean flow [Pasquill & Smith, 1983]. The fluctuating components of atmospheric flow
are referred to as eddies or turbulence. Turbulence is responsible for vertical f1uxes of
heat, matter and momentum. Eddies occur at varying time and space scales, with
larger eddies continuously breaking down into smaller eddies. During the day, vigorous
small-scale eddies are generated by heating and the boundary layer may extend to a
depth of several hundred metres. At night, the development of highly stable air near the
ground suppresses turbulence and mixing. This decreases the depth of the mixing
layer [Preston-Whyte & Tyson, 1988]. Turbulent mixing forms and maintains the
atmospheric boundary layer. The production mechanisms for turbulent mixing are:
convectively generated turbulence produced by surface heating, mechanical turbulence
produced by surface friction and finally, mechanical turbulence produced by local wind
shear at the top of the boundary layer, which is a weak source of turbulence
[Driedonks, 1982].
The daytime convective mixing layer ranges in depth from five hundred metres to two
kilometres. The depth of the nocturnal boundary layer varies from tens of metres to a
few hundred metres. Thus, in the course of one diurnal cycle, the atmospheric
boundary layer exists in two states. The first is a deep, convectively driven, turbulent
mixing layer during the daytime; the second is a shallower layer of shear-driven
turbulence with a surface-based temperature inversion at night. Shortly after sunrise
the boundary layer is not yet in a state of fUlly developed convection. The mixing layer
grows slowly because the nocturnal inversion has to be eroded and the heat input is
still not very large. After the nocturnal inversion has been eroded the miXing layer
grows quickly [Driedonks, 1982].
5.2.3 Winds
The wind speed affects the distance to which contaminants will be transported
downwind. The variability in wind direction controls the extent of crosswind spreading
of contaminants. Winds combine with surface roughness to generate mechanical
turbulence in the atmospheric boundary layer [US-EPA, 1998].
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Wind roses display the joint frequency distributions of wind speed and wind direction.
The frequencies of wind speeds for each direction are depicted within wind speed
classes, which are assigned high and low bounds (much like bins in a histogram). The
joint frequency distribution is portrayed as a rose, made up of petals oriented along
each direction radiating from a central circle. Each petal is made up of rectangular
segments with variable widths and lengths representing the actual frequency of the
direction/class combination. Thin dashed concentric circles are drawn at fixed
percentage intervals (usually 5 per-cent) for easier visual interpretation of petal lengths.
The frequency of calms is indicated in the central circle. Calm periods are periods for
which wind speeds are below one metre-per-second (m/s) [Lakes Environmental
Software, 2000). The South African Weather Service provided meteorological data for
use in this investigation. Figure 5.5 presents the annual average wind rose for the
Durban International Airport for the years 1993-2002.
Joint Frequency Distribution
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Figure 5.5: Annual average wind rose for the Durban International Airport, 1993-2002
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Figure 5.5 illustrates that the predominant winds in the Durban South Basin blow from
two sectors: the north, north-northeast and northeast sector; and south, south-
southwest and southwest sector, in approximately equal proportions (30 per-cent
each). Calm periods prevail for approximately 1 per-cent of the year.
Figure 5.6 illustrates the diurnal variation of the wind field in the Durban South Basin.
This variation is partially attributable to land and sea breezes in the region. The
differential heating and cooling of land and sea surfaces gives rise to the diurnally
reversible land-sea breeze circulation. During the daytime, when sea breezes
predominate, high wind speeds and unstable conditions prevail. In contrast, a greater
prevalence of calm conditions, weak vertical mixing and stable conditions characterise
nights. Land breezes are normally associated with low wind speeds; thus, they do not
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Figure 5.6: Diurnal wind roses for the Durban International Airport, 1993-2002
Figure 5.7 illustrates the seasonal variation in the wind field of the Durban South Basin.
Winter nights in particular, experience much lower wind speeds and a greater
prevalence of calm conditions [Preston-Whyte & Tyson, 1988]. In preparing the wind
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Figure 5.7: Seasonal wind roses for the Durban International Airport, 1993-2002
Wind roses depict graphically the dominant transport direction of the winds for an area.
However, due to the influences of local terrain, possible coastal effects, the exposure of
the instruments and the variability of the wind, the wind rose statistics may not always
be representative of true transport for an area [Lakes Environmental Software, 2000).
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5.2.4 Other meteorological parameters
Air temperature and insolation are significant in governing the formation of the mixing
and inversions layers. Insolation refers to the amount of electromagnetic energy (solar
radiation) incident on the surface of the earth [Pasquill & Smith, 1983]].
There is a relatively low diurnal and seasonal range in air temperature in Durban
because of the damping effect of the Indian Ocean [Preston-Whyte & Tyson, 1988]. A
summary of the average daily minimum and maximum temperature in Durban for the
period 1961-1990, is presented in Figure 5.8.
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Figure 5.8: Diurnal and seasonal variation in temperature in Durban, 1961-1990
[Statistics for Durban, 2001]
Due to cloudy weather during the summer months, Durban experiences a sunshine
duration of approximately 45 per-cent during daylight hours. In contrast, insolation
durations of approximately 70 per-cent occur during winter months [Hunter, 1990;
Statistics for Durban, 2001].
5.2.5 Pasquill stability categories
Pasquill & Smith [1983] placed the stability of the atmosphere into six categories (A-F)
in terms of wind speed, the time of year, time of day or night and the degree of cloud
cover. Category A represents very unstable conditions; category F represents very
stable conditions. These categories are presented in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Pasquill stability categories in terms of wind speed, insolation and state of
sky [after Pasquill & Smith, 1983]
Surface Insolation Night
wind speed f--------,-------r-----j Thinly overcast!
[m/s] Strong Moderate Slight ~ 4/8 low cloud
S 3/8 cloud
<2 A ~B B
---------------- ----------------- -----------.---- ---------.---.-- --------------------- -------------------
2-3 A-B B C E F
.-------.------- ----------------- ---------------- ---------------- --------------------- ----.--------------
3-5 B B-C C D E
---------------- ----------------- ---------------- ---------------- --------------------- -------.-----------
5-6 C C-D D D D
---------------- ----------------- ---------------- ---------------- --------------------- -------------------
>6 C D D D D
5.2.6 Parameterisation of the boundary layer
A more recent method of describing the condition of the boundary layer is to use a
boundary layer scaling approach. This approach characterises the boundary layer in
terms of two parameters, the boundary layer height (h) and the Monin-Ubukhov length
(LMO)' Many different values of LMO and h may correspond to a single Pasquill stability
category. Hence, there is no exact correspondence between the boundary layer
parameters (h and LMO) and the Pasquill stability categories. The parameterisation of
the boundary layer allows the inclusion of the variation of boundary layer properties
with height [CERC, 2001]. The Monin-Ubukhov length is a measure of the stability of
the atmosphere. It is defined as:
(5.1 )
where:
u. = friction velocity at Earth's surface = le,!p , in m/s
• =shear stress at Earth's surface, in kg/ms2
K = von Karman's constant (= 0.4)
9 =acceleration due to gravity, in m/s2
Foo =surface sensible heat flux, in W/m2
p =density of air, in kg/m3
cp = specific heat capacity of air, in J/kgfC
To = near surface temperature, in QC
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In stable conditions, the Monin-Ubukhov length is positive. Then, LMO is a measure of
the height above which vertical turbulent motion is significantly inhibited by the stable
stratification of the air [CERC, 2001]. In unstable or convective conditions, the Monin-
Ubukhov length is negative. Then, the magnitude of LMO is a measure of the height
above which turbulent motions caused by thermal convection, are more important than
the mechanical turbulence generated by friction at the Earth's surface [CERC, 2001].
Figure 5.9 illustrates the different regions of the boundary layer in terms of the
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Figure 5.9: Schematic representation of the variation of Monin-Ubukhov length with
atmospheric stability [after CERC, 2001]
5.3 Risk Analysis
5.3.1 ADMSTM dispersion model
The dispersion model used in the investigation was ADMSTM (Advanced Dispersion
Modelling System) developed by Cambridge Environmental Research Consultants Ltd.
(CERC). ADMS™ is a "new generation" model, which describes the atmospheric
boundary layer in terms of two parameters, the boundary layer height (h) and the
Monin-Ubukhov length (LMO), instead of a single Pasquill stability category. The
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Pasquill stability categories cannot be directly entered into ADMS™ [CERC, 2001]. No
general theory or generally accepted semi-empirical expression exists which describes
dispersion from a source at all heights within the boundary layer, in all conditions of
atmospheric stability and over the full range of distances from the source. ADMS ™
uses generally accepted formulae that have been developed for specific ranges of the
parameters z/h, h/LMO and x/h (where x refers to downwind distance from the source).
ADMSTM then interpolates between these ranges [CERC, 2001].
Different combinations of meteorological input data may be entered in ADMSTM,
depending on the recorded parameters that are available. Hence, the model is very
adaptable. ADMSTM links to other packages such as Surfe?M (a. contour-plotting
package produced by Golden SoftwareTM) and Arcview GISTM, for easy and effective
display of results. ADMSTM has been extensively validated [CERC, 2001].
5.3.2 Limitations of ADMS™
ADMS™ is a steady-state dispersion model. The plume formula was derived assuming
'steady-state' conditions, Le. the formula does not depend on time and is theoretically
constant. However, plume characteristics do vary in time, due to changing emissions
and meteorological conditions. The term steady-state does not mean that conditions
are steady from hour to hour [CERC, 2001]. ADMS™ calculates concentrations for
each hour from an emission rate and meteorological conditions that are uniform across
the modelling domain. Thus, these calculations represent an hourly average of these
values. The model is more representative of reality if conditions do not change rapidly
within the hour being modelled Le. conditions are reasonably steady and do not deviate
significantly from the average values for the hour being modelled [NIWAR, 2002].
Steady-state models have certain limitations. Those applicable to this investigation are
discussed in the following section.
• Low wind speeds or Calms
When the wind speed drops below 0.75 mls, the wind direction becomes irresolvable,
and the plume may travel anywhere, or simply pool. The steady-state equations are
undefined during low wind speed or calm conditions (wind speed appears on the
bottom line of the equations, and cannot be zero). Unfortunately, in many
circumstances it is these exact conditions that may lead to the highest ground-level
concentrations [NIWAR, 2002]. ADMS™ does not model calm conditions. The model
will skip any lines of meteorological data for which the wind speed measured at a
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height of ten metres is less than 0.75 m/s [CERC, 2001]. Analysis of the meteorological
data for the period 1993-2002 revealed that the wind speed was less than 0.75 m/s for
just 0.87 per-cent of the record.
• Spatially uniform meteorological conditions
Steady-state models assume that the atmosphere is uniform across the entire
modelling area and that transport and dispersion conditions exist unchanged long
enough for the material to reach the receptor. In the atmosphere, truly uniform
conditions rarely occur. Differences in land use, water bodies, surface characteristics
and surface moisture produce differences in the structure of the boundary layer that
may affect contaminant transport and dispersion. Steady-state dispersion models
assume contaminants are transported in a straight line to receptors that may be several
hours in transport time away from the source. They take no account of the fact that
wind may only be blowing at 1 m/s and will only have travelled 3.6 kilometres in the first
hour [NIWAR, 2002].
Despite these limitations, steady-state models provide reasonable results when used
appropriately. Even the most sophisticated atmospheric dispersion model cannot
predict the precise location, magnitude and timing of ground-level concentrations with
total accuracy. Dispersion models are usually subjected to a thorough model evaluation
process and the modelling results are reasonably accurate, provided appropriate input
data. Errors are introduced into results by the inherent uncertainty associated with the
physics and formulation used to model dispersion, and by imprecise input parameters,
such as emission and meteorological data [NIWAR, 2002].
5.3.3 Hazard identification
There is a distinction between a hazard and risk. A hazard is something that has the
potential to cause damage to life, the environment and property. Risk is the probability
that a hazard will manifest itself [Withers, 1988]. Once a hazard has been identified, it
is necessary to evaluate the hazard in terms of the risk it presents [Harwood & Russell,
1989].
The traffic surveys and subsequent analysis in Chapter 3 may be regarded as the
hazard identification process. A listing of the dangerous goods. belonging to Danger
group I (substances that present a very severe risk), which are being transported
through the Bayhead Road - South Coast Road; Edwin Swales VC Drive - South
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Coast Road; Tara Road - Duranta Road; M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta Road; and
The Avenue East - Refinery Drive intersections, was presented in Chapter 3. This
listing is reproduced in Table 5.2.
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A summary of relevant characteristics of the dangerous goods listed in Table 5.2
follows.
• Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride
Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride is a colourless fuming liquid with a strong, irritating
odour. Potential symptoms of exposure include: irritation of the eyes, skin, nose and
throat; pulmonary oedema; eye and skin burns; bronchitis; and bone changes.
Inhalation of mist or vapours may be fatal [NIOSH, 2002].
• Acrylonitrile
Acrylonitrile is a colourless to pale-yellow liquid with an unpleasant odour. Potential
symptoms of exposure include: irritation of the eyes and skin; asphyxia; headache;
sneezing; nausea, vomiting; lassitude (Le. weakness, exhaustion); and dizziness.
When heated or burned, toxic Hydrogen Cyanide gas is formed. Acrylonitrile is a





Benzene is a colourless to light-yellow liquid with an aromatic odour. Potential
symptoms of exposure include: irritation of the eyes, skin, nose, respiratory system;
dizziness; headache, nausea; anorexia, lassitude; dermatitis; and bone marrow
depression. Benzene is a potential carcinogen. Inhalation of vapours may result in
coma and possible death [NIOSH, 2002].
• Isopropylamine
Isopropylamine is a colourless liquid with an ammonia-like odour. Potential symptoms
of exposure include: irritation of the eyes, skin, nose, throat; pulmonary oedema; visual
disturbance; eye and skin burns; and dermatitis [NIOSH, 2002].
• Tetra Ethyl Lead
Tetra Ethyl Lead is a colourless liquid (unless dyed red, orange, or blue) with a
pleasant, sweet odour. Potential symptoms of exposure include: eye irritation,
insomnia, lassitude, anxiety; hypotension, hypothermia, pallor, nausea, anorexia,
weight loss; confusion, hallucinations, psychosis, mania, convulsions, and coma.
Inhalation of vapours may be fatal [NIOSH, 2002].
• Methyl Isocyanate
Methyl Isocyanate is a colourless liquid with a sharp, pungent odour. Potential
symptoms of exposure include: irritation of the eyes, skin, nose and throat; respiratory
sensitisation, cough, pulmonary secretions, chest pain, breathing difficulty; asthma; eye
and skin damage. Inhalation of vapours may be fatal [NIOSH, 2002]. Methyl Isocyanate
was the hazardous chemical involved in the 1984 Bhopal disaster in India [Withers,
1988].
5.3.4 Physical and consequence modelling
The adverse human consequences associated with a dangerous goods release may
be quantified using a dose-response analysis. A dose-response analysis relates the
intensity of the concentration and the exposure duration to the degree of injury. A large
release of a toxic substance may result in irritation, non-lethal injury or death to
persons. The impact assessment of toxic vapours involves a comparison of downwind
concentrations estimated by the dispersion model with public exposure guidelines,
including the Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG's) and the
Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health concentration (IDLH) [Lines, 1995].
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The ERPG's were developed by the American Industrial Hygiene Association. The
ERPG-3 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed nearly all
individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or developing life-
threatening health effects. The ERPG-2 is the maximum airborne concentration below
which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without
experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that
could impair an individual's ability to take protective action. The ERPG-1 is the
maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed nearly all individuals could
be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing other than mild transient adverse
health effects or perceiving a clearly defined objectionable odour. The values derived
for the Emergency Response Planning Guidelines are not expected to protect
everyone, but are applicable to most individuals in the general population. For
emergency response applications, the ERPG's are widely considered to be the best
health criteria available [Lines, 1995].
IDLH values were originally developed by the U.S. National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH) to ensure that a worker could escape from a given
contaminated environment in the event of failure of the respiratory protection
equipment. The current definition for an Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health
Condition is a situation "that poses a threat of exposure to airborne contaminants when
that exposure is likely to cause death or immediate or delayed permanent adverse
health effects or prevent escape from such an environment" [NIOSH, 2002]. As a
safety margin, the IDLH values were based on the effects that might occur as a
consequence of a 30-minute exposure. Essentially, the IDLH value is the maximum
concentration to which a healthy person may be exposed for thirty minutes without
experiencing irreversible health effects along with severe eye or respiratory irritation
and other effects (e.g., disorientation or incoordination) that could prevent escape
[NIOSH, 2002]. Exposure guidelines for the dangerous goods belonging to Danger




Table 5.3: Relevant exposure guidelines for selected chemicals [NIOSH, 2002]
Dangerous Goods ERPG·1 ERPG·2 ERPG·3[ppm] [ppm] [ppm]
IDLH
[ppm]
_~_~~!:~~?_~~_ ~~9_r_~~~~X_I~_~~i_~~ ~ ~~ ~~ ~_~ _
Acrylonitrile 10 35 75 85
--------------------------------------- -------._-- ----.------ ------------ -----------
Benzene 50 150 1000 500
--------------------------------------- ----------- ----._------------------ -----------
Isopropylamine . 750
--------------------------------------- Not yet available -----------
Tetra Ethyl Lead 3
M~thyl-I~~~y~~~-t~ ----------- -- ---- --0.025--1---- O~5-----I-- ---5----- --- --3- ----
5.3.5 Emission rate modelling
Peak modelled ground-level concentrations are directly related to the emission rate,
thus it is important:
• to use a rate which is sufficiently large to cover the worst case discharge of concern
• that the period that the maximum emission lasts for, matches the averaging period
of the relevant exposure guideline [NIWAR, 2002].
In a traffic accident, the cargo tank on a dangerous goods vehicle could be crushed or
punctured [Pet-Armacost et al. 1999]. Road tanker vehicles typically have several
compartments [Infosource, 2001] and only a single compartment may be ruptured
during an accident [Brown, Dunn & Policastro, 2001]. The fraction of the total capacity
that is released is defined as the discharge fraction. A ruptured compartment will
readily release its contents, leading to a discharge fraction close to one [Brown et al.
2001]. The total release amount and the release rate of material from the container are
dependent on the size and location of the hole in the container, which in turn depend
on the nature and severity of the accident [Harwood & Russell, 1989].
The dangerous goods listed in Table 3.7, which are being transported through the
chosen intersections, are all liquids or fuming liquids at ambient temperatures [NIOSH,
2002]. Liquids released from the container that are not flashed or entrained with the
flashed liquid, form a pool on the ground, which expands and contracts in response to
gravity-driven fluid flow and evaporation. Equilibrium pool depth varies based on the
volume of material released, Le. the average pool depth for larger releases is greater
than that for small releases [Kawamura & Mackay, 1985]. Pool evaporation may be
estimated using a time-dependent, energy-budget model that considers heat transfer to
and from the pool via radiation, convection, conduction, and evaporation. The energy
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budget of an evaporating pool is a balance between solar radiation, incoming longwave
radiation, outgoing longwave radiation, convective heat transfer and conductive heat
transfer to the ground [Brown et al. 2001J. Evaporation rate is also dependent on the
wind speed, the molecular weight of the selected chemical, and the vapour pressure of
the selected chemical [Kawamura & Mackay, 1985].
Thus, the emission rate value entered into the dispersion model depends on the
release rate of material from the damaged tanker and the rate of evaporation from the
subsequent liquid pool.
5.3.6 Surface roughness
Friction between the ground and air passing over it is one cause of mechanical
turbulence. The nature of the ground surface may influence dispersion by affecting the
amount of atmospheric turbulence. To account for the nature of the surrounding land
use, a surface roughness length of one metre has been specified, in line with ADMS™
recommendations for cities [CERC, 2001]. When all else is equal, a hazard area will be
smaller when a larger surface roughness value is chosen because greater turbulence
develops as surface roughness increases [US-EPA, 1999bJ.
5.3.7 Effect of study area topography on dispersion
The dispersion of atmospheric contaminants from a dangerous goods release may be
greatly affected by the nature of the surrounding terrain. Topographical features may
increase or decrease the estimated ground level concentrations, or change the plume
trajectory without changing the maximum ground level concentrations [US-EPA, 1998J.
ADMSTM contains algorithms to model complex terrain. The method used by ADMSTM
to incorporate the effects of terrain is relatively sophisticated; the actual wind flow
patterns are predicted, then the plume is dispersed within this modified flow stream.
Surrounding topographical features are integrated into a terrain file, which contains grid
co-ordinates and heights. This terrain file is used in ADMS™ to estimate the effect of
the terrain on plume dispersion. In ADMS™, the complex terrain module cannot be run
in conjunction with the coastline and puff release modules [CERC, 2001 J.
The Durban South Basin consists of a fairly flat coastal plain surrounded by a steep
ridgeline to the south and a ridge of hills, approximately 100-150 metres high, to the
west. To the north, the coastal plain widens around the harbour before narroWing again
119
Chapter 5
towards the Umgeni River [CSIR, 1999]. The coastal edge of the Durban South Basin
consists of a major dune that ultimately forms the Bluff at the harbour mouth. The top of
this dune is approximately eighty metres above sea level and seventy-five metres
above the floor of the Durban South Basin. Except at river mouths, the Bluff virtually
cuts the main region of coastal plain off from the ocean [CSIR, 1999]. This unique
topography of the Durban South Basin (illustrated in Figure 5.10) plays a significant
role in controlling local wind flows and affects the dispersion of pollutants [Preston-
Whyte & Tyson, 1988]. Consequently, the treatment of terrain has been identified as a






Figure 5.10: The topography of Durban South Basin [Preston-Whyte & Tyson, 1988]
The ADMS™ terrain files used in this assessment have been created from data
provided by eThekwini Municipality Water Services and the eThekwini Municipality GIS
Department. Separate terrain grids were created for the area surrounding each of the
five surveyed intersections, extending 10.5 kilometres in the north-south and east-
west directions with an average spacing of approximately 150 metres.
Dispersion modelling was undertaken at the Bayhead Road - South Coast Road,
Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road, Tara Road - Duranta Road, M4
Southern Freeway - Duranta Road, and The Avenue East - Refinery Drive
intersections, in order to assess the site-specific effect of interactions between terrain,
wind speed and wind direction on a dispersing plume.
Meteorological data from the weather station at the Durban International Airport, which
is within the Durban South Basin, was utilised in this investigation. The South African
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Weather Service provided hourly average wind speed, wind direction, air temperature,
relative humidity and global radiation data for the years 1993-2002. An accurate
estimate of the depth of the mixing layer is essential if dispersion of contaminants
released in the boundary layer is to be modelled correctly. The South African Weather
Service does not record boundary layer height. If the user does not specify boundary
layer depth in ADMS™, the dispersion model's estimate of boundary layer depth for a
particular hour is improved if meteorological data for all the preceding hours from
midnight are provided [CERC, 2001].
The dispersion modelling simulations were conducted using every hour of
meteorological conditions for the four-year period (1999-2002). A four-year period was
utilised, as ADMSTM has a limit to the number of lines of meteorological data that may
be used in a single run [CERC, 2001]]. A comparison of the wind roses for the two sets
of meteorological data presented in Figure 5.11, illustrates that the meteorological data
for the years 1999-2002 are representative of the meteorological conditions for the ten-
year period 1993-2002. The years 1999-2002 show a slight increase in the
percentage of calms.
Jan 1993 - Dec 2002 Jan 1999 - Dec 2002
1 1.54 3.09 5.14 8.23 10.8
Wind Speed (Metres Per Second)
--
-- __ J_. _
·-·----8--------
Calms induded atcentre
Rings dJ'allVrl at 5 per-cent intervals
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Figure 5.11: A comparison of the annual average wind roses for the Durban
International Airport, 1993-2002 and 1999-2002
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The dispersion of a neutrally buoyant (passive) gas was simulated at each of the five
intersections using a continuous unit emission rate of 1 kg/so A passive release has the
same density has the ambient air. As the dispersion modelling simulations were
conducted using every hour of meteorological conditions for a four-year period (1999-
2002), all wind directions and atmospheric stabilities would have been encapsulated.
The maximum (Le. 100th percentile) concentration contours for identical release
conditions and meteorological data at each intersection, have been plotted onto scaled
maps in Figure 5.12. These plotted concentration contours (isopleths) represent the
highest ground-level concentration that could be expected at each point within the
study area, resulting from a 1 kg/s passive gas release under all feasible
meteorological conditions. The output concentrations are given in units of pg/m3
(micrograms of vapour or gas per cubic meter of contaminated air). A concentration
averaging time of one hour was specified in ADMS™. Averaging times are used by the
dispersion model to estimate the component of lateral (across-wind) plume spread due
to variations in the mean wind direction [US-EPA, 1998].
Figure 5.12 illustrates that the surrounding terrain is a key factor associated with
dangerous goods releases in the Durban South Basin. When compared with the
dispersion modelling results for flat terrain (Figure 5.12a), it is evident that
topographical features in the basin (Figure 5.12b-f) have the effect of reducing the size
of the hazard area or footprint. Clearly, the ridge of hills to the west, the ridgeline to the
south and the dune on the eastern (coastal) edge of the Durban South Basin act to
constrain the plumes in those directions. Terrain channelling of the plumes is also
evident, especially in Figure 5.12(d): the plumes are channelled through the narrowing
of two hills to the northeast of the intersection. Figure 5.12(c) and (d) also illustrate that
the plumes travel towards the lower ground at the harbour. The terrain plots in Figure
5.12(b-f) may be interpreted as the plumes moving along the path of least resistance,


















(b) Bayhead Road - South Coast Road
intersection
Metres
(c) Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road
intersection
(d) M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta Road
intersection
(e) Tara Road - Duranta Road intersection
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Figure 5.12: The effect of topography on dispersion at each intersection
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Figure 5.12 confirms that complex and diverse interactions arise between wind speed,
wind direction and local terrain. Topographical features (e.g. hills, ridges, valleys,
escarpments and slopes) may deflect plumes considerably to almost 90° from the
original wind direction. While terrain and wind direction may affect the direction of the
plume, a relationship also exists between terrain and wind speed. Topographical
features have an influence on the wind speed as it passes over them [McKendry,
Looney &McKenzie, 2002].
Figure 5.13(a) illustrates that as air approaches a shallow slope (slope angle 0<17°),
wind speed reduces to a minimum value at the base of the slope, then increases to a
maximum value near the crest of the slope, and thereafter decelerates to a constant
value downwind. As the slope angle increases above 17°, up-slope flow produces
separation of the airflow at the base of the slope and at the crest, resulting in reverse
flow at both of these locations (Figure 5.13b). Flow down the slope creates reverse flow
only at the base and not at the crest (Figure 5.13c). Wind speed also increases through
valleys. These changes in airflow around topographical features undoubtedly influence
turbulence and the mixing of contaminants [McKendry et al. 2002].
WIND







(C) Flow down steep escarpment
Separation bubble
(8) Flow up steep escarpment
Decelerates
Separation bubble
Figure 5.13: Wind flow over escarpment [after McKendry et al. 2002]
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5.4 Risk Assessment Methodology
This section outlines the methodology that has been utilised to assess the significance
and extent of the impact in the event of a dangerous goods release. The aim of
investigating toxic vapour clouds resulting from a dangerous goods release is to
identify areas that may be exposed or affected, or individuals who may be subject to
injury or death.
5.4.1 Concentration conversion factors
The dispersion model ADMS™ calculates the downwind concentrations in units of
J]g/m3 . Each chemical has a unique numerical factor for the conversion of
concentrations in units of J]g/m3 to ppb (parts of vapour or gas per billion parts of
contaminated air by volume). This conversion factor is a function of the molecular
weight of the chemical [NIOSH, 2002J. Conversion factors for the dangerous goods
belonging to Danger group I, which are being transported through the selected
intersections, are presented in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Conversion factors for selected chemicals [NIOSH, 2002J
Conversion Factor
Dangerous Goods (P9 /m3 to ppb)








Tetra Ethyl Lead 0.075
------------------------------------------ ------------------------------
Methyl Isocyanate 0.427
5.4.2 Implications of using a deterministic dispersion modelling approach
The parameters that affect the consequences of a dangerous goods spill, e.g. release
quantity, surrounding population density and meteorology (comprising wind speed,
wind direction, temperature, cloud cover, relative humidity, global radiation, etc) vary
temporally at a given location. Thus, these parameters, like accident probability and
release probability discussed in Chapter 4, are actually continuous distributions.
Accordingly, the consequences also follow a distribution. Deterministic techniques that
attempt to fix the various input parameters to mean values and obtain an average
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consequence value are essentially flawed because they ignore the true range of the
possible consequences. Such approaches may lead to erroneous conclusions [Brown
et al. 2001].
5.4.3 Treatment of specific chemicals
As ADMS™ does not support probabilistic sampling of input variables, a surrogate
measure was employed. As discussed in Section 5.3.7, dispersion modelling
simulations were conducted at each of the five intersections for a passive gas, using a
continuous emission rate of 1 kg/so These simulations were conducted using every
hour of meteorological conditions for a four-year period (1999-2002). Hence, all wind
directions and atmospheric stabilities have been encapsulated. The concentration
averaging time of one hour, specified in ADMS™ is still appropriate, as the ERPG's are
based on a one-hour exposure [Lines, 1995].
In order to estimate downwind concentrations resulting from the release of a specific
chemical (for a 1 kg/s emission rate), the numerical ADMS™ output at each
intersection from Section 5.3.7, must be scaled by the appropriate factor for the
conversion of concentrations in units of J1g/m3 to ppb (presented in Table 5.4).
Exposure limits for chemicals are usually expressed in units of ppm (parts of vapour or
gas per million parts of contaminated air by volume). Hence, the concentrations in units
of ppb must be scaled into units of ppm, to enable comparison to the relevant exposure
limits.
As discussed in Section 5.3.5, that the dangerous goods emission rate into the
atmosphere depends on the release rate of material from the damaged container and
the rate of evaporation from the subsequent liquid pool. The dangerous goods
belonging to Danger group I, which are being transported through the selected
intersections (listed in Table 3.7), are carried in mild steel ISO-tainers [Ecoserv, 2003;
de Klerk, 2004] or in road tankers. The number of compartments within a road tanker
and the capacity of each compartment vary according to the tanker configuration. Up to
six kilolitres of dangerous goods may be carried in each compartment [Perry, 2003].
Specifying a 1 kg/s continuous emission rate in ADMS™ means that a total quantity of
3.6 metric tons of dangerous goods is released into the atmosphere over the course of
one hour. Table 5.5 reveals that if just a single six-kilolitre compartment is ruptured
during an accident, the quantity of material released will exceed 3.6 metric tons.
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Table 5.5: Mass of dangerous goods released in the event of a rupture to a six-kilolitre
compartment in a tanker
Liguid Density Release Mass
Dangerous Goods [kg/m3] [NIOSH, 2002] [Metric tons]
Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride 972 5.8
~~ ~ ~~~~~1~610[~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ ~ ~~ ~~ ~~~~ ~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Benzene 885 5.3
:: :::f~t~~~~~;'IT~:~::::::::: :::::::: :::::: ::::::;~~\~:::: :::::::: :::::: :::~~~:::::::::
Methyl Isocyanate 958 5.8
5.4.4 Treatment of specific release scenarios
Experimentation and CERC [2001J have revealed that downwind concentrations
estimated by ADMS™ are directly proportional to the emission rate. In order to
estimate the downwind concentrations resulting from different release scenarios, Le.
emission rates other than 1 kg/s, the ADMS™ output for specific chemicals at each
intersection should be scaled by the new emission rate.
5.4.5 Application of geographical information systems (GIS)
Through the use of geographical information systems (GIS), plume coordinates,
information about the population distribution, transportation network, and spatial and
environmental data have been integrated. Dispersion modelling is thus enhanced as
consequences and population exposure may be estimated more efficiently. GIS data
used in this investigation was provided by eThekwini Municipality Water Services and
the eThekwini Municipality GIS department. Actual consequence measures associated
with the release of dangerous goods are difficult to predict accurately and are often
represented by population density figures. The use of population density figures
assumes that the actual consequences are proportional to the population exposed to a
release [FHWA, 1994J.
5.5 Risk Assessment Results
Employing the methodology outlined in Section 5.4, the impact of releases of selected
dangerous goods at each of the five intersections is estimated in this section.
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5.5.1 Bayhead Road - South Coast Road intersection
• Large Acrylonitrile release
Figure 5.14 presents isopleths indicating the downwind distances to the exposure
limits: ERPG-1, ERPG-2, ERPG-3 and IDLH, respectively for an Acrylonitrile release (1
kg/s emission rate) at the Bayhead Road - South Coast Road intersection. These 100
lh
percentile isopleths (and other isopleths plotted throughout Section 5.5) do not
represent the concentrations during a single incident. Rather, they reflect the highest
concentration value that could be expected at any point within the study area, resulting
from a 1 kg/s Acrylonitrile release under all feasible meteorological conditions.
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Figure 5.14: The extent of the impact on the area surrounding the Bayhead Road -
South Coast Road intersection of ground level concentrations following an Acrylonitrile
(ACN) release (1 kg/s emission rate), using the ERPG and IDLH guidelines
The ERPG-2 isopleth is generally accepted as the limit of emergency response [Brown
et al. 2001]. Figure 5.14 indicates that concentrations of Acrylonitrile above the ERPG-
2 level may exist as far out as 1.3 kilometres from the intersection. The ERPG-2
128
Chapter 5
isopleth in Figure 5.14 covers an area of 1.3 square kilometres. The residential
population density is relatively low in the industrial areas to the east of the Bayhead
Road - South Coast Road intersection. Approximately 1700 residents within the
ERPG-2 isopleth are potentially at risk, and if exposed would be expected to
experience irreversible or other serious health effects that could impair their ability to
take protective actions. Using GIS, the number of people at risk was estimated as the
product of the size of the ERPG-2 impact area and the population density within the
impact area.
Depending on the direction the wind is blowing towards, in the event of a large
Acrylonitrile release, it is recommended that King Edward VIII hospital, the affected
parts of the residential area of Umbilo; and the affected parts of the Maydon Wharf and
Bayhead industrial areas within the ERPG-2 isopleth, be notified or possibly evacuated
until the spill has been contained and removed. The King Edward VIII hospital is a
vulnerable zone where a large number of people who are difficult to protect or
evacuate, are concentrated. Occupants of vehicles travelling on roads close to the
Bayhead Road - South Coast Road intersection (e.g. M4 Southern Freeway, Umbilo
Road) may be exposed to high concentrations of Acrylonitrile for short periods of time
as they travel through and along the dispersing plume, especially near the source.
Section 5.6 outlines the methodology that may be employed to investigate the health
impact to road users, who are caught in queues that have formed on Bayhead Road
and South Coast Road as a result of an accident causing this release.
• Worst-case Acrylonitrile release
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration developed the dispersion model ALOHA (Areal Locations of Hazardous
Atmospheres) to assist emergency response personnel. Unlike ADMS™, ALOHA is
able to model evaporation from a pool on the ground. ALOHA accounts for the effect
on pool temperature of several kinds of heat energy exchange between the pool and its
environment to estimate pool evaporation rate [US-EPA, 1999b]. During the traffic
surveys described in Chapter 3, Acrylonitrile was identified as being transported in ISO-
tainers. ISO-tainers have no internal compartments and the capacity of an ISO-tainer
may be up to twenty-five kilolitres [Perry, 2003].
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Consider the following release scenario:
• twenty kilolitres of Acrylonitrile are released from an ISO-tainer and form an
unconfined pool on the ground
• a typical wind speed of 4 m/s and ambient temperature of 25°C prevail,
corresponding to neutral conditions (Pasquill stability class C)
ALOHA estimates that approximately 11.9 metric tons of Acrylonitrile will be released
into the atmosphere over a one-hour period. This equates to a continuous emission
rate of 3.3 kg/so ALOHA's estimate is comparable to the emission rate estimated using
the method of Kawamura & Mackay [1985] detailed in Appendix D.
Figure 5.15 presents isopleths indicating the downwind distances to the exposure
limits: ERPG-2, ERPG-3 and IDLH, respectively for an Acrylonitrile release (3.3 kg/s
emission rate) at the Bayhead Road - South Coast Road intersection.
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Figure 5.15: The extent of the impact on the area surrounding the Bayhead Road _
South Coast Road intersection of ground level concentrations following an Acrylonitrile
(ACN) release (3.3 kg/s emission rate), using the ERPG and IDLH guidelines
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Figure 5.15 indicates that concentrations of Acrylonitrile above the ERPG-2 level may
exist as far out as 2.7 kilometres from the intersection. The ERPG-2 isopleth in Figure
5.15 covers an area of 5.4 square kilometres. Approximately 5700 residents within the
ERPG-2 isopleth are potentially at risk, and if exposed would be expected to
experience irreversible or other serious health effects that could impair their ability to
take protective actions. Depending on the direction the wind is blowing towards, in the
event of such a worst-case Acrylonitrile release, it is recommended that the affected
schools and hospitals, including the King Edward VIII hospital; the affected parts of the
residential areas of Clairwood, Umbilo and Glenwood; and the affected parts of the
Maydon Wharf, Bayhead and Congella industrial areas within the ERPG-2 isopleth, be
notified or possibly evacuated until the spill has been contained and removed.
Occupants of vehicles travelling on the M4 Southern Freeway, Umbilo Road, Sarnia
Road and Edwin Swales VC Drive may be exposed to high concentrations of
Acrylonitrile for short periods of time as they travel through and along the dispersing
plume, especially near the source.
5.5.2 Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection
• Large Acrylonitrile release
Figure 5.16 presents isopleths indicating the downwind distances to the exposure
limits: ERPG-1, ERPG-2, ERPG-3 and IDLH, respectively for an Acrylonitrile release (1
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Figure 5.16: The extent of the impact on the area surrounding the Edwin Swales VC
Drive - South Coast Road intersection of ground level concentrations following an
Acrylonitrile (ACN) release (1 kg/s emission rate), using the ERPG and IDLH guidelines
Figure 5.16 indicates that concentrations of Acrylonitrile above the ERPG-2 level may
exist as far out as 1.1 kilometres from the intersection. The ERPG-2 isopleth in Figure
5.16 covers an area of 1.3 square kilometres. The residential population density is
relatively low in the industrial areas immediately surrounding the Edwin Swales VC
Drive - South Coast Road intersection. Approximately five hundred residents within the
ERPG-2 isopleth are potentially at risk, and if exposed would be expected to
experience irreversible or other serious health effects that could impair their ability to
take protective actions. Depending on the direction the wind is blowing towards, in the
event of a large Acrylonitrile release, it is recommended that the affected parts of the
Clairwood and Sea View residential areas; and the affected parts of the Maydon Wharf
and Bayhead industrial areas within the ERPG-2 isopleth, be notified or possibly
evacuated until the spill has been contained and removed. Occupants of vehicles
travelling on roads close to the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road
intersection (e.g. M4 Southem Freeway, Samia Road) may be exposed to high
concentrations of Acrylonitrile for short periods of time as they travel through and along
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the dispersing plume, especially near the source. Section 5.6 outlines the methodology
that may be employed to investigate the health impact to road users, who are caught in
queues that have formed on Edwin Swales VC Drive and South Coast Road as a result
of an accident causing this release.
• Worst-case Acrylonitrile release
Figure 5.17 presents isopleths indicating the downwind distances to the exposure
limits: ERPG-2, ERPG-3 and IDLH, respectively for an Acrylonitrile release (3.3 kg/s
emission rate) at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection.
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Figure 5.17: The extent of the impact on the area surrounding the Edwin Swales VC
Drive - South Coast Road intersection of ground level concentrations following an
Acrylonitrile (ACN) release (3.3 kg/s emission rate), using the ERPG and IDLH
guidelines
Figure 5.17 indicates that concentrations of Acrylonitrile above the ERPG-2 level may
exist as far out as 3.3 kilometres from the intersection. The ERPG-2 isopleth in Figure
5.17 covers an area of 5.3 square kilometres. Approximately 5100 residents within the
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ERPG-2 isopleth are potentially at risk, and if exposed would be expected to
experience irreversible or other serious health effects that could impair their ability to
take protective actions. Depending on the direction the wind is blowing towards, in the
event of such a worst-case Acrylonitrile release, it is recommended that the affected
parts of the Clairwood, Sea View and Montclair residential areas; the affected parts of
the Maydon Wharf, Bayhead and Jacobs industrial areas; and the affected schools and
clinics within the ERPG-2 isopleth, be notified or possibly evacuated until the spill has
been contained and removed. Occupants of vehicles travelling on the M4 Southern
Freeway, Sarnia Road and Umbilo Road may be exposed to high concentrations of
Acrylonitrile for short periods of time as they travel through and along the dispersing
plume, especially near the source.
5.5.3 M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta Road intersection
• Large Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride release
A monthly shipment of six metric tons of Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride is transported
to the Engen Oil Refinery through the M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta Road
intersection [de Klerk, 2004]. Specifying a 1 kg/s continuous emission rate in ADMS™
means that a total quantity of 3.6 metric tons is released into the atmosphere over the
course of one hour. Figure 5.18 presents isopleths indicating the downwind distances
to the exposure limits: ERPG-2, IDLH and ERPG-3, respectively for an Anhydrous
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Figure 5.18: The extent of the impact on the area surrounding the M4 Southern
Freeway - Duranta Road intersection of ground level concentrations following an
Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) release (1 kgls emission rate), using the ERPG and
IDLH guidelines
Figure 5.18 indicates that concentrations of Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride above the
ERPG-2 level may exist as far out as 3.1 kilometres from the intersection. The ERPG-2
isopleth in Figure 5.18 covers an area of 8.5 square kilometres. The residential
population density is relatively high in the areas to the south and east of the M4
Southern Freeway - Duranta Road intersection. Approximately 35000 residents within
the ERPG-2 isopleth are potentially at risk, and if exposed would be expected to
experience irreversible or other serious health effects that could impair their ability to
take protective actions. Depending on the direction the wind is blowing towards, in the
event of a large Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride release at the M4 Southern Freeway-
Duranta Road intersection, it is recommended that the affected parts of the residential
areas of Clairwood, Austerville and Merewent; the affected parts of the Jacobs and
Mobeni industrial areas, Mondi Paper, the Engen and SAPREF oil refineries; and the
affected schools, hospitals and clinics within the ERPG-2 isopleth, be notified or
possibly evacuated until the spill has been contained and removed. Occupants of
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vehicles travelling on roads close to the M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta Road
intersection (e.g. along South Coast Road, Tara Road) may be exposed to high
concentrations of Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride for short periods of time as they travel
through and along the dispersing plume. Section 5.6 outlines the methodology that may
be employed to investigate the health impact to road users, who are caught in queues
that have formed on Duranta Road and the M4 Southern Freeway off-ramps as a result
of an accident causing this release.
5.5.4 Tara Road - Duranta Road intersection
• Large Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride release
The monthly shipment of six metric tons of Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride to the Engen
Oil Refinery is also transported through the Tara Road - Duranta Road intersection [de
Klerk, 2004]. Figure 5.19 presents isopleths indicating the downwind distances to the
exposure limits: ERPG-2, IDLH and ERPG-3, respectively for an Anhydrous Hydrogen
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Figure 5.19: The extent of the impact on the area surrounding the Tara Road - Duranta
Road intersection of ground level concentrations following an Anhydrous Hydrogen
Fluoride (HF) release (1 kgls emission rate), using the ERPG and IDLH guidelines
Figure 5.19 indicates that concentrations of Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride above the
ERPG-2 level may exist as far out as 2.5 kilometres from the intersection. The ERPG-2
isopleth in Figure 5.19 covers an area of 8.4 square kilometres. The residential
population density is relatively high in the areas surrounding the Tara Road - Duranta
Road intersection. Approximately 37400 residents within the ERPG-2 isopleth are
potentially at risk, and if exposed would be expected to experience irreversible or other
serious health effects that could impair their ability to take protective actions.
Depending on the direction the wind is blowing towards, in the event of a large
Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride release at the Tara Road - Duranta Road intersection, it
is recommended that the affected parts of the residential areas of Austerville,
Merewent and Treasure Beach; the affected parts of the Mobeni industrial area, Mondi
Paper, the Engen and SAPREF oil refineries; and the affected schools, hospitals and
clinics within the ERPG-2 isopleth, be notified or possibly evacuated until the spill has
been contained and removed. Occupants of vehicles travelling along the M4 Southern
Freeway may be exposed to high concentrations of Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride for
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short periods of time as they travel through and along the dispersing plume. Section
5.6 outlines the methodology that may be employed to investigate the health impact to
road users, who are caught in queues that have formed on Tara Road and Duranta
Road as a result of an accident causing this release.
The 99.9th percentile ground-level concentration is the highest ground-level
concentration at each grid point after the highest 0.1 per-cent of predictions has been
discarded. Figure 5.20 provides an indication of the degree to which the chosen 10Qth
percentile concentrations are representative, by presenting the 99.9th percentile
ground-level concentrations. Figure 5.20 presents isopleths indicating the downwind
distances to the ERPG-2 exposure limit for an Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride release (1
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Figure 5.20: The extent of the impact on the area surrounding the Tara Road - Duranta
Road intersection of ground level concentrations following an Anhydrous Hydrogen
Fluoride (HF) release (1 kgls emission rate), using the ERPG-2 guideline
The effects of topographical features are clearly evident in Figure 5.20. The dune on
the eastern edge of the Durban South Basin acts to constrain the plumes in that
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direction and the 99.9th percentile ERPG-2 isopleth is slightly within the 100th percentile
ERPG-2 isopleth along the coast. However, the extent of the 99.9th percentile ERPG-2
isopleth is considerably less than the extent of the 100th percentile ERPG-2 isopleth
towards the northwest of the intersection (where the terrain slopes are shallower).
If a less conservative approach is taken (depending on the wind direction), it is still
recommended that the affected parts of the Austerville, Merewent and Treasure Beach
residential areas; the affected parts of the Mobeni industrial area, Mondi Paper, the
Engen and SAPREF oil refineries; and the affected schools, hospitals and clinics within
the 99.9th percentile ERPG-2 isopleth be notified or possibly evacuated until the spill
has been contained and removed.
5.5.5 The Avenue East - Refinery Drive intersection
• Large Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride release
Figure 5.21 presents isopleths indicating the downwind distances to the exposure
limits: ERPG-2, IDLH and ERPG-3, respectively for an Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride
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Figure 5.21: The extent of the impact on the area surrounding The Avenue East -
Refinery Drive intersection of ground level concentrations following an Anhydrous
Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) release (1 kg/s emission rate), using the ERPG and IDLH
guidelines
Figure 5.21 indicates that concentrations of Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride above the
ERPG-2 level may exist as far out as 2.2 kilometres from the intersection. The ERPG-2
isopleth in Figure 5.21 covers an area of 8.8 square kilometres. With the exception of
Isipingo Beach, the residential population density is relatively low in the areas
immediately surrounding The Avenue East - Refinery Drive intersection. Approximately
6100 residents within the ERPG-2 isopleth are potentially at risk, and if exposed would
be expected to experience irreversible or other serious health effects that could impair
their ability to take protective actions. Depending on the direction the wind is blowing
towards, in the event of a large Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride release at The Avenue
East - Refinery Drive intersection, it is recommended that the Isipingo Beach
residential area; the affected parts of the Isipingo Rail and Prospecton industrial areas,
the Durban International Airport, the SAPREF Oil Refinery; and the affected schools
within the ERPG-2 isopleth, be notified or possibly evacuated until the spill has been
contained and removed. Occupants of vehicles travelling on roads close to The Avenue
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East - Refinery Drive intersection (e.g. N2 Freeway, Prospecton Road) may be
exposed to high concentrations of Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride for short periods of
time as they travel through and along the dispersing plume. Section 5.6 outlines the
methodology that may be employed to investigate the health impact to road users, who
are caught in queues that have formed on The Avenue East, Refinery Drive and Joyner
Road as a result of an accident causing this release.
• Worst-case Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride release
A shipment of sixteen metric tons of Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride is transported to the
SAPREF Oil Refinery monthly through The Avenue East - Refinery Drive intersection.
Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride is transported in mild steel ISO-tainers or road tankers
[de Klerk, 2004].
Consider the following release scenario:
• sixteen metric tons of Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride are released from an ISO-
tainer
• these sixteen metric tons of Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride are released into the
atmosphere over a one-hour period. This equates to a continuous emission rate of
4.4 kg/so
Figure 5.22 presents isopleths indicating the downwind distance to the ERPG-3
exposure limit for an Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride release (4.4 kg/s emission rate) at














Figure 5.22: The extent of the impact on the area surrounding The Avenue East -
Refinery Drive intersection of ground level concentrations following an Anhydrous
Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) release (4.4 kg/s emission rate), using the ERPG-3 guideline
Figure 5.22 indicates that concentrations of Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride above the
ERPG-3Ievel may exist as far out as 3.2 kilometres from the intersection. The ERPG-3
isopleth in Figure 5.22 covers an area of 16.1 square kilometres. Approximately eleven
thousand residents within the ERPG-3 isopleth are potentially at risk, and if exposed
would be expected to experience or develop life-threatening health effects. Depending
on the direction the wind is blowing towards, in the event of a such a worst-case
Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride release at The Avenue East - Refinery Drive
intersection, it is recommended that Isipingo Beach, the affected parts of the Orient
Hills, Lotus Park and Athlone Park residential areas; the affected parts of the Isipingo
Rail and Prospecton industrial areas, the Durban International Airport, the SAPREF Oil
Refinery; and the affected schools and hospitals within the ERPG-3 isopleth be
evacuated until the spill has been contained and removed. The ERPG-2 and IDLH




5.5.6 Summary of risk assessment results
The results of the risk assessment conducted in Sections 5.5.1 to 5.5.5 are
summarised in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6: Impacts of selected dangerous goods releases at the chosen intersections
Maximum Area Residential
Dangerous Emission Threshold threshold within population
substance rate [1 oath distance threshold within
released [kg/s] percentile] from source [km2] threshold[km]
Acrylonitrile 1.0 ERPG-2 1.3 1.3 1720
Bayhead Road - South
--------------- ---------- ----------- -------------- ----------- --------------Coast Road
Acrylonitrile 3.3 ERPG-2 2.7 5.4 5743
------------------------- -.-.--------- -- ---------- ----------- -------------- -----.--._- --------------
Edwin Swales VC Acrylonitrile 1.0 ERPG-2 1.1 1.3 564
Drive - South Coast ------._---.--- -.-------- ----.------ -------------- ----------- --------------
c: Road
Acrylonitrile 3.3 ERPG-2 3.3 5.3 50850
~
(J
Q) ------------------------- --------------- -----.-.-- ----------- -------------- ----------- ---.-----.----l!! M4 Southern Freeway Anhydrous
Q)
Hydrogen 1.0 ERPG-2 3.1 8.5 35049... - Duranta Roadc: Fluoride
-.--.-.--------------._-- -------.------- ---------- ----------- -------------- ---------- ---------------
Tara Road - Duranta Anhydrous
Road Hydrogen 1.0 ERPG-2 2.5 8.4 37402Fluoride
------------------------- --------------- ---------- ---~------- -------------- ---------- --------~------
Anhydrous
Hydrogen 1.0 ERPG-2 2.2 8.8 6136
The Avenue East - Fluoride
--------------- ---------- ----------- -------------- ---------- ---------------Refinery Drive Anhydrous
Hydrogen 4.4 ERPG-3 3.2 16.1 11028
Fluoride
The ERPG-2 isopleth is generally accepted as the limit of emergency response [Brown
et al. 2001]. The risk assessment results indicate that several thousands of residents
are potentially at risk from experiencing irreversible or other serious health effects due
to releases of dangerous goods at the selected intersections. In particular, large
numbers of individuals living in close proximity to the M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta
Road and Tara Road - Duranta Road intersections are potentially at risk from releases
of Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride.
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Only the impacts of Acrylonitrile and Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride releases have been
highlighted in this chapter. Of the other Danger group I substances being transported
through the selected intersections:
• Benzene and Isopropylamine have a relatively high IDLH value compared to the
other selected chemicals (Table 5.3). Hence, the extent of the hazard area depicted
will be smaller.
• Tetra Ethyl Lead has a very low vapour pressure (Appendix 0: Table 0.1) [NIOSH,
2002]. Thus, the rate of evaporation from a pool will be very low [Kawamura &
Mackay, 1985] and the extent of the hazard area will be smaller.
• As discussed in Section 3.4.4, due to incorrect use of signage by the hauliers, there
is some concern as to whether Methyl Isocyanate is actually being transported
through the M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta Road and Tara Road - Duranta Road
intersections. Nevertheless, graphical risk profiles for Methyl Isocyanate releases at
the relevant intersections are presented in Appendix E.
5.6 Implications for Road Users
When demand exceeds capacity for a period of time on a roadway, a growing queue is
formed. A releasing dangerous goods accident, which disrupts the normal flow of traffic
at an intersection, is an example of a queuing process. Vehicles queue upstream of the
intersection and their departure is delayed to a later instant in time. Queuing analysis
may be combined with dispersion modelling to investigate the health impact to road
users who are caught in such queues.
5.6.1 Traffic stream models
This section introduces certain concepts that are necessary for queuing analysis. May
[1990] presented relationships among the fundamental traffic stream flow
characteristics: flow, density and speed for a linear speed-density model. These
relationships are illustrated in Figure 5.23.
Flow (q) is defined as the number of vehicles passing a specific point or through a
particular section of roadway in a given time period. Flow is expressed as an equivalent
hourly rate, often on a per lane basis (vehicles/hour/lane). Density (k) is defined as the
number of vehicles occupying a roadway segment. Density is expressed on a ,per lane
basis (vehicles/kilometre/lane). Speed is the average rate of motion expressed in units
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Figure 5.23: Relationships among the fundamental stream flow characteristics for a
linear speed-density model [after May, 1990]
Several unique parameters are highlighted in Figure 5.23. These include:
• Maximum flow rate or capacity (qm); the maximum sustainable flow rate at which
vehicles reasonably may be expected to traverse a point or segment of roadway
during a specified time period under given roadway, geometric, traffic and
environmental conditions [TRB, 2000].
• Jam density (kj ). The density that exists when vehicles are bumper-to-bumper and
stopped.
• Optimum density (km). The density that exists under conditions of maximum flow.
• Optimum speed (urn). The speed that exists under conditions of maximum flow.
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• Free-flow speed (Uf); in this context, the average speed of vehicles over an urban
street segment without signalised intersections, under conditions of low volume
[May, 1990].
5.6.2 Queuing Theory
May [1990] presented the following example to introduce the concepts of deterministic
queuing analysis. Consider an accident (or incident) on a roadway that causes a
reduction in capacity. The queuing diagram for this situation is presented in Figure
5.24. The input parameters are specified in Figure 5.24(a). The arrival rate of traffic
upstream of the accident (,A.) is given in vehicles per hour and is assumed constant for
the study period. The normal service rate or capacity of uninterrupted flow (Le. no
accident) is designated in Figure 5.24 as P, and is greater than the arrival rate. When
the incident occurs, it reduces the service rate to PR, which is less than the arrival rate.
This lower service rate is maintained for tR hours, until the disabled vehicle causing the
reduction in capacity has been removed.
Figure 5.24(b) drawn underneath the flow rate versus time diagram, is a diagram of
cumulative vehicles (at a point) versus time. Horizontal lines in Figure 5.24(a), such as
the arrival rate ,A. are transformed into sloping lines in Figure 5.24(b), with the slope
equal to the magnitude of the flow rate.
The number of vehicles in the queue is represented by the vertical distance through the
triangle in Figure 5.24(b). At the beginning of the incident, the number of vehicles in the
queue is assumed to be zero, Le. there is no initial queue. The queue increases to its
maximum after tR hours. After the disabled vehicle causing the reduction in capacity
has been removed, the number of vehicles in the queue decreases until the normal
service rate line intersects the arrival rate line. All vehicles arriving during the incident;
as well as vehicles arriving after the disabled vehicle has been removed, but before the
queue is dissipated; experience the queuing process and are forced to slow down
significantly or stop. The horizontal distance across the triangle in Figure 5.24(b)
represents individual delay. Delay refers to the additional travel time experienced by a


























Figure 5.24: Queuing diagram for incident situation [after May, 1990]
May [1990] developed the following relationship to estimate the maximum number of
vehicles in the queue at incident (or accident) sites:
(5.3)
where:
OM = Maximum number of vehicles in the queue [vehicles]:
A =Average arrival rate of traffic upstream of the incident [vehicles per hour]
JlR =Reduced service rate during incident [vehicles per hour]
tR =Duration of incident [hours]
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The value of IlR may be zero when the roadway is completely blocked, or some value
(IlR < A) when the roadway is partially blocked by a disabled vehicle. The number of
vehicles in the queue is a linear function of the incident duration tR [May, 1990].
5.6.3 Hypothetical worst-case scenario for a dangerous goods release
The deterministic queuing analysis methods developed by May [1990] have been
employed to investigate the health impact to road users as result of a releasing
dangerous goods accident at an intersection. The greatest road-user health impacts
will occur when a worst-case dispersion scenario coincides with a worst-case scenario
from a traffic perspective. The Acrylonitrile release (3.3 kg/s emission rate) at the
Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection from Section 5.5.2 is used to
illustrate the methodology adopted in this investigation.
The following hypothetical worst-case scenario from a traffic perspective is
investigated:
• The heavy vehicle transporting Acrylonitrile is involved in an accident during either
the morning or afternoon peak hour. The peak hour consists of the four consecutive
fifteen-minute periods that have the highest demand volume of traffic during the
study period [TRB, 2000]. The peak hour for different vehicle types occurs at
slightly different times. However, analysis of the eThekwini Municipality traffic
volume count at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection
conducted on 22 April 2002, indicates that heavy-vehicle traffic remains reasonable
constant throughout the daylight hours. Hence, the peak hour for "all vehicles" was
considered.
• The accident is of sufficient severity to result in a dangerous goods release and
disable the vehicle.
• The accident occurs at the start of the peak and it takes emergency response
personnel one hour to contain the spill and remove the disabled vehicle from the
scene, Le. tR =1 hour.
• There is no peaking of demand flows during the hour and vehicles arrive at a
uniform rate during the peak.
• Traffic on the approach under investigation is unable to evacuate or be diverted
from the road.
• The accident occurs within the intersection (for example, at the position
demarcated "X" in Plate 5.1). The disabled vehicle, results in the through-lanes and
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right-turn lanes of a particular approach (southern) being blocked. During the next
phase of the traffic signal cycle, vehicles from the adjacent (eastern) approach will
not be able to proceed straight. Eventually, all approaches will experience severe
reductions in capacity, as vehicles from each approach are prevented from
proceeding straight or turning right. Hence, queues will develop on all approaches.
• Plate 5.1 illustrates that the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road
intersection has left-turn slip lanes on all four approaches. The slip lanes are the
turning movement lanes separated from the neighbouring lanes by triangular
islands. For a limited period after the incident occurs, drivers may be able to utilise
the left-turn slip lanes.
• Drivers, who are not within line of sight of the incident, will have no knowledge of
the dangerous goods release. Hence, they will be unaware of the need to evacuate
or bypass the area (by utilising the left-turn slip lanes) and will remain in their
original lanes; the queues on each approach will continue to grow [Roebuck, 2005].
• The left-turn slip lanes are short lanes. Short lanes are lanes of limited length, e.g.
a turn bay or part of a lane available downstream of parked vehicles [Akyelik &
Associates, 2002]. Hence, once the queue extends beyond the position where the
short lanes are generated, the entire approach (including the left-turn slip lanes) will
become completely blocked [Roebuck, 2005]. The value of the reduced service rate
during the incident JlR, will then be zero.
• The concentration of Acrylonitrile in the immediate vicinity of the releasing accident
will be extremely high (i.e. greater than four times the Immediately Dangerous to
Life or Health concentration within one hundred metres of the source). A few
minutes of exposure to these extremely high concentrations may result in the death
of persons (including drivers) within this region [NIOSH, 2002; Ecoserv, 2003]. This




Plate 5.1: Layout of the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection
[eThekwini Municipality GIS, 2005]
The greatest impact will occur when the prevailing winds cause the plume that has
formed as a result of the Acrylonitrile release, to travel parallel to the road and in the
same direction as the growing queue. The Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast
Road intersection has four approaches. Hence, the prevalence of an adverse wind
direction is four times as likely when compared to a releasing dangerous goods
accident that occurs on a highway segment.
Section 5.2.3 reported that the predominant winds in the Durban South Basin blow
from two sectors: the north, north-northeast and northeast sector; and south, south-
southwest and southwest sector, in approximately equal proportions (30 per-cent
each). That is, the predominant winds blow along South Coast Road. Analysis of the
eThekwini Municipality traffic count for the intersection on 22 April 2002 indicated that
both the morning and afternoon peak hour volumes on the southern approach were
greater than the corresponding volumes on the northern approach. Accordingly, the
methodology adopted in this investigation is illustrated by applying the hypothetical
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worst-case assumptions to a queuing analysis of the southern approach of the Edwin
Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection.
5.6.4 Queuing analysis
During the eThekwini Municipality traffic count for the intersection on 22 April 2002,
1883 vehicles were recorded arriving on the southern approach in the morning peak
hour. The morning (AM) peak hour volume was greater than the afternoon (PM) peak
hour volume on the southern approach. Hence, the average arrival rate of traffic
upstream of the incident A, is taken as 1883 vehicles per hour.
As discussed in Section 5.6.3:
• for the hypothetical worst-case traffic scenario under investigation, the reduced
service rate of the approach during the incident PR, is taken as zero.
• the duration of incident tR is assumed to be one hour.
Substituting these chosen values of A, PR and tR into Equation (5.3) yields:
Maximum number ofvehicles in the queue, QM
=tR x (')." - fJR) =1x (1883 -0) =1883 vehicles
A less conservative approach (which would not yield the worst-case traffic scenario)
would be to assume that vehicles will be able to utilise the left-turn slip lanes for the
entire duration of the incident. During this highly unlikely case [Roebuck, 2005], the
reduced service rate of the approach PR, is taken as a function of the saturation flow
rate of the left-turn slip lanes. The saturation flow rate is the maximum departure
(queue discharge) flow rate achieved by vehicles departing from the queue during the
green period at traffic signals [TRB, 2000]. The procedures described in the Highway
Capacity Manual [TRB, 2000] may be applied to calculate the saturation flow rate of the
left-turn slip lanes.
5.6.5 Application of traffic stream flow fundamentals
In order to estimate the maximum length of the queue, the relationships among the
fundamental traffic stream flow characteristics (introduced in Section 5.6.1) are used.
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Bowen-Jones [1995], investigating signalised intersections in Durban, estimated the
jam density kj to be 136 passenger car units per kilometre per lane. The assumption
was made that this figure is representative of conditions within the Durban South Basin.
In order to convert jam density kj in units of passenger car units per kilometre per lane,
into units of vehicles per kilometre per lane, the additional space occupied by heavy
vehicles must be accounted for. The passenger-car equivalent used for each heavy
vehicle is 2.0 passenger car units (pcu's) [TRB, 2000].




) (HVxEHV )+(ex Ec )
(5.4)
where:
kjVEH = Jam density in units of vehicles per kilometre per lane
kjPcu =Jam density in units of passenger car units per kilometre per lane
HV = Proportion of heavy vehicles (and buses) on the approach
EHV = Passenger-car equivalent of a heavy vehicle (or bus) = 2.0 pcu/heavy vehicle
C =Proportion of cars on the approach
Ec = Passenger-car equivalent of a car =1.0 pcu/car
Analysis of the eThekwini Municipality traffic count for the Edwin Swales VC Drive -
South Coast Road intersection on 22 April 2002, indicates that heavy vehicles and
buses comprise approximately 20 per-cent of the total traffic on the southern approach,
with cars comprising the remainder. Substituting these parameters into Equation (5.4)
yields the jam density kjVEH in units of vehicles per kilometre per lane:
k
_ kjPCU _ 136
'VEH - -
) (HVxEHV )+(CxEc ) (O.20x2)+(O.80xl)
= 114 vehicles per kilometre per lane
As an alternative to these computations, the actual jam density on each approach may
be measured directly in the field.
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Upstream of the intersection (Le. before the flaring of the southern approach at the
junction) two lanes are available for traffic flow on Edwin Swales VC Drive. The






OML =Maximum queue length [kilometres]
OM =Maximum number of vehicles in the queue [vehicles]
kjVEH = Jam density [vehicles per kilometre per lane]
N =Number of lanes on the approach upstream of the intersection [lanes]
Substituting the estimated parameters: OM, kjVEH and N, into Equation (5.5) yields:
Maximum queue length, QML
= QM = 1883 = 8.3 kilometres
k jvEH xN 114x2
5.6.6 Integration of queuing analysis and dispersion modelling
(5.5)
Through the use of GIS, plume coordinates have been integrated with the
transportation network. For the Acrylonitrile release (3.3 kg/s emission rate) at the
Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection, concentrations above the
ERPG-2 level may exist as far out as 1.4 km along the southern approach (Figure
5.17). The estimated maximum queue length (8.3 kilometres) is greater than the extent
of the ERPG-2 isopleth. Hence, for the scenario under investigation, vehicles within the
ERPG-2 isopleth along the southern approach are at jam density.
The short lanes on the southern approach provide additional queue storage potential.
Using aerial photographs and GIS, this additional queue storage potential has been
estimated to be equivalent to a single lane of length 230 metres. The number of











=Number of queued vehicles within the ERPG-2 isopleth [vehicles]
=Length of the approach within the ERPG-2 isopleth [kilometres]
= Additional queue storage potential of the short lanes [kilometres]
=Jam density [vehicles per kilometre per lane]
=Number of lanes on the approach upstream of the intersection (Le.
before the flaring of the approach at the junction) [lanes]
Substituting the estimated parameters: LERPG-2, L SL , kjVEH and N, into Equation (5.6),
yields the number of queued vehicles along the southern approach within the ERPG-2
isopleth:
QERPG-2 =(LERPG- 2 xkjVEH xN)+(LSL XkjVEH )
=(i.40x 114 x 2) + (0.23 x 114) =346 vehicles
After a period tR of one hour, there are OM number of vehicles in the queue. As
discussed in Section 5.6.3, vehicles are assumed to arrive at a uniform rate during the
peak. Hence, the time it takes for the queue to reach the ERPG-2 isopleth, tERPG-2 may
be simply estimated using the following relationship:
where:




=Time it takes for the queue to reach the ERPG-2 isopleth [minutes]
= Number of queued vehicles within the ERPG-2 isopleth [vehicles]
=Maximum number of vehicles in the queue (at tR =1 hour) [vehicles]
Substituting the estimated parameters: OERPG-2 and OM, into Equation (5.7), yields the
time it takes for the queue along the southern approach to reach the ERPG-2 isopleth:
QERPG-2 346 .
tERPG- 2 = x60=--x60=11 minutesQM 1883
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Multiplying the estimated number of queued vehicles within the ERPG-2 isopleth by the
average vehicle occupancy, yields an estimate of the number of affected road users
within the ERPG-2 isopleth. Roebuck [2004] recommended that an average vehicle
occupancy of two persons per vehicle be assumed. Hence, in the event of an
Acrylonitrile release at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection,
approximately seven hundred road users within the ERPG-2 isopleth on the southern
approach may experience irreversible or other serious health effects that could impair
their ability to take protective actions.
The procedure outlined in Sections 5.6.4 to 5.6.6 has been utilised to estimate the
number of affected road users within the ERPG-2 isopleth on the other approaches to
the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection, in the event of a worst-
case Acrylonitrile release. The results of this analysis are summarised in Table 5.7.
The worst-case scenario from a traffic perspective would be a dangerous goods
release during the morning or afternoon peak hour. A worst-case dispersion scenario
would involve a dangerous goods release during stable atmospheric conditions. Stable
atmospheric conditions are often characteristic of clear, calm and dry winter nights
[Preston-Whyte & Tyson, 1988]. Table 5.7 reveals that in the event that adverse
dispersion and traffic conditions coincide with an Acrylonitrile release at the Edwin
Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection, up to 1100 road users may
experience irreversible or other serious health effects that could impair their ability to
take protective actions. Aggregating the risk on each approach reveals that
approximately 3400 road users within the ERPG-2 isopleth are potentially at risk.
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Table 5.7: Road users within the ERPG-2 isopleth: Acrylonitrile release (3.3 kg/s





Peak hour under investigation PM AM PM AM
Arrival rate of traffic upstream of the accident, A 1180 1883 1608 2786
_(~~_~~~~l _
Reduced service rate during incident, PR 0 0 0 0
_(~~_~~~~l _
Duration of incident, tR [hr] 1 1 1 1
Maximum number of vehicles in the queue, OM 1180 1883 1608 2786
_(~~_~l~~:~~ _
% Heavy vehicles (and buses) on approach, 27% 20% 12% 13%
HV
-------------------------------------------------------- ------------- ------------ ------------- ------------
Jam density, kjVEH [veh/km/lane] (5.4) 107 114 121 120
5322
# of lanes on approach upstream of
intersection, N
._ .. _--------------------------------------------------- ------------- ------------ ------------- ------------
Maximum queue length, OML [km] (5.5) 5.51 8.29 4.43 4.64
Length of approach within ERPG-2 isopleth, 1.38 1.41 1.20 0.94
_~_E..R..~~:~ J~_~J.________________________________________________________________________________ _
Additional queue storage potential of short 0.20 0.23 0.27 0.04
-~~~-~~~-~~~-(~~! --------- ---------- ------ ----- -------- --- --- ----- -- --------- --- ----- -------- -------- -- --
Number of queued vehicles within ERPG-2 318 346 467 569
_~~?p-I~~~~ .9~R..~~:~ JY_~~H~:l?L _
Time taken for queue to reach ERPG-2 16 11 17 12
isopleth, tERPG-2 [min] (5.7)
-------------------------------------------------------- ------------- ------------ ------------- ------------
Average vehicle occupancy [persons/veh] 2 2 2 2
Number of road users within ERPG-2 isopleth 635 691 934 1139
5.7 Why Dense Gas Effects Have Not Been Incorporated
The aim of this investigation is to illustrate how traffic and transportation techniques
may be applied toward the issues of dangerous goods transportation. Less emphasis
has been placed on dispersion modelling techniques. Certain dangerous goods
releases will result in the formation of a gas cloud that has a density greater than the
ambient air density. The higher density may occur for example, as a result of the
molecular weight of the chemical or the low temperature at which the chemical is
released [Van Ulden, 1988J. Releases of Acrylonitrile and Hydrogen Fluoride for
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example, may produce dense gas clouds under certain circumstances [NIOSH, 2002].
ADMS™ is incapable of modelling dense gas dispersion [CERC, 2001].
The influence of the density effects on dispersion is primarily due to the associated
buoyancy forces. Negative buoyancy refers to a buoyancy force opposite to the
positive direction of the z-coordinate. Thus, a dense gas layer at ground level in the
atmosphere is defined to be a negatively buoyant flow. The converse is a positively
buoyant flow such as an emission from a hot source into the atmosphere. The neutrally
buoyant case is generally referred to as passive [Britter & McQuaid, 1988].
5.7.1 Complex terrain
The generally accepted and used dense-gas dispersion models such as DEGADIS
[Spicer & Havens, 1989] and SLAB [Ermak, 1990] do not account for complex terrain.
As topographical features were found to have a very significant effect on the hazard
area, this factor contributed to the decision not to employ dense gas dispersion
modelling. Moreover, DEGADIS and SLAB do not allow for long-term simulations and
subsequent percentile calculations [Spicer & Havens, 1989; Ermak, 1990] such as
those performed in this investigation.
5.7.2 Britter and McQuaid criteria
The Richardson number is a dimensionless number that is relevant to dense gas
dispersion. It is the ratio of the buoyancy forces to the inertia forces of the flow. The
Richardson number is the parameter that is used to establish whether a dense gas
release will exhibit significant density effects or if it may be treated as a passive release
for practical purposes. Britter & McQuaid [1988] advised that for continuous releases,






I ( Po - Pa ) ( Po 1)go =g =g --
Pa Pa
(5.9)
0 0 =volume flow rate from a ground-level source [m3/s]
Uref = mean wind velocity at reference height of 10 m [m/s]
o = characteristic horizontal source dimension [m]
po =density of the released material [kg/m3]
Pa =density of the ambient air [kg/m3]
9 = acceleration due to gravity, 9.81 m/s2
By inspection, wind speed Uref has the greatest influence on governing passive
behaviour.
The relative vapour density of Acrylonitrile, Le. Po / Pa is equal to 1.8 [NIOSH, 2002]. In
the event that twenty kilolitres of Acrylonitrile are released from an ISO-tainer and form
an unconfined pool on the ground:
• Britter and McQuaid's passive condition is satisfied for a 1kg/s Acrylonitrile
emission rate when Uref ~ 1.5 m/so Analysis of the meteorological data for the period
1993-2002 has revealed that the wind speed was greater than 1.5 m/s for 94 per-
cent of the record.
• Britter and McQuaid's passive condition is satisfied for a 3.3kg/s Acrylonitrile
emission rate when Uref ~ 2.18 m/so Analysis of the meteorological data for the
period 1993-2002 revealed that the wind speed was greater than 2.18 m/s for 77
per-cent of the record.
In these calculations, the maximum pool area and hence, the characteristic horizontal
source dimension, 0 in Equation (5.8) were estimated by assuming that the released
Acrylonitrile will spread uniformly over the spill area and will form an unconfined pool
having an average depth of one centimetre, following the recommendations of
Kawamura & Mackay [1985] and US-EPA [1999].
Britter & McQuaid [1988] advised that downstream of the source, the source size 0
becomes progressively less relevant as the plume forgets its history. Provided the
concentrations of interest do not occur within the immediate vicinity of the source, e.g.
within 50, the source size 0 is not significant.
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5.7.3 Thermodynamics of Hydrogen Fluoride modelling
Under laboratory conditions, the relative vapour density of Anhydrous Hydrogen
Fluoride is equal to 0.7 times that of air [NIOSH, 2002]. However, there are several
complex interactions that influence the dispersion of a mixture of Hydrogen Fluoride
(HF), air and water in a cloud that has formed as a result of an accidental release
[Lines, 1995]. Oligomers of Hydrogen Fluoride include (HF)2. (HF)6 and (HF)a. HF
shows oligomerisation behaviour in the vapour phase and behaves as a dense gas in
dry air. Dilution causes the endothermic dissociation of these HF oligomers; this
increases the density of the dispersing cloud. Increasing the temperature also favours
dissociation. However, dissociation decreases the mean molecular weight of the
Hydrogen Fluoride causing a decrease in cloud density. HF present as an aerosol
evaporates and the pollutant cloud cools; however, the volume increases causing a
reduction in the overall cloud density [Lines, 1995].
Water vapour in the air and HF react exothermically to produce an acid mist, this
increases the cloud temperature and reduces the density. HF releases may be
modelled by dense gas dispersion. However, in moist air at a relative humidity greater
than 50 per-cent, the effect of the interaction between HF and water reduces the
downwind distance where the excess density is significant and may lead to positive
buoyancy. In fact, Hydrogen Fluoride clouds are predicted to become buoyant at
humidities greater than 67 per-cent [Lines, 1995]. The annual average humidity in
Durban is 79 per-cent [Hunter, 1990]. Table 5.8 confirms that although the relative
humidity in the basin varies diurnally and seasonally, the relative humidity rarely drops
to levels at which a dispersing HF plume will behave as a dense gas.
Table 5.8: Seasonal and diurnal variation in relative humidity in Durban, 1993-2002
Summer Day Winter Day Summer Night Winter Night
Mean 73 66 85 82
0.1 59 45 73 66
~ -------- ----------------- ------------------ ------------------ ------------------
.. 0.2 64 52 78 73
c: -------- ----------------- ------------------ ------------------ ------------------
Cl) 0.3 68 58 82 78
~ -------- ----------------- ------------------ ------------------ ------------------
Cl) 0.4 70 62 84 81CL -------- ------ _
0.5 73 66 87 84
With these complex thermodynamics influencing the dispersion of an accidental
release of Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride, approximating a release in the Durban South
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Basin as a passive cloud, was considered to be more representative of reality than
using dense gas dispersion modelling.
Moreover, the dispersion model ALOHA, introduced in Section 5.5.1, is able to model
both dense gas and passive dispersion. The dense gas dispersion calculations used in
ALOHA are based on those used in the DEGADISTM model [US-EPA, 1999b].
Experimentation has revealed that, when the user allows the model to choose, in most
cases ALOHA uses passive dispersion to model Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride
releases within the Durban South Basin.
Brown et al. [2001] conducted a quantitative risk assessment to estimate the risk on a
national basis in the U.S. due to transportation of selected dangerous goods. The
selected dangerous goods included Chlorine, Ammonia and Anhydrous Hydrogen
Fluoride, all substances that may behave as dense gases upon release under certain
circumstances. CASRAM (Chemical Accident Statistical Risk Assessment Model),
which provided atmospheric dispersion estimates in the Brown et al. [2001] study, does
not treat dense gas or complex-terrain effects.
5.8 Effects of Sheltering
The consequence analysis used in this study did not account for the fact that people
are normally indoors and are thus partially protected from outdoor concentrations of
toxic substances. This effect. called sheltering. impacts severe accidents more
profoundly than less severe accidents. The exclusion of sheltering from the risk
assessment is consistent with most related studies [Brown et al. 2001]. For example,
sheltering was excluded in calculating Protective Action Distances for the Emergency
Response Guidebook [USDOT. 2004]. Accordingly, the effect of sheltering on the
occupants of motor vehicles was also not considered in this investigation.
The protection afforded by sheltering depends primarily on the building ventilation rate
and to a lesser extent on the release duration and meteorology. Sheltering provides the
greatest protection for short-duration releases and large releases that occur at night
[Brown et al. 2001]. During such incidents, sheltering the population in relatively airtight
buildings may reduce the number of people exposed to dangerous airborne
concentrations by more than two orders of magnitude over the potential number that
could be exposed if no sheltering occurs (Le., when everybody is outdoors). Well-
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planned emergency management procedures may further reduce dangerous goods
transportation risk by advising all persons in the path of the plume to remain indoors,
shut off ventilation systems and take steps to reduce infiltration into the building [Brown
et al. 2001].
5.9 Chapter Summary
Dispersion modelling has been utilised to estimate the consequences of dangerous
goods releases at the Bayhead Road - South Coast Road; Edwin Swales VC Drive -
South Coast Road; Tara Road - Duranta Road; M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta
Road; and The Avenue East - Refinery Drive intersections. ADMSTM, the new
generation dispersion modelling software used in this study, uses the Monin-Obukhov
relationship to describe the condition of the atmosphere rather than the Pasquill
stability categories. ADMSTM is capable of modelling complex terrain situations and
estimating airflow and dispersion over hills. The unique topography of the Durban
South Basin greatly influences the dispersion of contaminants. Complex and diverse
interactions arise between wind speed, wind direction and the underlying terrain. Air
dispersion modelling was undertaken to assess the site-specific effect of these
interactions.
The dispersion of a neutrally buoyant gas was simulated at each of the five selected
intersections using a continuous unit emission rate. These simulations were conducted
using every hour of meteorological conditions for a four-year period, thus encapsulating
all feasible wind directions and atmospheric stabilities. This ADMS™ output was scaled
by a new emission rate and chemical-specific concentration conversion factor, in order
to estimate downwind concentrations resulting from specific release scenarios.
Through the use of this efficient methodology, downwind concentrations may be
estimated for a passive release of any chemical at any emission rate, with only a single
run of the dispersion model at a location.
Geographical information systems provide a natural platform for the analysis
dangerous goods releases, enabling the integration of information describing the toxic
plume co-ordinates, the transportation network and population distribution. The
downwind concentrations estimated by ADMS™ for specific release scenarios, were
compared to exposure guidelines, which relate the intensity of the concentration to the
degree of injury. Taking the size of the impact area and using local population density
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information, allowed the number of people exposed to a threshold concentration of
each chemical to be estimated. The dispersion modelling simulations indicate that
several thousands of residents are potentially at risk from experiencing irreversible or
other serious health effects due to releases of dangerous goods at the selected
intersections. In particular, large numbers of individuals living in close proximity to the
M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta Road and Tara Road - Duranta Road intersections
are potentially at risk from releases of Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride.
Queuing analysis and traffic flow fundamentals may be integrated with the results of
dispersion modelling to estimate the number of road users at risk from a releasing
dangerous goods accident at an intersection. Applying this methodology to an
Acrylonitrile release during peak traffic conditions at the Edwin Swales VC Drive -
South Coast Road intersection, reveals that over a thousand road users may be
exposed to concentrations that would cause irreversible or other serious health effects,
which could impair their ability to take protective actions. The number of potential
exposures in this investigation does not consider potential exposure reduction due to
the protective effects of sheltering. Thus, the stated number of exposures represents a
conservative upper bound on the actual number of injuries.
ADMS™ is incapable of modelling dense gas dispersion. However, releases of
Acrylonitrile and Hydrogen Fluoride may produce dense gas clouds under certain
circumstances. The widely used dense-gas dispersion models do not account for
complex terrain. As topographical features were found to have a very significant effect
on dispersion within the study area, this factor contributed to the decision not to employ
dense gas dispersion modelling. Moreover, most dense-gas dispersion models do not
allow for long-term simulations such as those conducted in this investigation.
Application of the Britter & McQuaid [1988] criteria revealed that passive dispersion
results are valid for the majority of the simulated Acrylonitrile releases. Due to complex
thermodynamics specific to Hydrogen Fluoride, passive dispersion results are more




6.1 Summary of Investigation
In this investigation, a methodology was developed to estimate the likelihood and
consequences of releases of dangerous goods due to road accidents at intersections.
A case study was explored and the methodology was applied to estimate the risks
posed to the people residing in, working in and travelling through the Durban South
Basin.
In Chapter 2, the literature pertaining to risk assessment of dangerous goods transport
is reviewed. The current state of the art and the theory and methodology used in
previous risk analyses are identified. In Chapter 3, the selection of the case study for
this investigation is discussed. An account is given of the traffic surveys conducted at
the following intersections: Bayhead Road - South Coast Road; Edwin Swales VC
Drive - South Coast Road; Tara Road - Duranta Road; M4 Southern Freeway -
Duranta Road; and The Avenue East - Refinery Drive. Chapter 4 presents two
approaches to estimate the likelihood of dangerous goods accidents and releases at
intersections: a deterministic model and a method based on Monte Carlo simulation.
Chapter 5 discusses the integration of dispersion modelling and geographic information
systems in order to estimate the impacts of releasing dangerous goods accidents at the
selected intersections; as well as the use of queuing analysis to estimate the risks
posed to road users.
6.2 Summary of Findings





• The majority of the dangerous goods transportation studies reported in the literature
relate to aspects such as risk analysis, database development and designating
routes for transporting dangerous goods.
• Historical records confirm that dangerous goods transportation incidents may have
very serious consequences.
• Dangerous goods releases may occur during normal transport (en-route) or as a
result of a traffic accident. Traffic accidents are the leading cause of severe
dangerous goods incidents (deaths, injuries, etc.).
• Risk is a measure of relative safety and is a combination of accident likelihood,
release probability and consequence of release.
• Risk estimates are not precise. The accuracy of the risk estimates is governed by
the quality of the data collected by disparate agencies and the judgements of the
researcher.
• Risk estimation requires information on: flows of dangerous goods; incidents and
accidents; and the population at risk.
• Accident likelihood is estimated from traffic accident rates and traffic volumes.
• An accident involving a dangerous goods vehicle cannot lead to potentially
catastrophic consequences unless the cargo is released. The probability of a
release, varies with the type of accident and varies between different classes of
roads.
• Intensive risk analyses should consider the activities of non-residential areas and
vulnerable zones (places that concentrate a large amount of people who are
difficult to protect or evacuate, e.g. schools, hospitals or commercial centres).
• South African legislation stipulates that municipalities and provinces must prepare





High levels of traffic flow occur within the Durban South Basin and significant
volumes of dangerous goods are transported on the roads of the basin daily.
These high flows of dangerous goods, when combined with South Africa's poor
road safety record, create numerous opportunities for incidents (including traffic
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accidents) that could release dangerous goods into the environment and result in
public exposure to poisonous, corrosive and possibly carcinogenic substances.
• In South Africa, the majority of road accidents occur in urban areas and accidents
at intersections account for a high percentage of the total number of urban
accidents.
• Dangerous goods accidents involving heavy vehicles may have far more severe
consequences than those involving light delivery vehicles, due to the larger
quantities of dangerous goods involved.
• Acrylonitrile, Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride, Benzene, Isopropylamine, Methyl
Isocyanate and Tetra Ethyl Lead, all dangerous goods belonging to Danger group I
(substances that present a very severe risk), are being transported through the
following intersections: Bayhead Road - South Coast Road; Edwin Swales VC
Drive - South Coast Road; Tara Road - Duranta Road; M4 Southern Freeway -
Duranta Road; and The Avenue East - Refinery Drive.
6.2.3 Likelihood of dangerous goods accidents and releases
• The deterministic approach developed to estimate dangerous goods accident and
release rates at intersections, reveals that the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South
Coast Road intersection has the highest expected rate of dangerous goods
accidents and releases, followed by the Bayhead Road - South Coast Road
intersection. The Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection is
expected to experience, on average: six dangerous goods accidents per year and
one releasing dangerous goods accident every thirteen months. The Tara Road -
Duranta Road, M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta Road and The Avenue East -
Refinery Drive intersections have a comparatively lower expected Dangerous
Goods Accident Rate and Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate. No reliable
South African dangerous goods incident statistics are available to validate these
results.
• The substances allocated to Danger group I, which are being transported through
the selected intersections, present a very severe risk. However, as the proportion of
heavy vehicles transporting these substances is low (compared to Petroleum for
example), the estimated frequency of accidents and releases involving Danger
group I substances is much lower.
• At the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection, the mean values
of the Dangerous Goods Accident Rate and the Dangerous Goods Releasing
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Accident Rate calculated using Monte Carlo simulation, are quite similar to those
results calculated using the deterministic approach. However, Monte Carlo
simulation enables a more detailed understanding of the nature and distribution of
dangerous goods accident and releases.
6.2.4 Consequences of dangerous goods releases
• The ground-level concentrations resulting from a release of contaminants are
dependent on the prevailing meteorological conditions.
• By combining information on the spill characteristics, material properties and
meteorological and topographical parameters, the consequences of dangerous
goods releases may be estimated using dispersion modelling.
• Long-term dispersion modelling simulations Le. greater than one year, encapsulate
all feasible wind directions and atmospheric stabilities at a location.
• The unique topography of the Durban South Basin greatly influences the dispersion
of contaminants.
• The downwind concentrations estimated by the dispersion model may be compared
to public exposure guidelines, which relate the intensity of the concentration to the
degree of injury.
• The use of geographic information systems (GIS) enhances dispersion modelling
by allowing consequences and population exposure to be estimated more
efficiently. With GIS, information describing the transportation network, specific
chemicals, historical meteorological conditions and population distribution may be
combined into an integrated environment.
• Queuing analysis and traffic flow fundamentals may be integrated with dispersion
modelling to estimate the number of road users at risk from a releasing dangerous
goods accident at an intersection.
• The results of this investigation indicate that thousands of residents within the
Durban South Basin are potentially at risk due to releases of dangerous goods at
the selected intersections. In particular, over 35000 individuals living in close
proximity to the M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta Road and Tara Road - Duranta
Road intersections are potentially at risk from experiencing irreversible or other
serious health effects due to releases of Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride.
• An Acrylonitrile release during peak traffic conditions at the Edwin Swales VC Drive
- South Coast Road intersection may expose over a thousand road users to
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concentrations that would cause irreversible or other serious health effects that
could impair their ability to take protective actions.
• Application of the Britter & McQuaid [1988] criteria revealed that passive dispersion
results are valid for the majority of the simulated Acrylonitrile releases. Due to
complex thermodynamics specific to Hydrogen Fluoride, passive dispersion results
are more applicable for HF releases within the Durban South Basin.
• The emergency response in the event of a large dangerous goods release should
be to notify the affected communities and possibly evacuate the affected areas until
the hazard has been contained and removed. If evacuation is not possible,
sheltering the population in relatively airtight buildings may reduce the number of
people exposed to toxic concentrations by more than two orders of magnitude over
the potential number that could be exposed if no sheltering occurs (i.e., when
everybody is outdoors).
6.3 Conclusions
The methodology developed in this investigation yields an estimate of the following:
• The likelihood or frequency of dangerous goods accidents and releases at
intersections
• The extent of the impact area and the severity of the human consequences that
may occur following releases of dangerous goods.
From the findings listed in Section 6.2, the following can be concluded:
Traffic surveys at selected locations (or along a route) provide an indication of
directional dangerous goods vehicle flows and the types of dangerous goods being
transported through these locations (or along these routes), i.e. traffic surveys are an
acceptable means of hazard identification. However, the estimate of the hazard would
be improved through the co-operation of industry within the study area.
The Monte Carlo simulation approach may be applied to a broad range of problems
including the estimation of dangerous goods transportation risks, especially when there
are substantial data uncertainties. Monte Carlo simulation enables a detailed
understanding of the nature and distribution of the parameter being investigated.
Utilising the same raw data as a deterministic approach, coupled with reasonable
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assumptions based on the available data, Monte Carlo simulation provides the
researcher with far more information.
Complex and diverse interactions arise between wind speed, wind direction and the
underlying terrain. Topographical features may have a significant impact on the extent
of the hazard area. In such situations a dispersion model that is capable of
incorporating complex terrain effects and estimating airflow and dispersion over hills, is
required.
Through the use of the methodology developed in this investigation, downwind
concentrations may be estimated for a passive release of any chemical at any emission
rate, with only a single run of the dispersion model at a specific location. The output
from simulations of the dispersion of a neutrally buoyant gas using a continuous unit
emission rate, may be scaled by a new emission rate and chemical-specific
concentration conversion factor, in order to estimate downwind concentrations resulting
from specific release scenarios.
Dispersion modelling in combination with geographical information system enables an
efficient estimation of the consequences of dangerous goods releases. Geographical
information systems provide a natural platform for the analysis dangerous goods
releases, enabling the integration of information describing the toxic plume co-
ordinates, the transportation network and population distribution. Queuing analysis in
combination with dispersion modelling and GIS is an applicable method for estimating
the risk to users from releasing dangerous goods accidents at intersections.
The results of this risk assessment suggest that although dangerous goods accidents
and releases within the Durban South Basin are infrequent, the potential exists for very
serious incidents involving large numbers of casualties.
6.4 Recommendations and Suggestions for Future Work
6.4.1 Application of the methodology
Major Hazard Installations (MHI's) have an influence on the dangerous goods flows on
the surrounding transportation network. It is envisaged that this document will alert risk
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analysts to the implications of dangerous goods transportation, and that such impacts
will be included in future MHI risk assessments.
6.4.2 South African dangerous goods statistics
There is a need to develop and maintain reliable databases for analysing the
movement of dangerous goods in South Africa. Databases should contain information
on: shipment origin-destination, material type, quantity, route, shipper, haulier and
shipment date.
There is also a need to develop and maintain databases that provide a thorough and
accurate account of each dangerous goods incident in South Africa. The following data
fields could be included in these databases:
• The chemical released in the incident.
• The quantity of material being transported in the shipment and the quantity of
material released in each dangerous goods incident. This value would improve
discharge fraction statistics.
• For incidents involving releases from bulk containers that are cracked or ruptured
as a result of an accident, cataloguing the approximate size and location of the
resulting hole would be helpful to future researchers.
• The approximate release duration would be a valuable statistic, as this is one of the
primary factors in estimating the rate of emission into the atmosphere.
• A database containing photographs of accident scenes, failed containers, and
release-related environmental and property damage would also beneficial. Due to
advances in computer storage, such a database could be easily assembled,
maintained and stored [Brown et al. 2001].
6.4.3 Enhancements to the proposed methodology
The proposed methodology could be enhanced by developing a statistical risk
assessment model (or obtaining and modifying CASRAM, which is introduced in
Section 5.7.3) to estimate dangerous goods release rates and dispersion. Distributions
of impact areas could be generated stochastically through Monte Carlo sampling of
accident and meteorological parameters. Hence, the distribution of possible outcomes




For example, the release rate of material from the transport container may be based on
the location and size of the hole, which follow distributions derived from dangerous
goods incident databases. Total release amounts may follow discharge fraction
distributions derived from incident databases [Brown et al. 2001].
6.4.4 Application of Intelligent Transportation Systems
The application of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) to dangerous goods
incidents warrants investigation. Intelligent transportation systems are emerging
transportation technologies that enhance the safety and efficiency of vehicles and
roadway systems. ITS include any technology that allows drivers and traffic control
system operators to collect and use real-time information to improve roadway system
control, vehicle navigation, or both [TRB, 2000]. Consider the Edwin Swales VC Drive-
South Coast Road intersection, which experiences an average of four traffic accidents
per week (Table 3.4). Electronic signboards placed before junctions (i.e. off-ramps, on-
ramps, intersections, etc) on South Coast Road and Edwin Swales VC Drive, may be
used to inform drivers to bypass the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road
intersection if an accident occurs there. In the event of a dangerous goods release, ITS
may be used to instruct drivers on alternative routes to be used (so as to avoid
exposure to any toxic plume) [Roebuck, 2005].
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A. APPENDIX A: Preliminary Dangerous Goods Survey
A summary of the preliminary dangerous goods survey is presented in Table A.1.







Group Tara The Avenue Bayhead Lansdowne
Road East Road Road
1075 Liquefied petroleum gases 2 - --J-1090- Aceio~e- ------------ --------------- ---3-- - -- --ii--- - ------ ------------ - -----~- ----------- ---- --
-1105- A-~-yl~-lc-~h~I~--------------------- ---3--- ---ll/ill--- ------ ------------- -----~---- -------------
-11-1-4- Be~~er;e--------------------------- ---3--- -----1----- --:,j-- ------~------ ------------------------
-11-20- B~t~~-~i~--------------------------- ---3--- ---ll/ill--- ------ ------------- -----~------------------
-1170- Ettiyl ~-lc-~h~l- ------ ------ --------- ---3--- ---ll/ill --- ------ --------- -- -- -----~---------------- --
-1202- 6i~-~el-f~el --------- ------------ -- -- ---3-- - -- --111--- - ----- - ------~- ---- - -------- ------ --- ---- ---
-12-03- Petr~I------------------------------ ---3--- ----ii---- --:,j-- ------~------ -----~------------------
-12-1-0- p~i~ti~ii i~k,-fla~~~-bie ----------- ---3- -- ---Il/ill --- ------ ------~- ----- ---------- -------------
-1223- Ke~~~e~e ---------- -------- -------- ---3--- ---- III --- - --:,j -- ------------ - -----~- -------- ---------
-12-30- Metha~~I- --------- --- ------------ -- -- -3--- ----ii--- - ------ ------------- -----~- ----- -- ---- ------
-1245- MethYl" isoi;~tyl -keto-~e- (he~o~~Y ---3- -- ----ii---- ------ ------------- -----~---- -------------
:i?~?: ~~!~i~~t~~~rXl~~:r!!~~~~~~:: :::~::: ::::][:::: :::::: ::::::::::::: ::::J:::_:::::::::::::
1263 Paint related material 3 11/111 --J-12-68- Petr~le~~-p;~~i~cts--- ------------ --- 3- -- --iili/lll-- --:,j-- ----- -------- --- --~- ------ -- ---- -----
-1274- P~opyi-~Ico-hol~ -~o~~al- ----- -- --- ---3--- ---ll/ill--- ------ --- -- -------- -- -- -~- --- --- -- ----- ---
-12-94- Tol;;e~-e---------------------------- ---3--- ----ii---- ------ ------------- -----~------------------
------- ------------------------------------- -.--.-. ---------- ------ ------------- ------------------------
1307 Xylenes 3 11/111-1547- A~iii-~~- --------- ----------- --------- ---6- -- ---- li -- -- ------ ----- -------- -----~- --------- --------
-1649- Tetra-Ethyl-Lead---------------- -- ---6- -- -----1- ---- ----- - ------~- ----- --- -- -------------------
-1824- s~di~~-h-yd~o~id~-~-~i~ti~~------- ---8--- ---111111--- --:,j-- ------------- -----l--- -------------
-1863- A~iatio-~ -f;;el --------- -- ------------ ---3- -- ---Il/ill --- --- --- ------- ------ -----~- --- -------------
:i~!?: ~J!~~~:~~:,: ~~f~i~~~~t~~: [i~~[~:::::: :::?::: :::::::::: :::::: ::::::::::::: ::::J:::::::::::::::::
1993 Additives, for petrol mixed with 3 11 --J
flammable solvent, non toxic-1S-99- Ta;~:liq~id------------------------- ---3--- ---I'/i'I--- --:,j-- ------~------ -----~---- -------------
-i()S5- Sty~e~e~-~~~~~-r- i~h-it;iied------ -- -3- -- ----III ---- ----- - ---- --~- ----- --- --l-----------------
-iO-78- Tol;;e~-e -dii~~cy~~-~ie- ------------ ---6--- -- -- li ---- --- -- - ---------- --- -----~----- --- ---- ------
-i672- A~-~o~-ia ~ol~ii~~- -- ------ ---- ---- ---8- -- ----lli- --- --:,j-- ----- -------- -- --- ----- -- ---- -------
------. ------------------------------------- ------- ---------- ------ ------------- ------------------------
3082 Environmen~all~ hazardous 9 III --J --J
--. ---- ~~-~~!~!'!~~-'-~~~~~ ----- --- --- ------- ------- ---------- ------ -- ----------- -- ---------- -- --- -------Multiload* --J --J --J
*Multiload refers to a vehicle carrying more than one type of dangerous substance. In
place of the usual UN Number, the placard reads: "Multiload".
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B. APPENDIX B: Dangerous Goods Intersection Surveys
B.1 Bayhead Road· South Coast Road Intersection Survey
A summary of the dangerous goods survey at the Bayhead Road - South Coast Road
intersection is presented in Table B.1.
Date: 11/7/2004 Time: 07:55-13:55 Hours: 6 hours
• Guidance on reading Table B.1
Explanation of column headings:
NL: vehicle approaching the intersection from the NORTH, turned LEFT at the
intersection
NS: vehicle approaching the intersection from the NORTH, proceeded STRAIGHT
through the intersection
NR: vehicle approaching the intersection from the NORTH, turned RIGHT at the
intersection
Similar conventions are used for vehicles approaching from the South, East and West.
Taking the first row of data in Table B.1 as an example, during the six hours surveyed:
• ONE dangerous goods heavy vehicle carrying an ISO-tainer of Butylene
approached the Bayhead Road - South Coast Road intersection from the NORTH
along South Coast Road and proceeded STRAIGHT through the intersection
• ONE dangerous goods heavy vehicle carrying an ISO-tainer of Butylene
approached the Bayhead Road - South Coast Road intersection from the SOUTH
along South Coast Road and turned RIGHT at the intersection
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Table B.1: Summary of dangerous goods survey at the Bayhead Road - South Coast Road intersection
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Class I GroupDangerous GoodsUN No.
-_19_1_?_ ~l!!¥!~!1_~ ~..1 : !~9..-_t~i!"!~~_ J -1-_L_
1075 Liquefied Petroleum Gases 2.1 - HGV
~~{9~~~ ~~g~~!i~~~~~~~9J~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~I~~~~~~~~[~~~1~~~
-_19_~~_ ~~~!C?!1_i!~i~~~_I.~~J~J!~~ ~._1. ! !~_9..-.t~i!"!~~_t " _
-_1~_14_ ~~!1_~~!"!~ ~ ! I~!1_~~! . " _
1120 Butanols 3 11/111 Tanker-------- ------------------------------------------------------ ------ ---------- --------------t--------~-------
__1E9_ ~t_~¥! ~'-~C?hC?! J~!~9_'~9)) ~ W~I.I I~!1_~~! . " _
-_1 ~7.9_ ~t_~¥! _C!I.~C?~_C?! J~!~9_~9.1) ---------------------------- ---~ -- ---)~)~--- -!~.9..-_t~i!"!~~-I--------"-------
__1E9_ ~t_~¥!~I_~C?hC?! J~!~9_~9.1) ~ )~)!I ~~1)!9J~_~~ ? "- _
-_1 ~ 7.~_ ~t_~¥! ~~_~!~!~ ~ I~ I ~!1_~~! t " _
__1~_~~_ f_l!~l!~~L ~ )!I I~!1_~~! _
1202 Diesel fuel 3 III Tanker I 1
__1?_q~_ ~~!~C?!. ~ IL I~!1_~~! ~~ J _
1208 Hexanes 3 11 Tanker
-------- ------------------------------------------------------ ----------------- --------------t--------~-------
1212 Isobutanol 3 III Tanker-------- ------------------------------------------------------ ----------------- --------------t--------~-------
__1?_1_~_ !~9R~C?R~!1_~! ~ 11. I ~!1_~~! . " _
__1?~~_!~9R~C?P1!C!~~~~ ~ ! !~9.._:.t~i!"!~~_ t- "- _
1223 Kerosene 3 III Tanker-------- ------------------------------------------------------ -----.---.------- --------------1--------~-------
__1?~? M~.thy! ~_~!~9_~':Y!~!~_ ~9_~9_f!1_~~~ J~_~i_~i_t~~ ~ I~ I~!1_~~! . " _
__1?~? M~_th¥! !!1c~!~9_~~~~!~_ ~9_~9_f!1_~~ ~ J~_~i_~~t~~ ~ 11. !~_9..-_t~i!"!~~ _. " _
__1?~~_ ~~~~!_r_~'_C!!~~_ ~_C!!~~i_C!L ~ )~~!I ~~Y_ • " _
__1?~~_ ~~!~C?!~!J_"!!.R~C?~l:l~~~ ~ I!!I!!I! __ ---I~~-~~!---t--------"-------
__1?_~~_ ~~!~C?~~!J_"!! .R~C?~l!~_t~ ~ .If!'!!I! ~~Y_ • " _
__1?7.4_ ~:_P-~C?R~!1_C?~ ~ WJ!I I~!1_~~! t " _






































































Class I GroupDangerous Goods
E
UN No.
, NL I NS I NR I SL I SS
1?1?- ~~ll!~~. . .. .. __!U ._..I! !~_Q-_t~i~~~. j ) . ..
. _1~1~_ T.~!~~ _~.t~lt h~9_q __ .. ._ _ .__ .~..1 .. I. _ _I~!l.~~!__ .. _. _. _ _. __
._1?~~. ~<?~.i!J_~ _~y~.~q~!g~ .~l?!i~ _ __ _. : -: _ I~!l.~~!_. _. __ _..•.......
..1?~~. ~_<?~.i!J.~_~y~_~q~!g~ .~l?!LJ!lq!l__ ._ __ ._. __ ~._ WJtl_. _._. I~!l.~~! .__ ._. _.
1?~~_ ~'{l~!i~~.fLJ~_I. __ __ __ ._. _. .. _. _.. _. .._.. _.~ __ .J~Jtl_ I~!l.~~! .._.._ .
..1?~~. R~~.i!l. ~9J!J_t!l?~,..~9_~~~.~t~ _ _...... ~ __ .__ ..wJ~..__.~~~!~J!l.~~.I ? _.. _
..1~_1?- ~t_~y! ~~_rxl~t~,. !~hi.~i!~.q. _. _. _.._ __.. _.~ __ I! _. _. _. _I~!l_~~! .. _. _.. _.
._.1~_~~_ T.~~~! .~lg!JJ~_,_l~~!LJ~i!!g. ~l?~q_ 9~1?~_~tt_ ~_~g_ 9.it~ ~ .J~Jtl I~!l_~~! . • _
._~9~?_ ~tY.~~!l_~ _~l?~<?~~~ J!l_~i_~i_t~_q . ~ ..._Jtl I~!l_~~!. __ . . _
__~?_1?_ ~~~!i~~~Jg~_i_~~!~J!~~ . .__ .. ~ .. .IL._ ..~~~!~J!l.~~ ._.-.- .
.--~?~?- ti~~.~!l.qt~. _. _. _ ._ _. . .__ .. _~ Jtl__ ._._. I~!l_~~! __ __ . . _. __ .
--~b~~- ~~~~;~~~}:II-·h~~~;d~~~-~~b~·t~~~:ii·-~id··· ---~-------m···· ---~:~-~:~-·-I-·-3-···----···.- .. _.. _.._--_ ... _--_ ..... y--_._ .... __ . __ ._---------_ .. _g._---- ... _.. _... _... _-- ._--_._-_._ .. - .... __ ..•.. _----
_.~9.~? ~~yJ~l?!!~~.~!~tly_~_~?~~q9_LJ~_~.l!~~_t~~~~ !lgLJJ~_. _.. _~ ... __ .. Jt' .!~_Q-.t~i~~~_. .. _
..~9_~? ~~yJ~l?~~~.~!~tly_ ~_~?~~q~LJ~_ ~_l!~~.t~~~~ Ji.qLJJ~ .~ __ .. __ .Jtl .~~~ _ _ _
--~?~?- ~l?!~9~i~~_~g.l!lq~~~lql~~~~g9.~l~ ._ ..... .__ ...~ .._.. _~!~~!_. _.~~~!~J!l_~~_. . .
-_~?~?_ tiy~_r~~9.~~l?"!~! .llg!J.i~. __ . .... .._ __ .~ 1!!I!tl!.. ...I~!l.~~! . . . ._..
.... ---...~!JJ!iJ9_~g~ ... -. ----.- .....--- -. -- -----. --. -- -- ---. --. -- -. -.. -- - -. -I~!l_~~!__ -1- -------~-----..
Multiload HGV 2 2
-----.------------------------------------------------ ------------._--- -------------- ----.-.- -------
Multiload LDV 3 1




8.2 Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road Intersection Survey
A summary of the dangerous goods survey at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection is presented in Table B.2.
Date: 31/10/2004 Time: 07:40-13:40 Hours: 6 hours




Class I Group Config.
Edwin Swales VC Drive I South Coast Road
From West I From East I From North I From South
WL I ws I WR I EL I ES I ER I NL I NS I NR I SL I SS I SR
L
J Q~~_ 9_~YR~~!_R~f~ig~~~_t~g_~9.~~~ ?:? - I~~_~~~ L J _
,JQ~~_ ~tq~_~~~~_~_~!~q~~~_I!1_~~~~_~ ?:L - I~~_~~~ L L ? J ~ __
JQ~~_ ~tq~~~~_~_~_~!~q~~~_~~_~~~_~ ?:L - fj~~ .1. ~ ~ J J ~ 1. 1~__
JQ~~_ ~i_q~_~~~~_~_~!~q~~~_I!1_~~~~~ ?:L - ~~Y_ ~ L J ~ __
1090 cetone 3 11 Tanker 1 1 1 31------. . _
1~_?9_ ~!J_t~I)~I~ } [1!~I1. I~~_~~~ ? } } J ~ __
J ~_?~_ ~~tY_I_~~~.t~.t~~ } ,[1!~I1. I~~_~~~ L J _
1133 dhesives containing flammable liquid 3 11/111 Tanker 1 11--- - we •• _ ••
.1_1X9_ ~!~Y_1_9l~~~~I_(~_t!!~!1_<?V } JI!~IL I~~~~~ ~ L L L __ J L ~ 1L
.1~XQ ~!~Y_1_9l~~~~I_(~_t!!~~_<?V ~ [I!~I1._ !~_9.-.t~i~~~ L J _
,.1~XQ ~!~Y_1_9l~~~~I_(~_t!!~!1_<?V } [I!~I1. __~~1)!9J~_~~ L J _
_1~_~? ~!~Y_I~I)~~!y~_q[~gl)~~~.t~.Y.~~!~~! } [I! I~~_~~~ J L ~ __
_1.1_~~_ ~!~y_I_ M~_t!!y[ _~~_t~l)~ ~ !~ I~~_~~~ L J _
.1 ~_~~_ ~!J-,1!J_r~1. } [11. I~~_~~~ L L ~ __
.1~Q?_I?J~~~!!!J_~~ } ['1. I~~_~~~ 1. ~ L L ~ __
J~Q~ ~~t~~I ~ !~ I~~_~~~ .1~ __ J.~ ~ ~ ~ ? J_~ ~ ?~ .1~ __ J_~ ~ g~_
J~?~_I~_qp!~l?yl9_~i!1_~ } J !~_9.-_t~i~~~ 1. J _






Class I Group Config.
Edwin Swales VC Drive I South Coast Road
From West I From East I From North I From South
WL I ws I WR I EL I ES I ER I NL I NS I NR I SL I SS I SR
1:
1245 Methyl isobutyl ketone (hexone\ 3 11 Tanker 2 21 1 . . _
1263 Paint related material 3 11/111 Tanker 1 11------- . _
1268 Petroleum products 3 1/111111 Tanker 1 2 1 3 1 3 2 2 15
------. ------------ ------------------------------------- ------- -------- ------------ .----- -------------- ----.- ------ ------ ------- ------ ------ ------ ------- ------ --.---
1274 n-Propanol 3 111111 Tanker 1 1 1 31 - _
1301 Vinyl Acetate, Inhibited 3 11 Tanker 1 1
------- --- ---------------------------------------------- ------- -------- ------------ ------ -------------- ------ ------ ------ ------- ------ ------ ------ ------- ------ ------
1307 Xylenes 3 11/111 Tanker 1 1 2------- - ------------------------------------------------ ------- -------- ------------ ------ -------------- ------ ------ ------ ------- ------ ------ ------ ------- ------ ------
1350 SUlphur 4.1 III Container 1 2 2 5------- --- ---------------------------------------------- ------- -------- ------------ ------ -------------- ------ ------ ------ ------- ------ ------ ------ ------- ------ ------
1649 Tetra Ethyl Lead 6.1 I Tanker 1 1 2
------- ---------- --------------------------------------- ------- -------- ------------ ------ -------------- ------ ------ ------ ------- ------ ------ ------ ------- ------ ------
1824 Sodium hvdroxide solution 8 111111 Tanker 1 1 1 2 5
------- ----------~------------------------_._------------------ -------- ------------ ------ -------------- ------ ------ ------ ------- ------ ------ ------ ------- ------ ------
1863 viation fuel 3 11/111 Tanker 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 121-----_- _
1866 Resin Solution, flammable 3 11/111 Tanker 1 1------- -------------------------------------------------- ------- -------- ------------ ------ -------------- ------ ------ ------ ------- ------ ------ ------ ------- ------ ------
1866 Resin Solution, flammable 3 11/111 ISO-tainer 1 11-----_- ~ _
1992 Flammable linuid, toxic 3 1/111111 HGV 1 1
------- --------------~---------------------------------- ------- -------- ------------ ------ -------------- ------ ------ ------ ------- ------ ------ ------ ------- ------ ------
1993 dditives, for petrol mixed with flammable 3 11 Tanker 1 1
-1 ~~~~ ~~!~~_~! ~ ~ ~~~ ~~ ~ ~~!t ~ ~~ ~~ ~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~T ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~~ ~ ~ ~T~
.1~~~ ~?_r~,_~i9.~~~~_i~_~I_~~~~~_r~~~~~p.~?_I!_~~_~_C?~I~ } W!IL I~~_~~~ ~ J J 1. J ~ __
.1~~~_ "f§J!~,_hi~~~~!_i~_~I_l!~!~g!~~~_~~p.~§J_IL~~_q_<?~I~ ~ JI!~I!. !:!Q~ 1.. J _
-~~~~- "f§J_r~,_hi~~~~!_i~_~I_l!~!~g!~~~_~~p.~§J_IL~~_q_<?~I~ } ~I!~I!. __QI?~~_~J~ J J _
2055 Styrene monomer inhibited 3 III Tanker 3 1 41--- - _
2209 Formaldehyde solution 8 III Tanker 1 1
------- ------------ ------------------------------------- ------- -------- ------------ ------ -------------- ------ ------ ------ ------- ------ ------ ------ ------- ------ ------
2348 Butvl Acrvlate 3 III Tanker 1 2 3- ~ :l . _
_?~~~_l?l~~_thy~.r?!~!l_I~~~ } !~ I~~_~~~ ~ J _
-?~.??- _~_~_<?~1§J_~_<?~l!!i~~!_\YJ!~_19Xo_':~!1]!T)9_l!i?~~?o~ ~ JI!. I~~_~~~ J J _
X!.~~_I?~~~_rJ~_~,_W~!,_f.iJ~~~_~~t_~_~~!~ ~ .lIL !:!Q~ .t J 1.. __ J ~ __
2794 Batteries, Wet, Filled with acid 8 III LDV 1 1------- -----------------------._------------------------- ------- -------- ------------ ------ -------------- ------ ------ ------ ------- ------ ------ ------ ------- ------ ------
2874 Furfurvl Alcohol 3.1 III Tanker 1 11 :J _
3065 Icoholic Beverages 3 11/111 ISO-tainer 1 1





Danger I Config.Class I Group
Edwin Swales VC Drive I South Coast Road
From West I From East I From North I From South
WL I ws I WR I EL I ES I ER I NL I NS I NR I SL I SS I SR
~
}Q~?- ~!1_'{~r~':l!!1_~':l~~_I!~_~~~~!~C?~_~_~~_~!?!~~~!_lj~. ~ .1'1.. I~!1_~~! ~ 1.. ? ~ __
}Q~?- 1:M~~~Jl?~~:?~P_~C?p.~!1_q! } !I1. I~!1_~~! J J _
-~?-.~!_ ~!~Y_~!~9J~_~~~_r_C!!~~~_!i~~!~ ~ !I1. ~~':l!~j!1_~~ ? ~ __
3265 Corrosive liquid, acidic, ornanic 8 1/111111 Container 1 1
------- ------------- --------------_~_..._-------------- ------- -------- ------------ ------ -------------- ------ ------ ------ ------- ------ ------ .----- ------- ------ ------
----- __ .~_~!tj!q~_(L .I~!1_~~! 1.. .? ~ ? ..1 1.. .._1.. J~__
Multiload Container 1 1 2
I-------~_-------------------------._------_._-------- . ._. . . . _
Multiload HGV 1 11 2 1 4 4 6 3 5 3 1 41
-------~-------------------------------_._---------------- ------. -------- ------------ _ -._-_ .. _ _- ------ ------ ------ ------- ---_ --.- .----- ------- -
Multiload LDV 2 2 1 1 6
1:
B.3 M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta Road Intersection Survey
32 I 48 I 12 I 7 I 10 I 14 I 58 I 22 I 39 I 34 I 51 I 13 I 340
A summary of the dangerous goods surveys at the M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta Road intersection is presented in Table 8.3.
Date: 8/5/2003 Times: 10:50-11 :50, 13:05-14:05 Hours: 2 hours
Date: 31712003 Times: 08:25-09:25, 10:25-11 :25, 12:25-13:25, 14:30-15:30 Hours: 4 hours
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Class I Group Config.
Southern Freewav Off Ramp I Duranta Road
From South I From North I From East
SL I SS I SR I NL I NS I NR I EL I ES I ER
1:
J_9?_~_ ~~g~_~~~~_~_~!~<.>l~~_f!!_G_~~~~ ?:L : J?_~~~~ ~ J ~ _
J_9!~_ ~~g~_~~~~_~_~!~<.>l~~_f!!_G_~~~~ ?:L : tJ_~y 1. 1.._
1114 Benzene 3 I Tanker 3 3
-------- ---------------------------------------------------- -------.---------- ------------- ------- ------- -------- -----.- ------- ------- .------- ------- ------- -------
J_?9.?_l?j~_~~!.f~~l } .Ill J?_~~~~ J .1. J ~ _
J_?9.~~ '='~t.r~I } 11.. J?_~~~~ .1~ ?~ ?9 ~? ~_~ __
J_?9.~_':'_~~~~~_~ } IJ J?_~~~~ .1 1.._
1263 Paint related material 3 11/111 Tanker 1 11---- __ -- . . _
1263 Paint related material 3 11/111 LDV 1 1-------- ---------------------------------------------------- ------------------ ------------- ------- ------- -------- ------- ------- ---------------- ------- ------- -------
1268 Petroleum products 3 1/11/111 Tanker 2 2 4
,-------- ------------ --------------------------------------- ------------------ ------------- ------- ------- -------- ------- ------- ---------------- ------- ------- -------
1863 Aviation fuel 3 11/111 Tanker 1 1
-------- ---------------------------------------------------- ------------------ ------------- ------- ------- -------- ------- ------- ---------------- ------- ------- -------
..1_~!?_~j!~<.>9.~~l_~~!~ig~~?_t~~_lj9.~~~ ?:? : ."I?_~~~~ .1 J ~ _
1999 Tars, Linuid, including road aSp'halt and oils 3 11/111 Open Bin 1 1-------- --------~-------------- --------- ----------------- ------------------ --- --------- ------- ------- -------- ------- ------- ---------------- ------- ------- -------
1999 Tars, Linuid, includinn road aSp'halt and oils 3 11/111 Tanker 1 3 2 3 9----- ~ >Z _
2448 Molten SUlphur 4.1 III Tanker 1 1
-------- ------------ --------------------------------------- ------------------ ------------- ------- ------- -------- ------- ------- ---------------- ------- ------- -------
2902 Methy'llsocyanate 6.1 1111/111 Tanker 1 2 3-------- ----- ------- -------------------------------------- ------------------ ------------- ------- ------- -------- ------- ------- ------- -------- ------- ------- -------
_~9~?_ ~~~~~~~_f!1_~~_t~l!y_~~~?!~<.>~_~_~~_~~!~_'"!~,_llg~J~ ~ I!I QR~~_~~~ ..1 ~ ~ _
~9~?_ ~~~l~~~_I!1.~~_t~l!y_~~~?!~~~~_~~_~~!~~~_,_~g~_i~ ~ .I!I ."I?_~~~~ ~ J ~ _
_~?~?_~!~X~!~~J~_f!!P~~~!~~~_ !i~~!g ~ I!I ~<'>!l_t J 1.._
Multiload LDV 2 1 3 6
I-----_--~-------------------------------------------- _
Multiload HGV 1 1I---- __ --~-------------------------------------------- _
Multiload Tanker 1 1
1:
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8.4 Tara Road - Duranta Road Intersection Survey
A summary of the dangerous goods surveys at the Tara Road - Duranta Road intersection is presented in Table B.4.
Date: 8/5/2003
Date: 3/7/2003
Times: 09:45-10:45, 11:50-12:50 Hours: 2 hours
Times: 07:25-08:25, 09:25-10:25, 11 :25-12:25, 13:30-14:30 Hours: 4 hours
Table B.4: Summary of dangerous goods survey at the Tara Road - Duranta Road intersection
Duranta Road I Tara Road I Bvfield RoadUN





1075 Liguefied Petroleum Gases 2.1 - Tanker 3 5 8_____ . ._. ._. _
1075 Liguefied Petroleum Gases 2.1 - HGV 1 11 - ._. pe •• • _
1105 Amvl alcohols 3 111111 Tanker 1 11--- - ~ ._ •• _. __ ••••• •• __ • ••• •• ••••• _. __
1114 Benzene 3 I Tanker 2 2------- ._._-------- .. _------.-----------.---_._.---------- --------------- ._. __ ._. __ ... __ ... _.--- --_ .... ------ ------- --_._- ------ ----_.- ----_. -----_._------ ... -.- ---_._-
1193 Ethvl Methyl Ketone 3 11 Tanker 1 1_____ .. J . . ._. . . . .. . . . . . . _
1202 Diesel fuel 3 III Tanker 1 11--- - • •• •• __ • • • • _
1203 Petrol 3 11 Tanker 36 47 83------- -----------------_ .. _--------_._----------------_.- ----_. -------- ----------- ------ ------ ------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ -_._---------- ------ -_._---
1208 Hexanes 3 11 Tanker 1 1------- -_._._--------------------------------_._---------- --------------- ----------- ------ ------ ------- ------ ------- ---_.- .----- -----_. ------ -------------- ---_.- -------
1223 Kerosene 3 III Tanker 2 21------- .. . . . . e. • _
1268 Petroleum p'roducts 3 1/111111 Tanker 4 6 10------- _._--------. ----------_._------------------------- --------------- ----------- .. _... ------ -_._--- ------ ------- ------ -_._-- ------- ... -.- -------------- _... _- -------
1274 n-Propanol 3 11/111 Tanker 1 11---- __ - . . . . . e. _
1307 Xvlenes 3 11/111 Tanker 1 1 2
------- -~--------._------------------_._----------------_•• _---- -------- _._-------- ------ ------------_. -_._-- ------- ------ ------ ------- ._---- ------_._----- e. _
1649 Tetra Ethvl Lead 6.1 I Tanker 1 1, • J __ •• • •• • _
1789 Hvdrochloric Acid Solution 8 111111 Tanker 1 11 J • • • • • _







Duranta Road I Tara Road I Byfield Road
L
J~~~ ~_~IR~_~~i~_~~!g_~i_t~_::?_1Y~_~~i~L . ~_ ... __IL__J~_~~~~__J . . .. . . 1.._
J~1~ ~!~I?!<?!1.i~~~!g ._. . ~. J!I .~.l?~... . J 1.._
J~~~_ ~Xi~~9.~_f.~~!.. ._. ~_ .. I!/J!I__ .J~_~~~~ ? .._... . ~ ~ _
J~?~ ~!~I?~~~_~~P.~9R~!1_~_~~~!~~~_. ~:L : .J~.~~~~ ?__ .. . . . . J ._. . .L.
._1~~~ T~~~I_hi~':l!g!.i!"!~!~~j!1.g.~C?~.~.~~R~~I!_~!1_~.9!1.~ ~ I!!J!I__ Qp_~~_~i_~ __ ~ . . ._.~ _
J~~~ T~~~,_hi~':l!g!_i!"!~l~~j~.g.~C?~_~_~~R~~I!_~!"!~.9!1.~ ~ I!/J!I J~_~~~~ __.? . . . "L J~._
2448 Molten SUlphur 4.1 III Tanker 1 11••• - •• • • _. • • • • _
-?~?? ~.'!'_'!!<?!1_i~~<?!':l!i_q~!_\YJ!~_~9~:'.'!~~<.>~J~:'.~?~ ~ I!I J~_~~~~ . . . Q _
._?~9? fy!~!~yl_!~9_~Y~_~~_t~ . . . ~:! ~!I!ll!. _J~_~~~~ ? . ~ ._~ _
}~~~ ~J~~~~I!~_1?_~Y~~~9.~~ ~ I!!Jll J ~_~~~~ . . . -_Q _
}~~? ~~_~i~~n.I!'_~~!~lly_~~.~~r~~_l!~_~~~~_t~n~~lJlg~!~ ~ I!I_._ Qp_~~_~i_~ __ ~ .. ~ . ._.~ _
~~~?_ ~!l_~i~~n.I!'_~~!~lly_~~.~'!r~~_l!~_~~~~_t~_I!~~lJlg~!~:_. ~ .J!I J~n~~~ ? ~ J .~ tQ __
3257 Elevated temperature liquid 9 III Tanker 1 1 1 3------- --------------- ----------- ----------------------- --------------- ----------. ------ ------ ------- ------ -----_ _._- ------ .. _ ---- _ -----_ ---_._.
fy!':l!!i!<?~~ .. __ . .. ~_Q~ ~ . . . .. ~ __
Multiload Tanker 2 2
1: 82 I 0 I 6 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 78 I 6 I 0 I 0 I 172
1AO
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8.5 The Avenue East - Refinery Drive Intersection Survey
A summary of the dangerous goods surveys at The Avenue East - Refinery Drive intersection is presented in Table 8.5.
Date: 717/2003 Times: 07:55-13:55 Hours: 6 hours




Class I Group I Config.
The Avenue East I Joyner Road
1:
1075 Liquefied Petroleum Gases 2.1 - Tanker 4 1 1 2 8
,----~-- -- ---------------------------------------------- ------ --------- ----------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ --------------
1075 Liquefied Petroleum Gases 2.1 - LDV 1 1 1 1 4
------- -- ---------------------------------------------- -.-.-. --------- ----------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ -----.- ------ ------ ------- .----- --------------
1114 Benzene 3 I Tanker 0
------- -----------------------.------------------------- ------ --------- ----------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ --------------
1123 Buh/l Acetates 3 111111 Tanker 2 2
------- ---~------------------------------------------------- --------- ----------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ --------------
1202 Diesel fuel 3 III Tanker 2 2
------- ------------------------------------------------- ------ --------- ----------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ --------------
1203 Petrol 3 11 Tanker 1 1 1 3
------- -----------------------------------------------_. ------ --------- ----------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- --_._- ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ --------------
1208 Hexanes 3 11 ISO-taine 1 1 2
------- ------------------------------------------------- ------ --------- ----------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ ----------_.
1208 Hexanes 3 11 LDV 1 1
,.------ ------------------------------------------------- ------ --------- ----------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ --------------
1210 Printing ink, flammable 3 11/111 Tanker 0------- ------- ----------------------------------------- ------ --------- ----------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ ----------_.
1268 Petroleum nroducts 3 1/11/111 Tanker 4 1 6 1 12_______ ____________ r . _
1268 Petroleum nroducts 3 1/11/111 LDV 1 11---- __ - ~ . _
1294 Toluene 3 11 Tanker 1 1
------- -----------------------------------------------_. ------ --------- ----------- ------ ------- ---_.- ------ ------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ --------------
1300 Turnentine Substitute 3 11/111 Tanker 1 1
,------- ---~------------------------------------------------- --------- ----------- ------ ------- ------ ------ -----_. ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ --------------
1307 X'jlenes 3 111111 Tanker 1 1 21-- - _
1649 Tetra Eth'jl Lead 6.1 I Tanker 0
------- ---------- -------------------------------------- ------ --------- ----------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ --------------
1830 Sulnhuric Acid with >51 % acid 8 11 Tanker 1 11 • 1: • ._. • _
1866 Resin Solution, flammable 3 111111 Tanker 1 1 2------ ------------------------------------------------- ------ --------- ----------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ ----------_.





Danger I Config.Class I Group
The Avenue East I Joyner Road
From West I From East From North I From South
WL I ws I WR I EL I ES I ER I NL I NS I NR I SL I SS I SR
~
J~?! ~j!~~g5~~J_~Eilf~j.9Eil~~_t~~_'-i51.~~q X? : J:<:J~~~! t J _
_1~~~ T?!~!_~i_qL!~~,_l~<?!L!g!I]R~<??_~~~[>~_C!I!_'!I]~_~j!~ } I!/J!I J:<:J~~~! 1 ~ J } _
-?Q~~ $~y!~r:'~!!1_q~_qrn~!_lr:'~_i~_i!Eil~ } J!I J:<:J~~~! .1. t ~ _
_?~1~ ~_~~~~Jl~_~_~~y.q~i_q~ ? J!I J:<:J~~~! .1. ~ } _
-?~~~ ty!~!~~~-~~!p_~~~ ~--.1 J!I J:<:J~~~! .1. J ~.
3065 Icoholic Beverages 3 11/111 Tanker 0------- ------------------- ----------------------------- ------ --------. ----------- ------ ------- ------ ------ .------ ------ ------- -.---- ------ _.----- ------ --------------
}Q?! ~!1_~i~<?!1_I!l_~I]!~!ly_~?_~~~~~_u_~_~L!~~!?_n.~~!_~<?~g ? J!I J:<:J~~~! .1. J _
}Q~?_ 1:~~_thy9_~Y:?~P.~9R<:J~~!. ~ J!I I<:J~~~! 9 _
ty!l.l!~i!~~_q I<:J~~~! J L ~ _
Multiload LDV 4 1 4 2 1 3 5 3 1 24-------._------------------------------------------------ ------ --------- -.--------- ------ .------ ------ -.---. ------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------ --------------
ty!l.l!~i!~~q .I~gy 1. J
Unmarked Tanker 2 2
:E 24 I 1 I 9 I 0 I 2 I 1 I 0 I 6 I 31 I 6 I 9 I 0 I 89
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C. APPENDIX C: Estimation of Annual Traffic Volume
The eThekwini Municipality conducts manual counts of traffic volumes at intersections
within the metropolitan area. Twelve-hour counts of traffic volumes are undertaken,
usually between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. on a weekday. Twenty-four-hour, seven-day traffic
volumes were not available for the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road
intersection, or for any of the other four intersections surveyed in this investigation.
Twenty-four-hour, seven-day traffic volumes were obtained for a location within the
Durban South Basin, in reasonably close proximity to the selected intersections. This
data was analysed and the following procedure was developed to expand the twelve-
hour eThekwini Municipality intersection traffic volume count into an Annual Traffic
Volume, taking into consideration after-hours and weekend traffic.
C.1 Expansion of Twelve-Hour Count into Total Weekday Traffic Volume
The only complete data set available from the eThekwini Municipality Transport
Authority were traffic volumes taken on the M4 Southern Freeway between Duranta
Road and Himalayas Road from 00:00:00 on Wednesday 24 April 2002 until 24:00:00
on Tuesday 30 April 2002. Data for all six lanes of the M4 Southern Freeway (both
inbound and outbound carriageways) were available. Unfortunately, traffic volumes
disaggregated by vehicle type were not available.
The M4 Southern Freeway traffic volumes were analysed for each weekday in order to
calculate the After-hours percentage of total weekday traffic, Le. the proportion of the
total weekday count recorded between midnight and 6 a.m., and between 6 p.m. and
12 p.m. Figure C.1 illustrates the variation in percentage of total daily traffic recorded



































Figure C.1 : After-hours percentage of total daily traffic volume, M4 Southern Freeway
On average, 16 per-cent of the total weekday traffic volume on the M4 Southern
Freeway was recorded between midnight and 6 a.m., and between 6 p.m. and 12 p.m.
Let 0 be the percentage of the total weekday traffic volume recorded after-hours. Then:
After hours traffic volume = 8 x Total Weekday traffic volume (C.1)
Total Weekday traffic volume
= (6 a.m. to 6 p.m. traffic volume) + (After hours traffic volume) (C.2)
= (6 a.m. to 6p.m. traffic volume) + (8 x Total Weekday traffic volume)
Simplifying Equations (C.1) and (C.2), yields the formula for the total weekday traffic
volume:
Total Weekday traffic volume
(6 a.m. to 6 p.m. traffic volume)
1-8
(C.3)
A total volume of 8985 heavy vehicles entered the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South
Coast Road intersection between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. during the eThekwini Municipality
traffic count on 22 April 2002. As this traffic count was conducted relatively recently, no
steps were taken to adjust this volume to allow for growth over time.
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The assumption was made that the M4 Southern Freeway traffic volumes for all vehicle
types, are indicative of after-hours and weekend heavy-vehicle traffic within the Durban
South Basin, as no other data are available. Hence, at the Edwin Swales VC Drive -
South Coast Road intersection, the total heavy-vehicle weekday traffic volume may be
estimated as:
Total Heavy-vehicle Weekday traffic volume
Twelve-hour eThekwini Municipality traffic volume
1 - After hours percentage oftotal daily traffic volume
= 8985 Heavy vehicles = 1.19x 8985
1 - 0.16
=10692 Entering Heavy vehicles/Weekday
(CA)
C.2 Expansion of Total Weekday Traffic Volume into Annual Traffic Volume
The M4 Southern Freeway traffic volumes were also analysed to calculate the
contribution of weekend traffic volumes to the total weekly traffic volume. Figure C.2
illustrates the daily variations in traffic volume.







































Figure C.2: Daily variations in traffic volume, M4 Southern Freeway
On average, 20 per-cent of the total weekly traffic volume on the M4 Southern Freeway
was recorded on Saturday and Sunday, Le. on weekends or non-weekdays. Let f3 be
the percentage of the total weekly traffic volume recorded on weekends. Then:
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Weekend traffic volume = 13 x Total weekly traffic volume (C.5)
Total weekly traffic volume
= (5 x Total Weekday traffic volume)+ Weekend traffic volume (C.6)
= (5 x Total Weekday traffic volume)+ (13 x Total weekly traffic volume)
Simplifying Equations (C.5) and (C.6), yields the formula for the total weekly traffic
volume:
5 x Total Weekday traffic volumeTotal weekly traffic volume = -=-----=-..:::....:....:..:.:....:....:..:.-.:....:...__..:C...----::~ _
1-13
Substituting into Equation (C.5), yields:
13 x 5 x Total Weekday traffic volume
Weekend traffic volume = !...---------::.--=----
1-13
Hence, the non-weekday traffic volume may be estimated as:
Weekend traffic volume
Non-weekday traffic volume = -----=----
2
= 13 x 5 x Total Weekday traffic volume
2 x (1-13)






South Africa has twelve public holidays. Hence, there are essentially 116 non-
weekdays per year (Le. 12 public holidays + [52 weekends x 2 days per weekend]).
Thus, the annual traffic volume may be separated into 249 days of normal weekday
traffic volumes and 116 days of non-weekday traffic volumes per year (assuming no




= (249 x Total Weekday traffic volume)
+ (116 x Non-weekday traffic volume)
Substituting into Equation (C.9), yields:
Annual traffic volume
=(249 x Total Weekday traffic volume)
[ [
2.5 x f3 x Total Weekday traffic vOlume]J+ ]]6 x A
1-p
{ (




Hence, at the Edwin Swales VC Drive - South Coast Road intersection, the annual
traffic volume may be estimated as:
Annual traffic volume
{ (
290X f3)}=Total Weekday traffic volume x 249+ 1-f3
{ (
290XO.20)}=10692 Heavy vehicles/Weekday x 249 +
1-0.20
=3.44 x 106 Entering Heavy vehicles/year
(C.12)
There may be serious limitations in extrapolating the Annual Traffic Volume using the
procedure described in this appendix. Fortunately, as discussed in Section 4.1.9, the
specific manner in which the model for estimating the Dangerous Goods Accident Rate
and the Dangerous Goods Releasing Accident Rate has been formulated, resulted in
the Exposure term (measured in units of Entering Heavy vehicles/year) being
"cancelled out". However, ifthere are no heavy vehicles entering the intersection, there
will be no heavy-vehicle accidents. Thus, Exposure and Accident Rate are clearly not
independent of each other.
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D. APPENDIX D: Estimation of Emission Rate from Evaporating Pools
Kawamura & Mackay [1985] developed the following relationships to estimate the
emission rate for dangerous goods releases that form evaporating pools:
AxKm xMWxPv fir I)E = {n:g s
RxT
where:
E =evaporation rate [kg/s]
A =area of the evaporating pool [m2]
Km =mass transfer coefficient [m/s]
MW =molecular weight of the selected chemical [kg/kmol]
Pv =vapour pressure of the selected chemical [Pal
R =the gas constant (8314 J/(kmoI.K))
T =ambient temperature [K]
The mass transfer coefficient Km, is estimated as:




U =wind speed at a height of 10 m [m/s]
Z =the pool diameter in the along-wind direction [m]
Sc =the laminar Schmidt number for the selected chemical (a dimensionless ratio)





v =the kinematic viscosity of air, assumed to be 1.5 x 10-5 m2/s




Graham's Law is used to estimate the molecular diffusivity of the selected chemical in
air:







=the molecular diffusivity of water (2.4 x 10-5 m2/s at 8°C)
=the molecular weight of water (18 kg/kmol)
=the molecular weight of the selected chemical [kg/kmol]
Combining terms and simplifying yields E, the evaporation rate:
00172xAxU719 xZ-119 xMW213 xP
E = . v (kgls)
RxT
where:
E =evaporation rate [kg/s]
A =area of the evaporating pool [m2]
U =wind speed at a height of 10 m [m/s]
Z =the pool diameter in the along-wind direction [m]
MW = molecular weight of the selected chemical [kg/kmol]
Pv =vapour pressure of the selected chemical [Pal
R =the gas constant (8314 J/(kmoI.K»
T =ambient temperature [K [Kawamura & Mackay, 1985]
(D.5)
Table D.1 provides relevant chemical properties for use with Equation (D.5) when
estimating evaporation rates for the selected dangerous goods under investigation.
Table D.1: Relevant chemical properties for selected chemicals [NIOSH, 2002]
Dangerous Goods Vapour Pressure Molecular Weight
@ 20 QC [Pal [kg/kmol]
Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride 103000 20.006
~~~!~:~i!~~I~::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :1:i9:~~::::::::: ::::::::~~.:q~~::::::::
Benzene 9999 78.114
i~~p~~pyi~~i~~------ ---- ---- ----- ----- --- --- ----- 61328-- --- ---- --- ---- -59.-112 --- -----




E. APPENDIX E: Passive Methyl Isocyanate Release
E.1 Methyl Isocyanate Release at the Tara Road - Duranta Road Intersection
As discussed in Section 3.4.4, due to incorrect use of signage by the hauliers, there is
some concern as to whether Methyl Isocyanate is actually being transported through
the M4 Southern Freeway - Duranta Road and Tara Road - Duranta Road
intersections. Nevertheless, graphical risk profiles for a Methyl Isocyanate release at
the Tara Road - Duranta Road intersection are presented in this appendix.
Figure E.1 presents isopleths indicating the downwind distances to the exposure limits:
IDLH and ERPG-3 for a Methyl Isocyanate release (1 kgls emission rate) at the Tara



































Figure E.1: The extent of the impact on the area surrounding the Tara Road - Duranta
Road intersection of ground level concentrations follOWing a Methyl Isocyanate (MIC)
release (1 kg/s emission rate), using the ERPG and IDLH guidelines
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Methyl Isocyanate has a low ERPG-3 concentration of 5 ppm [NIOSH, 2002]. Figure
E.1 indicates that concentrations of Methyl Isocyanate above the ERPG-3 level may
exist as far out as 3.2 kilometres from the intersection. The ERPG-3 isopleth in Figure
E.1 covers an area of 12.7 km2 . The residential population density is relatively high in
the area surrounding the Tara Road - Duranta Road intersection. Approximately 45000
residents within the ERPG-3 isopleth are potentially at risk, and if exposed would be
expected to experience or develop life-threatening health effects. Depending on the
direction the wind is blowing towards, in the event of a large Methyl Isocyanate release
at the Tara Road - Duranta Road intersection, it is recommended that the affected
parts of the Austerville, Merewent, Wentworth, Brighton Beach and Treasure Beach
residential areas; the affected parts of the Mobeni industrial area, the Durban
International Airport, Mondi, the Engen and SAPREF oil refineries; and the affected
schools, hospitals and clinics within the ERPG-3 isopleth be evacuated until the spill
has been contained and removed. The ERPG-2 isopleth was not plotted as it extends
beyond the receptor grid chosen in ADMS™. The Emergency Response Guidebook
[2004] recommends a Protective Action Distance of 8.7 kilometres during the day and
"11 +" kilometres at night for a "large" Methyl Isocyanate spill. Depending on the wind
direction, occupants of vehicles travelling on the M4 Southern Freeway may be
exposed to high concentrations of Methyl Isocyanate for short periods of time as they
travel through and along the dispersing plume.
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